Violence committed by non-State armed groups has displaced over 250,000 people in the Diffa region of Niger and crippled the regional economy. The humanitarian response included substantial investment in water infrastructure which has largely alleviated the immediate needs of displacement-affected populations. However, ongoing insecurity threatens the sustainability of these rural water services. A systems-thinking approach to explain the interaction between different sustainability factors for rural water services is advocated by a growing body of literature, but is almost exclusively focused on stable contexts. The applied research reported here adopted a qualitative assessment methodology to determine the impact of the insecurity in Diffa on these sustainability factors. Twenty-five respondents from government, water management structures, donors, and non-governmental organisations were interviewed between March and June 2021. The research demonstrated that insecurity in Diffa impacts negatively on all sustainability factors for rural water services and impedes access, coordination, and communication by and between relevant actors. The overlapping humanitarian and development contexts and the push to implement a triple nexus approach – which includes peace as its third element – raise dilemmas concerning the application of water tariffs, the durability of water infrastructure, and the suitability of a community-based approach to water management.

  • The insecurity in Diffa, Niger (part of the Lake Chad Basin) impacts negatively on all the sustainability factors for community-based water management and the functionality of rural water services.

  • A humanitarian-development-peace triple nexus approach requires actors to grapple with the contextual complexities and confront several dilemmas that affect how sustainability of rural water services may be achieved.

Graphical Abstract

Graphical Abstract
Graphical Abstract

Diffa and the Lake Chad Basin crisis

The Diffa region of Niger has a population of around 700,000 and is located over 1,000 km from Niger's capital city, Niamey, bordering Chad to the east and Nigeria to the south (Figure 1). Development indicators in Diffa are below the national average (Lake Chad Multidisciplinary Expert Meeting 2019) of a country ranking lowest in the 2019 Human Development Index (UNDP 2020). The cross-border water bodies – Lake Chad and the Komadougou-Yobe River – and adjacent land are critical to local livelihoods (Vivekananda et al. 2019).
Figure 1

The Diffa region of Niger, Lake Chad basin.

Figure 1

The Diffa region of Niger, Lake Chad basin.

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Non-state armed groups, commonly known as Boko Haram,1 began making substantial territorial gains in north-east Nigeria and border areas from 2010 (International Crisis Group 2019). Subsequently, extreme violence has provoked the displacement of over 2.5 million people in the Lake Chad basin, creating one of the world's worst humanitarian crises (Lake Chad Multidisciplinary Expert Meeting 2019). The first attack by Boko Haram on Nigerian soil occurred in February 2015, and recurrent attacks and kidnappings up to the present time have led to more than 250,000 refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons seeking refuge in the Diffa region, largely in a series of sites strung out along National Highway 1 (International Crisis Group 2017; UNOCHA 2021). This insecurity, and measures implemented by the Nigerian government to combat it, have crippled the economic activity in the region by restricting access to productive land and fisheries, transport, and cross-border trade (International Crisis Group 2019).

Diffa WASH response

Niger's Water Law enshrines the right to safe, accessible, and affordable water for all citizens, while adopting a user-pays approach (République du Niger 2010). Rural water services (RWS) in rural areas of Niger are the responsibility of the Commune (aided by an independent support/advisory structure), with technical support from the Water/Sanitation Department. Village water management committees are formed to manage hand pumps, while the operation of piped systems is assigned to delegated managers accountable to local water users associations (Maiga 2016). Both systems can be classified under the broad category of community-based water management (CBWM).

The WASH infrastructure in Diffa was already insufficient prior to the Lake Chad Basin crisis – 46.2% of Diffa's population had access to an improved water source, 11.9% of water infrastructure was non-functional, and 3.2% had access to a hygienic latrine (République du Niger 2013) – and has been overwhelmed since. Investment by government, donors, and more than 20 international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) associated with the Diffa WASH Cluster has largely addressed the immediate water needs of displaced and host populations. Large gaps remain, however, in terms of the durability of water points (with 30% non-functional in 2017), the quality of water, and access in areas with more challenging hydrogeology (UNOCHA 2017, 2018).

