The supply of renewable natural water available in a sustainable fashion in the Jordan River Basin, comprising Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, will soon drop below 100 m3/person/year. Drawing on recent technological progress and policy innovations, a comprehensive policy to address the region's water problems in the long run is offered. The policy has a dual goal: to satisfy the needs of a growing population (domestic, irrigation and industry) and to preserve important environmental amenities, including restoration of the Lower Jordan River and stabilization of the Dead Sea level. The gap between natural water supplies and the basic needs of the growing population will be closed by conservation and desalination; at the same time, all domestic water will be recycled and will be available for reuse in irrigation and environmental restoration. Over time the supply of recycled water that should be allocated for environmental restoration (accounting for the compensation of irrigators) will suffice to partially restore the Lower Jordan River and contribute to the stabilization of the Dead Sea. The analysis is relevant in a wide range of real-world situations, where satisfying the basic needs of a growing population and preserving environmental amenities become critical.

## Introduction

The average supply of natural water available in a sustainable fashion (without systematically drawing down water stocks) in the Jordan River Basin (JRB), comprising Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (PA), will soon drop below 100 m3/person/year. As a result, extensive diversions from natural sources have led to the deterioration, if not complete demolition, of natural stream flows and ecosystems. Two prominent environmental ‘victims’, shared by the three parties, are the Lower Jordan River (LJR) and the Dead Sea: the LJR's flow has been reduced to a trickle of mostly brackish water and partially treated sewage and its historically rich ecosystem no longer exists (Gafny et al., 2010); the Dead Sea level has been declining at a rate exceeding 1 m/year with far-reaching detrimental consequences to its surrounding environment (Becker & Katz, 2009; Tahal & Geological Survey of Israel, 2011; Rawashdeh et al., 2013). In this work we propose a comprehensive policy to address the water problems of the JRB in the long run. The policy has a dual goal: first and foremost, to satisfy the essentials of the growing population in subsistence (drinking and hygiene) as well as agricultural (irrigation) and industrial production; second, to maintain an acceptable level of environmental amenities, including partial restoration of the LJR and stabilization of the Dead Sea level. The proposed policy draws on recent technological progress and policy innovations. The analysis is relevant in a wide range of real-world situations, where the limited water resources make the dual goal of satisfying the needs of a growing population and preserving environmental amenities a critical problem.

Water scarcity is a fuzzy and complex concept because of the ‘liquid’ nature of the resource, which often exhibits large temporal and spatial variability, variation in quality, and dependence on idiosyncratic climate conditions (e.g. evapotranspiration). At the root level, water scarcity has to do with the availability of water needed to satisfy human livelihoods, including drinking, washing and food production as well as environmental preservation. The ability to satisfy these needs depends both on the available quantity of renewable, natural water as well as on how this water is managed. A region can experience an abundance of water some of the time (e.g. in the winter or monsoon periods) and a severe shortage in other times (e.g. in the summer or dry periods), and water shortage depends also on demand management and on the ability to transfer water across time and across space (from water-abundant periods/locations to water-scarce periods/locations), requiring, inter alia, storage and conveyance facilities. It is thus understandable that multiple indices of water scarcity exist with no consensus regarding which one to use in any given circumstance (discussions of the different water scarcity indicators can be found in Rijsberman (2006), Gleick (2002) and in references therein).

These qualifications notwithstanding, a rough and widely used index of water scarcity is the supply of renewable (i.e. available in a sustainable fashion) natural water suitable for human use, measured in units of cubic meters per person per year. Widely accepted measures of water scarcity defined by this index are due to Falkenmark et al. (1989). Based on estimates of water requirements for households, agricultural, industrial and environmental needs, Falkenmark et al. (1989) proposed the following thresholds: regions whose renewable water supplies fall below 1,700, 1,000 or 500 m3/person/year are said to experience water stress, water scarcity or absolute scarcity, respectively. The threshold of 100 m3/person/year is often mentioned as the water supply needed to satisfy basic human needs (Gleick, 1996) and we call this threshold subsistence scarcity. Water scarcity measures based on annual supplies of natural renewable water available per person are popular because their calculation requires data that are often available. Notice that these indices change over time due to population growth.

We begin in the next section with a description of the water scarcity situation in the JRB and its projected time evolution. We shall see that the region as a whole will soon suffer from subsistence scarcity and parts of it have already entered this phase. In Section 3 we discuss recent technological progress in desalination and policy innovations that have been used to deal with water scarcity in Israel, and we show in Section 4 how these policies underline the basic principles of a comprehensive solution to the water shortage problem in the region. Section 5 discusses how the environmental goals of partially restoring the LJR (the stretch of the river between Lake Tiberias-Kineret (hereafter referred to as Lake Kineret) and the Dead Sea) and stabilizing the Dead Sea level can be incorporated within this comprehensive water policy. Section 6 concludes.

