Accounting for solidarity: trust and results as a replacement of contracts in water operators’ partnerships

Water operators' partnerships (WOPs) concern ‘a peer-support exchange between two or more water or sanitation operators’ aimed at improving the performance of the involved water operators (UN-Habitat, 2018: p. 1). WOPs emerged as a strategy for building capacities of water supply and sanitation utilities through the Hashimoto Action Plan, which was published by the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation in 2006 (UNSGAB 2006). A unique feature of the WOPs is that the partnership is based on sharing skills, knowledge, and experience on a not-for-profit basis to develop capacity and improve the performance of the partner utilities. The underlying idea is that this solidarity-based approach allows the partner utility to maintain and sustain performance improvements over the long term.

In an often-quoted definition, Brinkerhoff (2002) defines a partnership as ‘a dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objectives, pursued through a shared understanding of the most rational division of labor based on the respective comparative advantages of each partner. Partnership encompasses mutual influence, with a careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision-making, mutual accountability, and transparency’. WOPs, however, deviate somewhat from this frequently cited definition of Brinkerhoff (2002) as these partnerships are ‘peer-to-peer’ partnerships rather than being diverse organizations. In addition, what distinguishes WOPs from other types of partnerships is that they are ‘solidarity-based’.

Brinkerhoff's (2002) definition of partnership is quite normative as it suggests qualities like equal decision-making, equal participation, and mutual influence that are unlikely to be prevalent in most partnerships. At the same time, the definition does highlight important questions surrounding partnerships. One such question, which is particularly relevant to consider in solidarity-based partnerships like WOPs, concerns the accountability of partners. Public water utilities are essentially the instruments of government through which the provision of water services to a population is arranged (Schwartz & Tutusaus 2023). Normally, the accountability relationship is quite straightforward, as the public water utility would normally be accountable to the government for the way in which it manages the activity of water services provision. However, through the engagement in a WOP additional actors are brought in. The water utility develops a relationship with this other water utility and also commits to shared objectives of the partnership they enter into. What essentially results is a collaborative governance arrangement that incorporates ‘an accountability system that involves an overlapping set of independent arrangements, different sources of control, and competing organizational norms and institutional logics’ (Lee & Ospina 2022: p. 63). The fact that this partnership is solidarity-based makes it even more complicated as traditional accountability mechanisms like formal contractual arrangements are usually not present in such partnerships.

Since 2006, more than 400 WOPs have been formed (GWOPA 2022), which have improved services for an estimated 58 million people¹. At the same time, academic research on these kinds of partnerships and their functioning is still in its infancy (Beck 2019). Although some research has been done on the impact of WOPs on the performance of water utilities, there have been no peer-reviewed publications examining accountability in such partnerships.

The body of literature dealing with the concept of accountability is extensive, as is the history of the concept. Although the concept of accountability found its origin centuries ago in accounting and financial administration, the concept has since evolved. Accountability came to describe a situation ‘when an actor recognizes that it has made a promise to do something and accepted a moral and legal responsibility to do its best to fulfill that promise’ (Brown & Moore 2001: p. 570). It initially focused on individuals' obligations to explain and take responsibility for their actions. Accountability thus revolves around providing and demanding reasons for the behavior of actors (Roberts & Scapens 1985: p. 447). Over time, however, the concept of accountability has further evolved beyond its fundamental meaning of being answerable for one's actions (Mulgan 2000). This development is closely linked to the growing relevance of collaborative governance as a response to increasingly complex public problems that require collaboration between multiple actors (Lee & Ospina 2022). It now encompasses a broader range of well-intentioned but loosely defined ideas related to good governance (Bovens 2005). The concept now serves as a synonym for various vaguely defined political ideals, such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, and integrity (Bovens 2005: p.183). Bovens (2005: p. 182/184) has even referred to the concept as a ‘hurrah-word’, which nobody can be against, but which has turned it into ‘a garbage can filled with good intentions’.

For authors like Steets (2010), accountability has become a concept with normative attractiveness, serving as a ‘rallying cry’ in the scholarship on partnerships, invoking notions of trustworthiness and justice. Authors such as Steets (2010) and Brinkerhoff (2002) see it as a critical ingredient for organizations to have successful partnerships. In this regard, Brinkerhoff (2002) defines accountability within partnerships as a reciprocal obligation between the partnering entities. She further deliberates that in reciprocal accountability systems, each partner takes responsibility for their actions and their influence on the partnership while being accountable to the other. It also involves partners having regular or on-demand access to performance information about both the overall partnership and its individual members.