A qualitative evaluation of the WASH response (Caremel 2018) found that the multiplication of water points has created several problems that threaten sustainability, including the over-supply and divergent models of water points in some locations, lack of community ownership, limited functionality of CBWM structures, and private appropriation of water points. Hand-drilled boreholes with hand pumps have a very high failure rate and the role of the State in maintaining these water points after NGOs have left is unclear.

Although predominantly financed as part of the humanitarian response, the sustainability of these new RWS is critical. Key to this is ensuring that ongoing operation and maintenance is adequately funded and implemented.

The triple nexus and the WASH sector

The humanitarian-development-peace (triple) nexus gained prominence in discussions around the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 2016, and has come to dominate global discourse over recent years, including in Niger.2 Its aim is ‘to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict’ (OECD 2020, p. 6) by bridging the gap between humanitarian and development responses, addressing the underlying causes of emergencies (Redvers 2019a) and confronting systemic or structural issues that have created silos between the different sectors (Redvers 2019b).

Although the nexus objectives of reducing reliance on short-term humanitarian aid and restoring the peace that is essential for development to occur are uncontested, implementation is far from straightforward. Humanitarian actors fear that the nexus will compromise their humanitarian principles. Conversely, development actors fear that implementation risks are too high in fragile and insecure contexts and that the urgency of a humanitarian crisis does not leave enough time to implement the studies, engagement, and planning that are pre-requisite for longer-term success (Oxfam 2019).

Mason & Mosello (2016) highlighted the differences between humanitarian and development WASH interventions. Humanitarian WASH traditionally has a short-term focus and implementation period, aims to achieve minimum humanitarian standards, is supply driven, and accepts free or subsidised services. In contrast, development WASH has a long-term focus on durable results, works towards the Sustainable Development Goals, and encourages community contributions to build ownership. Of particular interest for this paper, Mason & Mosello (2016) note that the development assumption that communities can manage water infrastructure without outside help does not hold true in fragile, conflict-affected settings. Humanitarian actors need to learn to invest in the enabling environment, in particular local government and the private sector, if CBWM is to be sustainable.

CBWM and the sustainability of RWS

Since the 1980s, CBWM has been the dominant paradigm for the management of RWS in developing nations (Moriarty et al. 2013; Hutchings et al. 2015), including Niger, despite a lack of concrete success (Foster et al. 2020). While isolated examples of successful CBWM do exist, these are due to unique local factors and have not been replicated on a wider scale (Lockwood & Smit 2011).

Many authors have attempted to list and define the various factors that must be present for RWS sustainability, which include finances, external support, community, management, governance, technical, and environmental issues (Valcourt et al. 2020). There is growing recognition of the interconnected nature of these factors and the need for a systems-thinking approach to achieving sustainable RWS (Liddle & Fenner 2017; Bonsor et al. 2018). Walters & Javernick-Will's (2015) causal loop diagram (shown in blue in Figure 2) demonstrates the interconnectedness of the sustainability factors. The positive nature of all causal influences and feedback loops means that an increase in one factor will favour an increase in all connected factors and improved functionality of the water service over time (a virtuous feedback loop), and vice versa (a vicious feedback loop).
Figure 2

Theoretical framework: Insecurity has a negative impact on the sustainability factors for RWS – builds on the causal loop diagram in blue developed by Walters & Javernick-Will (2015, Figure 1, p. 5038). Please refer to the online version of this paper to see this figure in colour: https://dx.doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2023.124.

Figure 2

Theoretical framework: Insecurity has a negative impact on the sustainability factors for RWS – builds on the causal loop diagram in blue developed by Walters & Javernick-Will (2015, Figure 1, p. 5038). Please refer to the online version of this paper to see this figure in colour: https://dx.doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2023.124.

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However, the literature focuses almost exclusively on stable development contexts as ‘countries in (post)-conflict situations or so-called ‘fragile states’… pose very specific challenges for governance and sector capacity for the delivery of sustainable rural water supply that go beyond the scope’ of most studies (Lockwood 2019, p. 16). It is hypothesised that the insecurity and fragility found in contexts such as Diffa have a negative influence on all sustainability factors, and this has been superimposed on the causal loop diagram in Figure 2 to form the theoretical framework for this study. This hypothesis is consistent with a nascent body of grey literature (UNICEF 2019; SIWI/UNICEF 2020; Tillett et al. 2020) examining the impacts of a fragile context on WASH systems.

