Navigating the water–energy nexus amidst the Lebanese economic crisis

Lebanon is currently in the grip of a devastating economic and financial crisis, a complex web of interconnected factors that began to unravel in October 2019. The crisis has been exacerbated by a relentless series of events, including a surge in bank deposit withdrawals, the country's first-ever sovereign debt default, the COVID-19 pandemic, socio-political unrest, the catastrophic 2020 Beirut port explosion, the far-reaching consequences of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, and the recent Israel–Hamas war (World Bank 2021; International Monetary Fund 2023; Bertassello et al. 2023b). The World Bank has grimly classified Lebanon's crisis as one of the most severe economic meltdowns globally since the mid-19th century (World Bank 2021). The situation has been further compounded by a lack of decisive policy action, hindered by a protracted political stalemate. While Lebanon had experienced liquidity shortages in the years leading up to 2019, the true fragility of its economy was concealed through financial engineering orchestrated by the central bank governor (Badra 2022). The crisis has caused the Lebanese pound to depreciate by over 98% and triple-digit hyperinflation eroded the value of the Lebanese currency (World Bank 2023). This crisis has created significant challenges for the Lebanese economy and its people. Depositors in Lebanese banks are unable to access their savings, and the crash in the value of the Lebanese pound has made it difficult for the country to pay for imports, including essential items such as fuel and wheat.

For over two decades, Lebanon's economic stability hinged on the fixed exchange rate of 1,507.5 Lebanese pounds to the US dollar, a cornerstone policy of the Lebanese central bank. Prior to the 2019 economic crisis, Electricite du Liban (EDL), the public utility responsible for electricity generation and distribution, was forced to implement rationing measures, providing residents with an average of 12–21 h of electricity per day, depending on the region. This scarcity left an indelible mark on the Lebanese population, with Beirut governate experiencing an average outage of 2.8 h daily, while the Baalbak-Hermel governorate endured outages of up to 11.5 h (Human Rights Watch 2023). Successive governments failed to address the country's underlying energy deficit, leaving residents reliant on costly private diesel generators for supplemental power (Badra 2022; Dagher & Ruble 2011; Fardoun et al. 2012; Ghanem 2018).

The year 2019 marked a turning point as the Lebanese pound began to falter under mounting pressure. The exchange rate on the parallel market surged, reaching a peak of 140,000 Lebanese pounds to the US dollar in March 2023, but it has since decreased to stabilize around 90,000 Lebanese pounds in the second half of 2023 (World Bank 2023). The impact of the crises on the energy sector was clear in 2021, especially when the Lebanese central bank ended fuel subsidies. This decision led to significant increases in fuel prices and, as a result, EDL could barely provide an average of 3 h of electricity per day (Human Rights Watch 2023). The impact on the lives of Lebanese citizens was profound, as documented by Human Rights Watch. During the crisis, Lebanese households endured an average of 9 h of daily power outages, a stark contrast to the pre-crisis era when outages were estimated at a mere average of 90 min per day (Human Rights Watch 2023). On October 9, 2021, the nation plunged into darkness for 24 h as Zahrani and Deir Ammar, the country's two largest power plants, succumbed to fuel shortages. The crisis's stranglehold on the energy sector was further underscored by a study conducted by Dagher et al. in March 2022. The study revealed that 78% of Lebanese households reported an inability to maintain adequate heating, while the average Lebanese household allocated a staggering 69% of its income to energy expenses (Dagher et al. 2023).

The economic crisis in Lebanon has had a profound impact on the energy and water sectors. The collapse of the Lebanese pound has resulted in significant increases in fuel prices, which, in turn, has led to an increase in power outages and potentially exacerbated water shortages. Lebanon currently lacks a unified database that integrates high-quality meteorological and hydrological datasets to comprehensively assess its water balance. The Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) estimates annual precipitation at 8.6 Bm³, evapotranspiration at 2.6 Bm³, and total renewable water resources at 5.98 Bm³. Of this, approximately 1.76 Bm³ leaves Lebanon through surface runoff and groundwater flows to neighboring countries or the Mediterranean Sea, leaving 4.225 Bm³ within Lebanon's borders. However, other estimates vary significantly; the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) presents a range of precipitation values, ranging from 7.8 Bm³ for a dry year to 11.9 Bm³ for a wet year. Groundwater recharge is estimated to fall between 4.1 and 6.6 Bm³, while runoff and evapotranspiration are estimated at 2.1 and 1.5 Bm³, respectively (Lebanese Ministry of Energy & Water 2014). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates total average precipitation at 8.6 Bm³, groundwater recharge at 3.2 Bm³, runoff at 4.1 Bm³, and evapotranspiration at 1.2 Bm³ (Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2008). Lebanon has historically depended on groundwater, surface water, and dams to meet its water supply needs. Groundwater is the primary source of water extraction in Lebanon, with an estimated 990 Mm³ extracted annually. Springs contribute an additional 594 Mm³ per year, while rivers and dams provide 328 Mm³ per year Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water (2020). Water use estimates in Lebanon vary across studies, ranging from 1.23 to 1.59 Bm³ per year. Agriculture is the primary water-consuming sector, accounting for 60–72% of total water use. Domestic and industrial water use account for 12–32% and 6–18%, respectively (Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water 2020; Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2008; Shaban 2020). These discrepancies highlight the need for a unified database that provides a comprehensive and consistent understanding of Lebanon's water resources, enabling informed decision-making for water management.