While accountability is generally perceived as a favorable attribute, the dynamics of a reciprocal accountability system are challenged in partnerships due to the presence of polycentric governance arrangements (Lee 2022; Lee & Ospina 2022). These arrangements involve multiple organizations, with diverse actors and intentions, which often present challenges that are unique to partnerships (Waardenburg et al. 2020). It gives rise to multiple systems of accountability with an ‘overlapping set of independent arrangements and organizational norms’ (Bryson et al. 2015). These systems present a web of intertwined accountability relationships, which in an idealistic sense should complement each other, but in practice end up competing with each other giving rise to what Lee (2022) defines as ‘accountability tensions’.

Moreover, information gaps and silos across organizational boundaries hinder partners' understanding of different organizational systems, leading to conflicting expectations. As a result, partners may encounter competing accountability demands that appear reasonable on their own but become inconsistent and conflicting when seen in the context of the partnership. This further exacerbates the accountability tensions described by Lee (2022).

Establishing an accountability system is considered essential for partnerships, but it is complicated for collaborative governance arrangements and requires contextualization for solidarity-based partnerships like WOPs. This article will address the question: How is accountability managed in solidarity-based WOPs?

To study accountability in WOPs, this article developed a framework that is based on an analysis by Acar & Robertson (2004) on the challenges of reciprocal accountability. The original analysis by Acar and Robertson identified seven factors that complicate reciprocal accountability in public–private partnerships in the education sector. Given that this article focuses on solidarity-based partnerships rather than public–private partnerships and on public water utilities rather than the education sector the framework was adapted. This adaptation was done based on interviews with academics and utility managers knowledgeable about WOPs. Through this process, we identified four key challenges based on the original framework that are particularly relevant in the context of WOPs. Although these are introduced separately, the different factors are strongly intertwined and can best be viewed as a web of challenges that underlie accountability mechanisms in WOPs (Table 1).

• 1. First of all, in partnerships, ‘there typically is not a well-defined administrative hierarchy through which to determine and control the activities of a partnership's members’ (Acar & Robertson 2004: 332). In these partnerships, managers often do not oversee many of the individuals on whom their performance depends. Monitoring channels tend to be diffuse and unreliable, and the shared organizational culture has only a limited and indirect impact (O'Toole 1997: p. 47). This means that managers involved in partnerships must find alternative ways to influence the behavior of partners with whom they have no hierarchical relationship in order to achieve a level of performance that is considered desirable.

• 2. Second, the reason for establishing partnerships is usually that the individual organizations do not manage to address specific problems themselves (Acar & Robertson 2004). However, the problems that these partnerships are to address may be quite complicated to address and may even be wicked problems (O'Toole 1997; Lee & Ospina 2022). This characteristic may lead to a real threat that the partnership is expected to perform ‘too much, too early’ (Acar & Robertson 2004: 334). Ultimately, the water supply sector revolves around the operation and management of infrastructure. The performance of a water utility is largely based on the availability and condition of infrastructure. Given that WOPs are mainly capacity-strengthening instruments with only limited investments, the risk of expecting ‘too much, too early’ is considerable.

• 3. Third, in addition to addressing the actual water supply problem or issue that is the focus of the water operators' partnership, the partners also need to develop the partnership itself. Developing accountability mechanisms for such partnerships, especially if they concern water providers from different cultures, is not easy. Gelfand & Brett (2004: p. 136) have argued that three aspects of culture (individualism–collectivism, cultural tightness–looseness, and hierarchy–egalitarianism) produce ‘unique cultural configurations of accountability’. Partners may thus have different ideas about what type of configuration of accountability is preferred.

• 4. The fourth challenge is that contrary to Brinkerhoff's (2002) definition, considerable power asymmetries usually exist in a partnership. As a result of such asymmetries, some partners are likely to be able to have greater influence over the activities that will be developed under the partnership. Linked to the question of power asymmetries is that although water operators may have similar goals of ensuring universal service coverage of safely managed services, the partners may have different underlying values and goals.