This paper aims to further the understanding of how insecurity in a context characterised by complex and overlapping humanitarian and development needs – as encountered in the Diffa region of Niger – influences CBWM and the sustainability of RWS.

The applied research adopted a qualitative assessment methodology typical of case studies to address the key research questions (Neuman 2006). A mixed research approach was discounted because security and logistical constraints meant that the collection of quantitative data was not feasible. A non-probability sampling technique – purposive sampling (Berndt 2020) – was used to identify 25 respondents belonging to the four main stakeholder groups involved in the management of RWS in Diffa, with whom 19 semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and six focus group discussions (FGDs) were undertaken:

  • Four SSIs with senior representatives of local government – Communes and Water/Sanitation Department (GOV1-GOV4).

  • Eight SSIs with country directors and WASH managers from international and local NGOs implementing humanitarian and/or development WASH projects in Diffa and/or elsewhere in Niger (NGO1–NGO8).

  • Five SSIs with senior organisational representatives from international donors and UN agencies funding humanitarian and/or development WASH projects in Diffa (DON1–DON5).

  • Two SSIs and six FGDs with CBWM structures – delegated managers and members of water management committees and water users associations (MAN1–MAN8).

The SSIs were conducted by the lead author between March and June 2021, predominantly in Diffa and Niamey. Most interviews were conducted in French and recorded, then translated and transcribed into English. The CBWM structures were interviewed through FGDs conducted in six villages in March 2021. These villages were selected for their relative safety3 (due to their proximity to Diffa town), and FGDs were conducted by experienced local community WASH mobilisers (one female, one male). The FGDs were conducted in Kanuri with field notes made in French, then translated into English.

The field data was analysed following Braun & Clarke's (2006) six step thematic analysis approach to identify, analyse, and report patterns or themes within qualitative research data. NVivo was used to code data for themes derived using a theory-driven/targeted approach from the research questions and the theoretical framework, with some additional themes (data-driven/inductive) identified in the data during coding (Thomas & Harden 2008). Tables were used to help further group and organise issues raised by each respondent into the different themes, providing an overall summary of the results presented in the following section. Questionnaires and tables of results are provided in the Supplementary data.

The research was undertaken as part of the requirements for a Master of Integrated Water Management through the International WaterCentre at Griffith University and the above methodology was approved by the Griffith University Ethical Review Committee. It is noted that the lead author works for an international NGO that is actively involved in the Diffa WASH response, and personally knows many of the respondents. Although every effort was made to avoid it, there is potential for conscious or unconscious bias to have influenced the interviewing and analysis process.

This section summarises the data collected from the SSIs and FGDs, with selective quotations used to illustrate key issues drawn out by the data analysis. The results, which are shown graphically in Figure 3, clearly demonstrate the adverse effect that the insecurity present in Diffa has on access, coordination, and communication, which in turn impact negatively on all Walters & Javernick-Will's (2015) sustainability factors.
Figure 3

The conflict and insecurity in the Diffa region impact negatively on the sustainability factors for RWS (blue), while implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus presents several dilemmas (orange) to practitioners. Please refer to the online version of this paper to see this figure in colour: https://dx.doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2023.124.

Figure 3

The conflict and insecurity in the Diffa region impact negatively on the sustainability factors for RWS (blue), while implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus presents several dilemmas (orange) to practitioners. Please refer to the online version of this paper to see this figure in colour: https://dx.doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2023.124.

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Cross-cutting impacts of insecurity

Access

Fear of attacks by Boko Haram or of being caught in a military patrol (MAN1) limits the areas that WASH actors can reach, the frequency and duration of trips, and the efficiency of the work being undertaken. ‘We are permanently menaced. Each trip we put our lives in danger, each time we expose ourselves’ (MAN2). NGO5 concludes that monitoring visits by local government and technical services are irregular and ‘lightning’, there is difficulty in attracting contractors, work is rushed, NGO security protocols mean they ‘don't have much time’ in the field, and delegated managers are often absent.