## Water scarcity in the Jordan River Basin

We consider the part of the JRB that comprises Israel, Jordan and the PA (see Figure 1)1. The situation of the three parties is not symmetric: while Israel and Jordan are free to set their water policies, the PA is limited as it does not yet possess the same state status. While this political obstacle has consequences regarding feasible water policies in the short run, one hopes that it will be resolved and, once this happens, these (short-term) restrictions will no longer be effective. As this work takes a long-term perspective (as the title suggests), current political restrictions and mutual mistrusts among the parties are ignored, and the emphasis is on what could be done under collaborative political conditions.

Fig. 1.

The JRB. The Upper Jordan River extends between its headwater (at the confluence of the Dan, Banias and Hatzbani) and Lake Tiberias-Kineret. The LJR is the southern stretch of the river between Lake Kineret and the Dead Sea. Source: United Nations Environment Program (http://www.grid.unep.ch/products/4_Maps/jordanb.gif).

Fig. 1.

The JRB. The Upper Jordan River extends between its headwater (at the confluence of the Dan, Banias and Hatzbani) and Lake Tiberias-Kineret. The LJR is the southern stretch of the river between Lake Kineret and the Dead Sea. Source: United Nations Environment Program (http://www.grid.unep.ch/products/4_Maps/jordanb.gif).

### Water resources

We discuss first the water resources of Israel and the PA jointly (in line with the relevant publications), followed by a discussion of the water resources of Jordan.

#### Water resources in Israel and the PA

Table 1 presents average recharge into the main water sources west of the Jordan River for the periods 1976–1992 and 1993–2009. It also gives the quantities of brackish water recharge, where brackish water refers to water with chloride concentration above 400 mg/l. To obtain quantities of fresh water recharge (with chloride concentration below 400 mg/l) one needs to subtract the brackish from the average, e.g. the total average recharge of fresh water during 1993–2009 was 1,683 – 232 = 1,451 million cubic meters per year (MCM/year)2. Figure 2 provides a map view of Table 1. These are the quantities of natural water available to Israel and the PA on a sustainable fashion. Brackish water is unsuitable for drinking and when used for irrigation often requires mixing with good quality water to reduce salinity.

Table 1.

Average annual recharge (MCM/year) of main water sources west of the Jordan River and the share of brackish water (with chloride concentration above 400 mg/l).

1976–1992 1993–2009
Average Average
Basin Recharge Brackish Recharge Brackish
Kineret 623 18 540 14
Coastal 252 124 232 116
Western Mountain 369 333
Eastern Mountain 211 174
Northeastern Mountain 151 134
Lower Galilee 30 26
Western Galilee 139 30 132 30
Carmel 42 15 40 15
Negev & Arava 32 28 32 28
Gaza 44 31 40 23
Total 1,893 252 1,683 232
1976–1992 1993–2009
Average Average
Basin Recharge Brackish Recharge Brackish
Kineret 623 18 540 14
Coastal 252 124 232 116
Western Mountain 369 333
Eastern Mountain 211 174
Northeastern Mountain 151 134
Lower Galilee 30 26
Western Galilee 139 30 132 30
Carmel 42 15 40 15
Negev & Arava 32 28 32 28
Gaza 44 31 40 23
Total 1,893 252 1,683 232
Fig. 2.

Average renewable (natural) supplies (with chloride concentration below 400 mg/l), based on the 1993–2009 data of Table 1 (numbers in parentheses give brackish water – with chloride concentration above 400 mg/l). Source:Weinberger et al. (2012).

Fig. 2.

Average renewable (natural) supplies (with chloride concentration below 400 mg/l), based on the 1993–2009 data of Table 1 (numbers in parentheses give brackish water – with chloride concentration above 400 mg/l). Source:Weinberger et al. (2012).

Figure 3 shows the actual realizations of natural recharge for the period 1976–2009. It illuminates two features of renewable water resources in the Jordan Basin: high (temporal) fluctuations and a declining trend. Part of the declining trend (of 8.92 MCM/year) could be the result of climate change processes.

Fig. 3.

Actual observations of total natural water recharge of all major water sources (including brackish water) west of the Jordan River during the period 1976–2009. Source:Weinberger et al. (2012).

Fig. 3.

Actual observations of total natural water recharge of all major water sources (including brackish water) west of the Jordan River during the period 1976–2009. Source:Weinberger et al. (2012).

#### Water resources in Jordan

Table 2 presents Jordan's renewable water resources. The total average supply of renewable natural water in Jordan is 745 MCM/year on average3.

Table 2.

Jordan's renewable water resources.