In order to explore the concept of accountability within the context of solidarity-based WOPs, a case study methodology was employed using the four factors described in the previous section as a framework for analysis. The two selected case studies concern a partnership involving VEI Dutch Water Operators (VEI) and the Central Region Water Board (CRWB) and a partnership involving VEI and the Southern Region Water Board (SRWB) in Malawi. The SRWB and the CRWB are water operators that are organized as statutory corporations operating under the Ministry of Water and Sanitation, Republic of Malawi. The legal establishment of SRWB is grounded in the Waterworks Act Cap 72:01, while CRWB was created under the Waterworks Act No. 17 of 1995. VEI is a not-for-profit organization that manages the international projects of seven Dutch water utilities².

Data collection was conducted between November 2022 and July 2023 and involved an extensive review of relevant literature. Additionally, a total of 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted. A total of 13 interviews concerned the VEI–CRWB partnership and 10 interviews concerned the VEI–SRWB partnership. Throughout the interviews, field notes were taken to capture the responses, which were subsequently subjected to thorough analysis. All the interviews were transcribed and analyzed to identify themes that are consistent with the four factors of the framework discussed above.

As part of these partnerships, VEI and the respective water boards signed an MoU outlining specific objectives, activities, and their respective targets (VEI-S1). However, despite the formal nature of these arrangements, there is no contractual obligation for the partners to adhere to these objectives, activities, and targets. Consequently, there is no formal internal accountability system between the partners (VEI-S1, CRWB-3, and SRWB-8). This arrangement of the administrative hierarchy is seen in both partnerships.

Instead of relying on a formal reciprocal accountability mechanism between the partners, the accountability framework in the context of these WOPs takes on a different form (CRWB-3). This accountability is characterized by a vertical structure, where each partner assumes responsibility toward their respective superiors. Specifically, within the water boards, employees are held accountable to their respective managers, who, in turn, are accountable to the CEO. The CEO, being the highest authority within the water boards, bears the responsibility of being accountable to the board members of the respective water boards. As statutory corporations, these water boards ultimately find themselves accountable to the Ministry of Water and Sanitation of the Republic of Malawi (CRWB-4).

In the case of VEI, the resident project managers report to the VEI head office (which then reports to their shareholders) and to the WaterWorX program under which the partnerships are positioned. WaterWorX is then accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This relationship is perhaps best illustrated by a quote from the WOP project coordinator of SWRB. The project coordinator explained that ‘I am an employee of the water board, and I have tasks to do and I am accountable to my director. [The resident project manager] emails my director if she wants me to do something’ (SRWB-4). The prominence of the vertical accountability relationship is not surprising as Bovens (2005: p. 187) also explains that ‘[t]he first and foremost important accountability relation for […] managers is organizational. Their superiors, both administrative and political, will regularly […] ask them to be account for their assignments’.

The initial perception of the directors and managers of SRWB was that VEI would be solely responsible for financing the partnership activities and for investing in large-scale infrastructure projects such as building dams and water supply networks (SRWB-7). However, this expectation was not met as WOPs are generally capacity development projects with only limited investment. Some staff of the waterboard believe that without any monetary incentives the water boards are putting in more resources than they are benefiting from (SRWB-7). The expectation that the partnerships would bring significant investment was based on earlier meetings in which examples of other WOPs gave the impression that these partnerships incorporate significant investment. A staff member of SRWB highlights that ‘when we started, we had a meeting in Uganda, where different countries met, and you could see that in some countries like Zimbabwe, they're spending a lot. They have even implemented big projects.’

Whereas managers of the SRWB were expecting significant investment, field staff initially saw VEI as auditors or consultants who were reviewing the performance of the water board. This perception also meant that field staff were reluctant to participate in some of the activities under the partnership (VEI-S2).

At the same time, VEI also places considerable effort in clarifying that WOPs are primarily instruments of capacity development. They emphasize that such partnerships are different than consultancy projects and usually do not incorporate investment funds (VEI-C2). In this sense, the diverging expectations also seem to be a result of the unfamiliarity of the management of the water boards with such partnerships and, in particular, with WOPs under the WaterWorX program (which do not have investment funds).