Coordination

The crisis caused by Boko Haram attacks saw a rapid influx of humanitarian actors into the Diffa region. The Commune Development Plans were ‘put to one side due to the urgency’ (GOV4) and standard pre-crisis development procedures were suspended (GOV2). Local government structures were frequently bypassed during the somewhat chaotic opening stanza of the humanitarian WASH response in Diffa (GOV2). The WASH Cluster Working Group was formed in mid-2015 under the joint leadership of the Water/Sanitation Department and UNICEF (GOV1), taking the lead on data collection and analysis, needs assessments, and tracking and matching gaps and responses (DON5), leading to a significant improvement in coordination and communication by early 2016 (GOV2).

However, despite the ‘remarkable level of implication and involvement by all the WASH actors’ (GOV1), coordination remained a challenge. ‘In Diffa, for emergency responses, it's quite difficult because there are hundreds of other humanitarian organisations working in the same sector, in the same area’ (NGO1). Often this means that there are several actors working in the same site, constructing different types of water points and adopting differing approaches to CBWM (NGO1). ‘You can go to a site with 10 water points and find 10 committees, and this is not a good thing. This can create a conflict between the different committees’ (NGO5).

Communication

There is a paucity of reporting and information at all levels of the water management system. While some of the problems can be traced back to a lack of financial base and access challenges, there are also structural challenges to good communication between the different actors:

  • Communication within the community is hindered by a lack of social cohesion.

  • Communication between the CBWM structures and the community is limited by the low capacity of the former, and the perceived risk that transparent communication (particularly around finances) poses to committee members (NGO7).

  • Communication between the water users association and delegated managers is strained because the relationship between the two begins with and revolves around the collection of water tariffs (NGO3). Payment modalities are often not clearly understood and accepted by the community before the delegated manager assumes service (MAN1).

  • Communication between the delegated manager and the NGO is mostly non-existent as the former is not appointed by the Commune until the NGO has handed over the completed water system and is phasing out its interventions in the village (NGO5).

  • Communication between the delegated manager and the local government is hindered by the lack of physical presence of some delegated managers in Diffa and the irregularity in reporting (GOV3). A support/advisory structure that should help with monitoring and reporting has not been recruited due to insufficient funds (GOV4).

Impact of insecurity on sustainability factors

Government

Two specific criticisms are levelled at government actors regarding water management: inadequate monitoring visits to the field, and failure to comply with prescribed reporting requirements (GOV1). ‘Everyone complains that the Communes don't submit annual reports, there is no systematic transmission of information [which should underpin good water governance]. But this is because there is one actor who has not been recruited in Diffa region’ (GOV1). This missing actor is an advisory/support structure that should be recruited by the Commune to support it in monitoring and reporting on RWS (GOV3). Unfortunately, the funds generated through water tariffs are insufficient to recruit this agent, and government actors often ‘don't have the means to go to the field and verify what is happening’ (GOV3).

The roles and responsibilities regarding water management in Niger are clearly prescribed in various texts and policies and are well known by the actors concerned. However, ‘the legal water code and all the texts in Niger were elaborated based on development principles. It does not have a humanitarian spirit’ (NGO7). In fact, ‘there is no policy today which defines how to deal with WASH in a humanitarian situation’ (NGO8). This creates confusion around the financial contributions required of water users in a context of economic fragility, with an apparent impasse between the legal obligation to pay for water and the population's incapacity to do so. Attempts have been made to find a solution through consultation between government and NGO actors, but there is ‘no unanimity in the approach’ that should be adopted (NGO1).

Community

Boko Haram attacks and the resultant population movements have disrupted traditional community dynamics in the Diffa region, forcing host and displaced populations from diverse backgrounds to coexist within the same site. ‘There is not the same understanding or social cohesion to the same degree as we see in other populations’ (NGO1) and ‘the notion of community, which the classical model assumes’ (DON1) is invalid. Consequently, community structures and leadership are confused, and ‘there is no synergy, there is no sense of common cause that unites everyone’ (NGO3).

This divergence creates tensions within a site, which are expressed in various ways:

  • Difficulty in electing committee members to represent the combined population (NGO1).

  • Reluctance to participate in CBWM due to mistrust of the wider community (NGO7).

  • Refusal of some groups to pay for water (MAN1).

  • Problems between traditionally rival communities obliged to cohabit the same site (NGO3).

  • Poor community ownership of common-pool resources (NGO2).