Lebanon's water governance landscape is characterized by a convoluted network of administrative entities, comprising state agencies, public corporations, and private actors. This institutional framework fosters overlapping responsibilities for water resource management, encompassing infrastructure development, service delivery, and regulation. Key stakeholders include the MoEW which has two departments charged with water resource management, the Directorate of Hydraulic and Electrical Resources (GDHER) and the Directorate of Exploitation (GDE), overseeing four regional water establishments (WEs): the Bekaa Water Establishment (BWE), the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMLWE), the North Lebanon Water Establishment (NLWE), and the South Lebanon Water Establishment (SLWE). Additionally, the Litani River Authority (LRA) bears specific responsibilities for managing the Litani River, particularly in the context of irrigation and hydropower generation (Eid-Sabbagh 2015). The broader institutional framework also encompasses other ministries with intersecting water-related mandates and government agencies such as the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) that have funded a considerable water-related infrastructure project (Eid-Sabbagh 2015). WEs grappled with chronic underfunding and understaffing prior to the economic crisis, stemming from inadequate fee collection. The MoEW documented fee collection rates of 63, 32, 79, and 51% for the NLWE, BWE, BMLWE, and SLWE, respectively, rendering them incapable of covering energy expenses and accumulating substantial debts to EDL and other electricity providers. This financial instability severely hampered the WEs' ability to maintain and upgrade critical infrastructure, ultimately culminating in widespread water shortages, service disruptions, and deteriorating water quality (Eid-Sabbagh 2015; Catafago & Jaber 2001).

The Lebanese economic crisis has markedly impacted water availability and security within the nation. This crisis, compounded by the country's delicate infrastructure and the substantial influx of Syrian refugees since 2011, has further strained an already struggling system, leading to a deterioration in Lebanon's water infrastructure, including distribution networks and storage facilities (Hussein et al. 2020; Müller et al. 2016; Bertassello et al. 2023a). The depreciation of the Lebanese pound, coupled with the persistent pricing of maintenance and repair materials in US dollars, has exacerbated the challenges in upholding Lebanon's water infrastructure. As a result, ensuring the provision of clean and reliable water to the Lebanese populace has become an increasingly arduous undertaking. The economic crisis has also triggered shortages of drinking water, contributing to disease outbreaks, notably witnessing the resurgence of cholera cases after decades (Sallam 2023; Berjaoui 2023).

The economic crisis has affected Lebanon's water resources in several ways, revealing a profound connection between energy and water security in the country. The economic downturn has directly impacted Lebanon's energy sector, consequently influencing water security. Multiple factors, such as climate change, population growth, and unsustainable water usage practices, threaten Lebanon's water security. Pollution and degradation further exacerbate the precarious state of water resources, significantly compromising both its quality and availability (Shaban 2020). The water–energy Nexus is a critical concept for sustainable resource management, as water distribution and extraction rely heavily on energy inputs (Copeland & Carter 2014; Maftouh 2022; Salomons et al. 2023). There is a strong interdependence between water and energy systems, and disruptions to one resource can have widespread impacts on all other resources. A quantitative assessment of the water–energy nexus at the country level in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region reveals a strong reliance on energy for water infrastructure in many parts of the region. This dependence is particularly pronounced in the Gulf countries, where 5–12% of total electricity consumption is dedicated to desalination, a process that converts seawater into freshwater (Siddiqi & Anadon 2011). The water supply sector is a major consumer of electricity and the significant energy costs associated with water provision are highlighted by the electricity bills of WEs in Lebanon. Notably, energy consumption accounts for approximately 20% of the annual budgets for both the NLWE and BMLWE. Moreover, for BMLWE, energy expenses constitute 33.6% of its operation and maintenance costs. The energy costs for BWE are even higher, reaching an estimated 36% of its total budget for 2019, which is equivalent to 47% of its overall operation and maintenance budget (Issam Fares Institute 2021). The economic crisis placed additional strain on the national power grid, which is already grappling with capacity shortages and blackouts, resulting in inadequate water supplies for domestic, industrial, and agricultural water usage in Lebanon (Lazaro et al. 2022; Hamiche et al. 2016; Dai 2018; Scott et al. 2011; Choueiri et al. 2022; Karnib 2017).