In the researched partnerships, all partners strive to cultivate a relationship centered on relational outcomes, with trust being a fundamental element in this process (VEI-1). This emphasis on relational governance is evident in the case of the CRWB-VEI WOP, where the RPM makes a clear distinction between the project and the partnership. The distinction is based on the recognition that the ‘project’ pertains to specific collaborative activities, targets, tasks, and objectives aimed at achieving certain outcomes, while the ‘partnership’ denotes a broader and deeper connection between VEI and CRWB. The idea is that partnership should transcend the individual components of the project, encompassing mutual understanding, trust, and interdependence. In the words of the RPM (VEI-C1):

In terms of communication, the Director of Technical Services of CRWB is designated as VEI's formal focal point. However, VEI's project manager maintains multiple informal communication points with several operational staff at the utility involved in the implementation. This approach facilitates relationship-building and partnership growth by enabling communication with people at all levels, which, in turn, aids in effective implementation on the ground (VEI-C1). Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) share the same view when they deliberate that these kinds of informal rules emerge from repeated interactions between the partners and create stability in partnerships and network governance.

Although the focus on relational governance and the establishment of informal communication channels contribute to strengthening the partnership by nurturing a conducive environment for collaboration and trust-building, the project does need to produce clear outcomes and tangible results on the ground (VEI-C1).

Although the informal communication system is considered useful to develop the partnership by the RPM of VEI, the management team of CRWB has a strong desire to formalize this informality, especially when it comes to the sharing of plans for future activities. As a public institute, CRWB requires formalized plans and reports to obtain budgetary approvals (CRWB-1, CRWB-3, and CRWB-4). This view is shared by the managerial team of SRWB. Although the current channels for dialogue and information sharing display a high level of adaptability, demonstrated by the flexibility of communication between the partners, SRWB desires a more formal sharing of plans (SRWB-1 and SRWB-6). In response to this, the RPM of the VEI–SRWB WOP has taken this into account and now shares formal plans and roadmaps with the water board.

The CEO of SRWB further emphasizes that trust focused on relational governance can exist only because VEI is capable of delivering the results stipulated in the agreement with specific targets. He even emphasizes that if VEI fails to achieve the expected results, the trust built through relational governance will be compromised. ‘It is through the consistent delivery of results by partners that trust can be established, rather than the other way around’ (SRWB-8). The RPM of VEI is also aware that if the informal communication approach leads to compromised project results, it could impact the sustainability and credibility of the partnership (VEI-C1). In other words, developing a relationship of trust is useful, but it is in itself not sufficient if the project does not perform. Thus, despite the distinction between the project and the partnership, these two aspects are interconnected. While the partnership's relational governance lays the foundation for effective collaboration, the success of the project's outcomes is vital for sustaining and reinforcing the partnership's trust and credibility (Figure 1).

It is difficult to state anything definitive about the existence of power asymmetries in the partnership. This is largely because the partners appear to have different sources of power. VEI has considerable control over the budget underlying the WOPs. This also appears to be the main source of power that VEI holds. While the directors at SRWB acknowledge the importance of having access to VEI's budget for proposed activities, VEI is not bound by a contractual obligation to share such detailed financial information.

The waterboards, on the other hand, control the setting and the actual activities that need to be implemented. A manager of the CRWB mentions that ‘[i]t's not like [the resident project manager] can approve something and expect in 10 mins for people to go to field’. The same manager goes on to explain that ‘[w]e are in the battlefield ourselves, VEI is not. For example, if we have a certain water problem in a certain town, everything will stop. VEI doesn't have problems like that. We are doing the actual work of supplying water, and that is number one for us. VEJ needs to understand that their problems can wait’ (CRWB-6).

Various authors have suggested that relational norms, such as trust, act as substitutes for complex and formal agreements (Gulati 1995; Bernheim & Whinston 1998; Adler 2001). According to this logic, relational governance and its underlying normative behaviors serve as self-enforcing safeguards, offering a more effective and cost-efficient alternative that replaces contracts (Hill 1990; Uzzi 1997). Some scholars even argue that formal contracts may undermine a partner's ability to develop a system of relational governance, as they can signal distrust and discourage trust-based accountability systems (Fehr & Gachter 2000).

The cases of the VEI–SRWB and VEI–CRWB partnerships, however, seem to nuance this perspective. Whereas the authors mentioned above seem to suggest that accountability is either through formal mechanisms or through relational mechanisms, the studied WOPs appear to be characterized by a ‘pluralistic system of accountability’ (Benner et al. 2004) in which accountability exists through a complex relationship of trust and results. The complexity of the relationship between trust and results lies in the fact that the two elements seem to coexist and even reinforce each other. Improved results are achieved through the existing trust between the partners and, at the same time, enhanced trust allows for the achievement of better results.