Mobility of communities and individuals continues to be one of the defining characteristics of the Diffa context. ‘You can drill a borehole in Diffa in a locality that is going to be attacked and that people are going to leave. Then you have no more community around the water’ (DON1). Individuals too are highly mobile, frequently moving due to economic (NGO2) or security (MAN2) considerations, creating challenges for consistency of committee membership (NGO5). Those remaining are hampered by ‘psychological fear’ (MAN1) and ‘deprived of all income-generating activities’ (MAN2), making ‘the perspective of planning for the years ahead …. somewhat abstract and irrelevant’ (DON1).

External support

The greatest form of external support provided to water management in Diffa is the huge investment in new water infrastructure and training of CBWM structures and pump technicians (GOV1) that has been made by humanitarian actors since 2014. However, the lack of post-project support raises concerns as to the sustainability of the water services. ‘Maintenance, who will look after the maintenance? The humanitarians construct and then leave, but who will look after it later?’ (GOV4).

Many NGOs and donors take the stance that their ‘job is already done’ (DON2) once the infrastructure is handed over to the community and the Commune. With short-duration humanitarian projects, the time allocated for follow-up is extremely limited. ‘This is a problem that all the emergency partners have. The project finishes tomorrow, and it is today that we hand over the water point. There is no time and no funding to monitor’ (NGO5).

Other NGOs seek to undertake occasional post-project monitoring where possible. Where repairs exceed the capacity of the community some NGOs feel that they ‘must return to repair. Sometimes you must return to the same system two or three times to repair it. You financed the infrastructure, and now you wait for a new project to insert a budget line for rehabilitation’ (NGO6).

Management

Although the theoretical roles of the different actors are clear, many respondents feel that other actors are not playing their role fully. This impacts adversely on the outcomes of water management, which is described at times as ‘chaotic’ and ‘anarchic’ (GOV2).

  • Local government actors are hindered by insufficient human and logistical resources, and consequently do not monitor regularly enough to ensure that management structures are working (NGO1).

  • Water management committees are lacking for many hand pumps and, where present, ‘the convention [with the Commune] is often not signed, and even if there is a signed convention the Commune often doesn't find the means to undertake monitoring visits. This means that community management doesn't work’ (GOV2).

  • Water users associations should act as ‘police’ (GOV1) or ‘referees’ (MAN1) to ‘regulate the functioning of the local water supply’ (GOV1) and ‘defend the interests of the villages’ (GOV3) for systems that have been placed under delegated management. However, most ‘are not playing their role, they don't even know what their role is … There are certain villages where the association doesn't even exist’ (MAN1).

  • Delegated managers of larger systems often have an adversarial relationship with the communities over payment for and access to the water service (MAN1), which is compounded by poor communication with the population (NGO3).

  • A support/advisory structure should be recruited by the Commune using the funds generated through the sale of water to assist in monitoring and reporting of the RWS, ‘but this does not function at all’ (GOV4) because ‘the Commune says that they don't have the means to pay them’ (MAN1).

  • NGOs play a significant role in water management in Diffa, although they are outside the formal framework. All NGO respondents affirm that water infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated by their organisation is accompanied by training of a CBWM structure. In contrast, there is minimal contact between NGOs and delegated managers (NGO1), as the Commune typically appoints the delegated manager after the NGO's project (and funding) is finished.

Financial

Respondents are unanimous that financial resources must be available to pay for the operation, maintenance, extension, and eventual replacement of water services. ‘You have to collect money one way or another’ (DON1), and in the case of Niger that is through the principle of ‘user-pays’ (DON2). However, the economic fragility of the Diffa population means that ‘we are confronted with a problem for the payment of water, because these people have nothing. We can push them to pay, but they don't have anything to pay with’ (GOV2).

Non-payment by certain individuals or communities has an adverse impact on the willingness of others to pay, contributes to intra- and inter-community tensions, and makes it difficult for those charged with collecting water fees (MAN1). Failure to generate sufficient funds through the sale of water has several direct repercussions on the sustainability of RWS:

  • ‘There are very few committees who have funds, so when the water point breaks down there is a serious problem’ (GOV2).