Source MCM/year
Groundwater (safe yield) 275
Surface water (by 2022) 365
Artificial recharge (in 2007) 55
1994's Peace Treaty (from Lake Kineret) 50
Total 745
Source MCM/year
Groundwater (safe yield) 275
Surface water (by 2022) 365
Artificial recharge (in 2007) 55
1994's Peace Treaty (from Lake Kineret) 50
Total 745

#### Water resources in the JRB

The average supply of renewable natural water in the JRB (available to Jordan, Israel and the PA in a sustainable fashion, i.e. without drawing down stocks) is therefore 2,428 (1,683 + 745) MCM/year, of which (at least) 232 MCM/year is of brackish quality (with chloride concentration exceeding 400 mg/l, unsuitable for drinking and for irrigation of many crops without mixing). The annual supply of renewable, fresh natural water (with chloride concentration below 400 mg/l) available in the JRB is therefore 2,196 (1,683 – 232 + 745) MCM/year on average.

### Population and per capita water supplies

Figure 4 presents the actual population (up to 2011) and also the projected population of Israel, Jordan and the PA from 1950 to 2050. Dividing the annual natural water supplies of 2,196 MCM/year by the population gives the per capita annual water supplies, presented in Table 34.

Fig. 4.

Actual population (until 2011) and projected population (million). Source:United Nations (2011).

Fig. 4.

Actual population (until 2011) and projected population (million). Source:United Nations (2011).

Table 3.

Population and per capita supplies of natural water in the Jordan River Basin.

Year Population (million) m3/person/year
2013 18.8 117
2030 25.0 88
2050 31.6 69
Year Population (million) m3/person/year
2013 18.8 117
2030 25.0 88
2050 31.6 69

The latter is obtained by dividing natural water supply (2,196 MCM/year) by the population.

As Table 3 reveals, the region as a whole is already far below the absolute scarcity mark of 500 m3/person/year and within two decades will cross the subsistence scarcity mark of 100 m3/person/year. At such an acute scarcity, the problem of allocating natural, potable water becomes also a human-right issue, implying that any water allocation policy in the region should give priority to the supply of domestic (potable) water. Increasing the allocation of domestic water can be achieved by reallocating water from irrigation or by introducing new water supplies or from a combination of these. In the next section we describe the recent experience of Israel's water policy, which can serve as a guide for water policy in the regions as a whole.

## Dealing with water scarcity: Israel's experience

Water scarcity in Israel has been addressed by demand management aimed at improving conservation and efficiency of water use and by supply management through augmenting water supplies in the form of desalinated and recycled water. We discuss demand and supply measures in turn.

### Demand management

Policy measures aimed at affecting water demand must rely in one way or another on a combination of water pricing and water quotas, and these tools have always been the foundations of Israel's water policy (see Tsur (2009) for a discussion of water pricing in general and Kislev (2011) for a detailed account of water pricing in Israel). The efficacy of strict volumetric pricing of domestic water is demonstrated in Figure 5, which presents domestic water consumption during the period 1996–2011. As the figure shows, domestic water consumption increased more or less in proportion with the population growth until 2007, reaching a peak of 767 MCM in that year. Thereafter, it decreased to 665 MCM in 2011 – a decline of more than 10% or 100 MCM/year (the equivalent of a large-scale desalination plant). As population continues along its secular growth trend, water consumption per person has decreased even more drastically. What happened in 2007 that led to such a shift in domestic water consumption?

Fig. 5.

Domestic water consumption (MCM/year) in Israel during 1996–2011. Source:Israel's Water Authority (2011). Water consumption by sectors: 1996–2011 (in Hebrew) (http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/ProfessionalInfoAndData/Allocation-Consumption-and-production/20112/1996-2011.pdf).

Fig. 5.

Domestic water consumption (MCM/year) in Israel during 1996–2011. Source:Israel's Water Authority (2011). Water consumption by sectors: 1996–2011 (in Hebrew) (http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/ProfessionalInfoAndData/Allocation-Consumption-and-production/20112/1996-2011.pdf).

A number of measures are responsible for this shift. First, Israel's Water Authority was formed in 2007 as an independent, statutory regulatory body with authority to set extraction permits and water prices in all sectors5. Second, municipal water management shifted from the municipalities (city, regional and local councils) to Water Corporations. Third, 2007 was the third winter in a sequence of five of below-average precipitation (see Figure 2). These three events have led to a number of interventions. First, domestic water prices increased sharply to reflect the cost of water supply (including scarcity cost)6. Second, the transfer of the management of municipal water to Water Corporations has reduced water loss (due to leakage or theft) and improved collection of water fees from users. Third, the prolonged period of below-average rainfall has increased public awareness for the need to reform the water sector and was conducive to the implementation of drastic measures to conserve water and improve management.