What perhaps also acts as a third accountability mechanism is that the two partners need each other. As highlighted in the results section, the partners have different sources of power. Whereas VEI has considerable control over the budget, the water boards control the setting and the actual activities that take place. Both elements are necessary for the partnership to produce results and both parties realize that they need the other partner in order to achieve their objectives. Both partners eventually look at potential ways to work together and integrate instead of opposing each other's way of working. This is echoed by Ospina & Saz-Carranza (2010) who call for ‘bringing paradox to the center of the inquiry’, arguing that competing demands can be embraced simultaneously with a ‘both/and’ approach, rather than an ‘either/or’ approach.

The cases also highlight how the values and operating styles of the partners are quite different and lead to some friction. WaterWorX, under which the two partnerships fall, allows for relative flexibility. The water boards on the other hand are more bureaucratic and strongly controlled by the Ministry of Water and Sanitation. The divergent organizational cultures also lead the partners to have different preferences about the nature of the accountability mechanisms. VEI seems to emphasize more flexible relational mechanisms such as trust and respect. Although management of the water boards acknowledges the importance of trust and respect, they also indicate they need formalized agreements as that is part of their organizational culture and would have a strong preference for more formalized agreements. In this sense, the cases highlight how different organizational values and cultures also lead to different preferences for accountability mechanisms. The current pluralistic system of accountability, which emphasizes both trust and results, then also does not appear to be an optimal accountability mechanism, but rather one that is acceptable to the partners for the time being.

The different prioritization of formal mechanisms can be linked to the cultural tightness or looseness of the organizations involved in the partnership. In tight cultures, such as bureaucratic organizations, social norms ‘are clearly specified and pervasive’ and, as a result, accountability connections are strong and formal (Gelfand & Brett 2004: p. 144). ‘On the other hand, accountability connections are not so well defined in loose cultures (i.e., they are more open to negotiations by the individuals involved’. Within such a loose cultural system there is more room for tolerance and flexibility (Gelfand & Brett 2004: p. 144).

The role played by the resident project managers in steering the partnerships and creating an environment that enables partners to feel valued was prominent in both cases. Effective communication and recognition of a partner's work are essential skills in fostering trust (Brinkerhoff 2002). Trust is seen as a result of partner interactions and is closely linked to the reactions resulting from these interactions. The emphasis on more informal communication between the RPMs and the staff of the water boards is very much dependent on the individual RPM. Similarly, the project manager's ability to recognize and value each other's contributions is crucial in building trust and sustaining the partnerships. This suggests that with the emphasis on relational contracting also the agency of the individual RPM becomes prominent in WOPs.

This dependence on individual relations then also leads to questions about the sustainability of accountability mechanisms in WOPs. Given the importance of individual agency in partnerships, O'Leary & Vij (2012) highlight that more scholarly attention is needed to study their roles in managing accountability systems in partnerships (see also Lee, 2022).

The emphasis on the role of the individual manager suggests that it is difficult to institutionalize a trust-based system of accountability. Every newly appointed RPM would have to invest in relations with the partner before accountability through trust would be feasible. As such, the system of accountability appears to be somewhat more ad hoc and temporal in comparison to completely formalized accountability mechanisms, in which the role of the individual is less prominent.

The article started with an often-quoted definition of Brinkerhoff (2002) in which she highlights how partnerships are characterized by reciprocal accountability. The case studied in this article suggests that solidarity-based partnerships do not adhere to this characterization. Understandably, both partners prioritize the vertical accountability to their own organization over the horizontal accountability to the partner utility. Although the accountability system involves overlapping arrangements, there is a clear prioritization of one accountability relationship over another.

In practice, the partnership is largely characterized by relational governance in which trust and respect play prominent roles. At the same time, relational governance appears to work as long as the partnership produces results. It appears that trust and results appear to be two sides of the same coin. Achieving results increases trust, and trust allows the partners to achieve better results.

The diverging expectations of partners and the different organizational cultures and values highlight why partnering and arriving at an optimal accountability mechanism is so challenging, if not impossible. The cases suggest that rather than thinking about optimal accountability mechanisms, ensuring accountability mechanisms that are sufficient and accepted by both partners is already a considerable achievement.

Data cannot be made publicly available; readers should contact the corresponding author for details.

The authors declare there is no conflict.