The absence of a comprehensive database of water resources in Lebanon poses a significant challenge to effective and equitable water management practices. This data scarcity is further compounded by the ongoing economic crisis, which has led to reduced staffing levels within WEs due to stagnant salaries in Lebanese Pounds, coupled with a decline in data collection and monitoring activities. As a result, municipal-level data offers a more comprehensive understanding of the economic crisis's impact on the water–energy nexus in Lebanon compared to data from WEs, whose accounts of water supply typically reflect limited population coverage rates. Moreover, a substantial portion of the Lebanese population relies on private wells outside the coverage of WEs, further highlighting the limitations of WE-derived data. Consequently, data gathered directly from local municipalities can provide a more accurate and holistic representation of water resources and supply in Lebanon, encompassing both public and private sources.

Due to the complex relationship between energy and water services in Lebanon, and the lack of studies on how the economic crisis has affected this relationship at the municipal level, this study aims to provide policymakers with a better understanding of this complex issue during a period of economic crisis and hyperinflation. The new insights provided will assist policymakers in enacting reforms that mitigate the impact of the economic crisis on water and energy. To date, there is no comprehensive study that has addressed this issue and offered an exhaustive comprehension of the water scarcity issue, along with the current adaptation strategies during the economic crisis, such as a larger reliance on solar photovoltaic (PV) in the water sector. This study intends to gather essential data from municipalities scattered across the Lebanese Governorates, recognizing that the impact varies significantly based on multiple factors, including the available energy sources, municipal funding sources, and the management policies implemented in each municipality to navigate the evolving economic crisis. This study examines how a severe economic crisis affects water supply and leads to the proliferation of informal tanker water markets (TWMs). Understanding the dynamics of water–energy nexus in the global South, especially during periods of hyperinflation, is becoming increasingly important. Furthermore, the economic crisis has prompted a growing consideration of renewable energy, particularly solar PV systems, in residential, commercial, and industrial energy production and in various applications across the water extraction and distribution sector. This study highlights the close links between Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) and SDG7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) in Lebanon, emphasizing the importance of addressing water and energy management together to achieve sustainable development. While progress toward SDG6 has been notable in many parts of the world (Grafton et al. 2023), this study demonstrates how Lebanon's economic crisis is hindering SDG6 attainment. This study is expected to make a significant contribution to our understanding of the water–energy nexus in Lebanon and to the development of effective policies to address the challenges posed by the economic crisis.

Data were collected from 150 municipalities across Lebanon, including all nine governates. Respondents included municipal officials or municipality-affiliated engineers or employees. We administered a structured questionnaire and conducted inperson interviews from February until September 2023. We explained the study objectives to respondents and obtained their consent to participate. The interviews lasted approximately 30 min. Completing the questionnaire was voluntary and anonymous, and we did not offer any incentives. The Lebanese American University's Institutional Review Board approved this study. A detailed list of surveyed municipalities is available in Supplementary information.

This survey targets municipalities instead of individual households or other governmental agencies. According to the MoEW, the WEs provide 57% of the country's water supply, their coverage of the population is limited, with 33% for NLWE, 52% for BWE, 92% for BMLWE, and 66% for SLWE (Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water 2020). There are an estimated 1,615 public wells distributed across the different WEs. However, a significant portion of the population relies on private wells, estimated at around 85,000, which are not covered by the WEs (Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water 2020). Among the registered private wells, 2,888 have exploitation permits, while 17,649 have drilling licenses but no exploitation permits (Lebanese Ministry of Energy & Water 2014). Leveraging data directly from local municipalities ensures comprehensive coverage of both public and private water resources, as municipal officials possess extensive knowledge of private wells due to their deep-rooted connections within the community. Municipalities, being under the purview of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, are uniquely positioned to provide highly accurate estimates of water resources and supply. Their status as local administrative entities empowers them to grant or withhold permits, effectively approving or denying water and energy-related projects. Municipalities provide more comprehensive coverage regarding energy sources because private diesel generators and renewable energy projects, particularly residential solar PV and solar water heating, are not within the purview of EDL. In addition, Lebanon's lack of a centralized water resource database impedes effective and equitable water management practices. This data shortage is exacerbated by the ongoing economic crisis, which has resulted in reduced staffing levels at WEs due to stagnant Lebanese Pound salaries, along with a decline in data collection and monitoring efforts. Consequently, municipal-level data provides a more comprehensive understanding of the economic crisis's impact on the water–energy nexus in Lebanon. Besides, conducting a municipal survey is more efficient and effective for gathering data on water resources and supply compared to surveying individual households. Household data on water usage and access can vary widely, making municipal-level data collection more reliable. Municipal surveys can reach all residents within a municipality, ensuring a more representative sample of the population. This study surveyed 150 municipalities, representing over 80% of Lebanon's population, including major cities like Beirut and Tripoli. The data collected covers 78% of the total water supply in Lebanon. The sample size indicates a margin of error of 7.5%.