  • Delegated managers struggle to cover costs, make a profit, and make their contractual payments to the Commune (MAN2). Consequently, repairs to water services take a long time (GOV3), with the least profitable systems being most at risk of neglect (NGO4).

  • ‘The balance of the Commune's renewal and extension fund is low (thus jeopardising the long-term replacement of assets), does not cover the monitoring and functioning costs of the Commune, and does not allow them to pay the advisory/support structure’ (GOV1) who should be responsible for monitoring and reporting.

Where payment is made, several respondents raised the logistical and security challenge of collecting and storing money. Anyone involved in financial management ‘will be reluctant to hold onto the money collected because he is afraid that thieves will come in the night to steal it’ (GOV3). For this reason, what money is collected is hidden and there is no transparency in financial management (NGO7).

Environment and energy

While the accessibility and quality of groundwater in most parts of the region has greatly facilitated the humanitarian response, superficial aquifers in areas towards Lake Chad are characterised by high salinity and are unsuitable for human consumption (GOV1). In these locations, deep (and costly) boreholes are required to tap into the underlying ‘sweet’ aquifers, but these are difficult to fund and construct in an unstable and insecure environment (NGO6).

Technology, construction, and materials

The early humanitarian response in Diffa was characterised by a rapid multiplication of low-cost, hand-drilled boreholes to meet the immediate water needs of displaced populations. Although they ‘played an important role in responding to the emergency water need’ (GOV1), the short lifespan of hand-drilled boreholes meant that ‘they weren't counted in [government] statistics for improved access to potable water’ (DON2). The generally poor quality of the boreholes (sand infiltration) and of the hand pumps (corrosion) (NGO1) places a huge strain on community management, because ‘if you hand over a poor-quality water point to a committee … there will be lots of repairs and, with their weak financial capacity, it is a water point that is destined to fail’ (NGO5).

A desire to construct more durable infrastructure (DON2), particularly in larger sites, saw the humanitarian response evolve towards machine-drilled boreholes equipped with submersible pumps. Here again, ensuring consistent quality was a challenge as insecurity restricted supervision and limited the number of contractors willing to work in the zone (GOV3).

Insecurity also impacts on the recruitment of qualified technicians (MAN2) and on their mobility within the region (MAN1). While many pump technicians have been trained, they are often ill-equipped, and ‘there are many difficulties related to the security, the distance of certain centres, and the availability of spare parts on the local market’ (DON4).

Water system functionality

While cases of vandalism by Boko Haram do occur (NGO3), theft of pumps, generators, and solar panels is much more prevalent. ‘In the night, the people are afraid. They hear a noise and are afraid it is Boko Haram, but really they are bandits. Because of the situation there is no-one around and the thieves exploit this void’ (GOV3). Actual or feared attacks by Boko Haram have caused already displaced populations to flee many sites, abandoning water points that were constructed as part of the earlier humanitarian response. Initially, the abandoned infrastructure was stolen, but some has also been proactively removed by the Communes (GOV4).

The effect of this on the functionality of RWS is devastating, with many water systems being put out of service, leading to the conclusion that ‘the problem in Diffa is that, especially in terms of WASH, more is wasted than good’ (NGO3). Ambiguity around the responsibility for replacing stolen assets (GOV3, GOV4) complicates the required response, and even if funding were available there is considerable risk ‘because we have no guarantee that it will remain if we rehabilitate it’ (DON5).

Triple nexus sustainability conundrums

This research reveals several points where attempts to implement a triple nexus approach to achieve sustainable results pose a particular dilemma to WASH actors from traditional humanitarian and development backgrounds (Figure 3).

Payment vs access

Respondents recognise that ‘water points must be financially self-sufficient to cover maintenance and repairs’ (NGO5). However, in the Diffa context of vulnerability and economic fragility a user-pays approach to water risks excluding the most vulnerable. This apparent conflict between guaranteeing access for the most vulnerable and ensuring the sustainability of the water service is ‘the oxymoron of humanitarianism versus nexus’ (DON1), and something that many actors are struggling to grapple with. Three contradictory approaches to this were encountered. Some respondents align themselves as closely as possible to national development policy by actively promoting financial contributions from the community (NGO2). Some refuse to ask for water payments as they constitute ‘a violation of the humanitarian principles’ (DON1), while others occupy a more pragmatic middle ground: ‘we leave the Commune to manage it… We think that it is useful to pay for water, but as humanitarians we are not directly involved in this’ (NGO5).