However, the study's scope is constrained by several factors. Firstly, the participation of municipalities was restricted in the governorates of Baalbek-Hermel (three municipalities) and Akkar (four municipalities). Secondly, data collection occurred within a specific timeframe, between February and September 2023. Additionally, the water and energy data requested from municipalities covers the period between February and April 2023, potentially limiting the generalizability of findings beyond this period. Thirdly, the study was exclusively conducted in Lebanon, thus potentially limiting its applicability and comparability to other countries. On the other hand, the insights gained from this research can inform similar urban areas facing economic instability and water–energy challenges. The study's methodology and results provide valuable lessons for policymakers and researchers in other regions dealing with similar issues. However, it is essential to consider the unique context of Lebanon when applying these findings to other countries. Finally, the reliance on self-reported data from municipalities introduces potential human error. Consequently, it is essential to interpret the study's findings bearing these constraints in mind.

While data collection occurred from February until September 2023, the questionnaire sought information from municipalities regarding data during the economic crisis, encompassing the period between February and April of 2023, and data before the economic crisis covering the same period in 2019. It specifically requested details on various aspects, including the amount and sources of water supplied, the reliance on conventional and unconventional water sources, the percentage of the population relying on water tanker trucks, the energy consumption for water extraction and distribution using public utility (EDL), private generators, and solar PV, as well as the adoption rates of solar water heaters and solar PV systems in households. The data sought encompassed: the hours of water supply per week, the total volume of water supplied in cubic meters per year, the volumes from conventional and unconventional sources, the percentage of the population depending on water tanker trucks, the energy required for water extraction and distribution, and the percentages of households equipped with solar water heating and solar PV systems. In addition, the data collected requested information on water expenditure from municipal budgets.

Even in governates where the water supply exceeds 49 h per week, a significant challenge persists as a substantial portion of the population in major cities lacks connection to the public water network. For instance, in Tripoli, only 36% of residential units are connected to the public water grid. The decline in water supply in Lebanon is attributed to the decrease in energy provision from EDL and the high cost of diesel fuel for private generators. In fact, the significant depreciation of the Lebanese pound has potentially further exacerbated the situation, as fuel prices are linked to international oil prices, which are denominated in US dollars. Consequently, both public WEs and private providers have experienced a reduction in their capacity to extract, distribute, and treat water due to the energy constraints. As a result, there has been a notable increase in dependence on water tankers during the economic crisis.

The study underscores the profound interconnectedness of energy and water security, particularly amidst economic turmoil. It highlights the pressing need for holistic reforms within Lebanon's water and energy sectors. A centralized, unified database encompassing both public and private water and energy sources is paramount. Moreover, comprehensive policies are required to revamp the water and energy sectors and curtail their reliance on fossil fuels. These reforms should incentivize public and private investments that tackle the intertwined challenges of energy and water provision in Lebanon, safeguarding sustainable access to these critical resources for its population.

Lebanon's economic crisis has exposed the complex link between energy and water security. This study has delved into this critical nexus, drawing upon primary survey data from municipalities across the country to elucidate the causal relationship between energy dependence and water availability and affordability. The findings paint a sobering picture of a water sector in dire straits, with the average weekly water supply plummeting from 49 h pre-crisis to a mere 22 h in 2023. This precipitous decline has been accompanied by a surge in reliance on water tankers, underscoring a concerning shift in water acquisition methods. The study further highlights the untapped potential of renewable energy sources in mitigating the crisis. Solar PV systems have witnessed a remarkable rise, from a meager 3.3% to a significant 16.6% share of total water supply. This trend has been further amplified within the water sector itself, with solar PV adoption reaching 4.8% for water extraction from underground reservoirs and 2.8% for water distribution. Similarly, the utilization of solar water heaters has jumped from 7.9% pre-crisis to a notable 15.4% in 2023. Considering these findings, the study underscores the pressing need for comprehensive policies and investments that address the interconnected challenges of energy and water provision in Lebanon. The future of Lebanon's water security hinges on its ability to break free from its reliance on conventional energy sources and embrace sustainable alternatives. Failure to do so will only perpetuate the cycle of water scarcity and exacerbate the plight of its population.

The authors acknowledge the advisory support provided by Prof. Heinrich Joh. Wörtche (Sensors and Smart Systems – Research Center Biobased Economy, Hanze University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands).

All relevant data are included in the paper or its Supplementary Information.

The authors declare there is no conflict.