Durable infrastructure vs persistent insecurity

The early humanitarian response drew criticism from some quarters for its over-reliance on low-cost, short-lifespan, and low-quality water infrastructure. With a nexus optic of sustainability, the response evolved towards more expensive and more durable water points. However, much of this infrastructure has subsequently been badly hit by theft and vandalism or has been abandoned altogether as populations have fled renewed attacks to settle in new sites.

This raises the question as to whether this shift towards durability was the right strategy in the Diffa context. ‘It is really a paradox. We prefer to construct water points in the sense of the nexus, but it just needs a little problem, and the population will leave this infrastructure behind. Even worse, there are people who come and steal the solar panels and submersible pumps; the only thing they can't take is the water tower. We are in the nexus, but we have difficulties’ (GOV2).

Community-based approach vs lack of social cohesion

There is widespread recognition that CBWM is not working well and that the lack of social cohesion inherent within forcibly displaced and mixed populations is at the origin of many of the problems. Despite this, all respondents adopted the principles of CBWM in their WASH interventions in Diffa. This aligns with government policy and is an important part of NGO and donor's exit strategy ‘even if it doesn't always work’ (NGO5). While a humanitarian NGO can make some attempt to resolve inter-community disputes and improve community cohesion, ultimately ‘a NGO can't take the lead on this. It is the responsibility of the Commune’ (NGO6).

The literature clearly describes the difficulty of achieving sustainability of RWS in sub-Saharan Africa through CBWM, even in stable, development contexts. The research presented in this paper, summarised in Figure 3, highlights the additional challenges in fragile contexts characterised by protracted conflict, such as the Diffa region of Niger, where insecurity impacts negatively on all sustainability factors. It is clearly unrealistic to apply classical development approaches to the management of RWS, which struggle at the best of times, in a context of conflict and insecurity and to expect success. It is equally clear that strictly humanitarian and temporary life-saving approaches will not help transition out of a protracted crisis by ensuring the sustainability of RWS.

In regions such as Diffa where critical humanitarian emergencies overlap with and compound chronic underdevelopment challenges, and where peace is sorely lacking, a triple nexus approach has obvious appeal and is being heavily promoted. However, WASH actors have struggled to navigate several nexus quandaries, such as how financial sustainability of RWS can be achieved without jeopardising access, when to invest in durable infrastructure without a guarantee of security, and how to implement a CBWM approach when social cohesion has been severely disrupted.

The overarching conclusion from this research is that contexts such as Diffa are inherently complex, and that attempting to provide sustainable RWS to the vulnerable host and displaced populations living there is even more so. In this ‘swampy lowland [of] messy, confusing problems [that] defy technical solution’ (Schön 1987, p. 3) WASH actors at all levels must recognise that the triple nexus is not a magic bullet.

Nonetheless, real opportunities exist for humanitarian and development actors to work more closely together to enhance outcomes and provide greater reliability of RWS for vulnerable communities in Diffa and similar conflict-affected contexts elsewhere. Possibilities suggested by this research include the promotion of income generating and livelihood activities, measures to build social cohesion, adaptation of development-based water policies, and strengthening of CBWM structures and their links to local government and delegated managers. Ultimately, however, expectations around the sustainability of RWS in a protracted humanitarian crisis need to be realistic. Insecurity and conflict disrupt coordination, communication and access and adversely affect all the normal sustainability factors. In the absence of peace, the third leg of the triple nexus, no approach can give guaranteed results.

Data cannot be made publicly available; readers should contact the corresponding author for details.

The authors declare there is no conflict.

1

The group has subsequently splintered into several factions following internal disputes (International Crisis Group 2019). For simplicity and in keeping with common usage, Boko Haram will be used in this paper to refer to all non-state armed groups operating in the Lake Chad basin.

2

For example, the inclusion of the nexus as a key response strategy in the 2021 Niger Humanitarian Response Plan (UNOCHA 2021).

3

It is recognised that the results from the FGDs in these locations may be unrepresentative of more remote and insecure locations. This potential skewing of results is compensated for through the SSIs with actors working throughout the Diffa region.

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