These three processes combined have acted to reverse the domestic water consumption trend, as seen in Figure 5. This episode illuminates the importance of demand-management tools: an effective implementation of a number of demand measures (strict volumetric pricing, effective management practices, reduced leakage and unaccounted water) resulted in water saving equivalent to the quantity produced by a large-scale desalination plant.

Similar processes took place in Israel's agriculture, albeit more gradually. Figure 6 shows trajectories of two price indices during the period 1952–2011 (adjusted for consumer price index): the price index of natural, fresh (non-brackish) water in agriculture; and the price index of agricultural output (crop prices). The crop price index declined moderately until the late 1990s and has been stable since then. The water price index, on the other hand, has increased fivefold during this period, with a sharp increase following the early 1990s. This price trend has led to a decline in the demand for irrigation water from fresh, natural sources and accelerated the transition of Israel's agriculture to recycled water (see Figure 7 below)7.

Fig. 6.

Trajectories of the price indices of natural (non-brackish) water in agriculture and of crop prices during 1952–2011 (1952 = 100, adjusted for consumer price index). Source:Kislev & Tzaban (2013).

Fig. 6.

Trajectories of the price indices of natural (non-brackish) water in agriculture and of crop prices during 1952–2011 (1952 = 100, adjusted for consumer price index). Source:Kislev & Tzaban (2013).

Fig. 7.

Water allocation in Israel's agriculture during 1996–2011 (brackish refers to water with chloride concentration above 400 mg/l). Source:Israel's Water Authority (2011). Water consumption by sectors: 1996–2011 (in Hebrew) (http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/ProfessionalInfoAndData/Allocation-Consumption-and-production/20112/1996-2011.pdf).

Fig. 7.

Water allocation in Israel's agriculture during 1996–2011 (brackish refers to water with chloride concentration above 400 mg/l). Source:Israel's Water Authority (2011). Water consumption by sectors: 1996–2011 (in Hebrew) (http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/ProfessionalInfoAndData/Allocation-Consumption-and-production/20112/1996-2011.pdf).

### Supply management

In addition to the above-mentioned demand-management measures, the supply of water has been increased by the development of recycling and desalination. We discuss each in turn.

#### Recycling

Figure 7 shows the water allocation in Israel's agriculture sector during the period 1996–2011. As the figure reveals, the allocation of natural water to agriculture has reduced from 892.3 MCM in 1996 to 413.7 MCM in 2011 – a decline of 54%. At the same time, the supply of recycled water increased from 270 MCM in 1996 to 414.8 MCM in 2011. Israel's growers now use more recycled than natural water and this trend (of replacing natural water by recycled and brackish water) is ongoing.

The direct effect of reallocating natural water from agriculture to households is to increase the supply of (potable quality) domestic water. However, each cubic meter reallocated to households provides 0.6–0.65 m3 of recycled water that in turn is allocated to irrigation8. Thus, the overall effect of reallocating 1 m3 from agriculture to households is to increase domestic supply by 1 m3 and reduce agricultural supply by only 0.3–0.4 m3. Almost all domestic and industrial water supplies in Israel are now recycled and made available to irrigation (pending conveyance facilities). Moreover, all recycling facilities are expected (required by law) to be upgraded to tertiary level by 2015, reducing the limitation on the use of recycled water for most crops.

The cost of desalination has declined substantially during the last decade due mainly to ‘learning by doing’ associated with the increased scale of installed desalination capacity. Figure 8 presents the desalination costs ($/m3 at the plant's gate) of the major desalination plants in descending order. Also shown, for each plant, are the year when operation began (all plants are in operation except for Ashdod, which is expected to begin operation soon) and the plant's production capacity (MCM/year). At the completion of Ashdod plant, Israel's desalination capacity will exceed 600 MCM/year, which is about 90% of the total household consumption in 2011. The desalination capacity will reduce reliance on natural water sources and allow a more sustainable management of the natural water sources, by reducing average extractions in order to increase stock levels, thereby eliminating risks such as seawater intrusion into the coastal aquifer or potentially detrimental algae bloom in Lake Kineret. In addition, more water will be allocated for environmental purposes such as river restoration9. Fig. 8. Cost of desalination ($/m3 at the plant's gate calculated under the exchange rate: $1 = 3.6 NIS). The numbers in parentheses give the capacity in MCM/y (x + z means that the original capacity of x MCM/year has been or will soon be expanded by z MCM/year to give a total capacity of x + z MCM/year). Source: Israel's Water Authority10. Fig. 8. Cost of desalination ($/m3 at the plant's gate calculated under the exchange rate: $1 = 3.6 NIS). The numbers in parentheses give the capacity in MCM/y (x + z means that the original capacity of x MCM/year has been or will soon be expanded by z MCM/year to give a total capacity of x + z MCM/year). Source: Israel's Water Authority10. To sum up, the recent Israeli experience emphasizes the potential of demand-management measures in dealing with water scarcity. The pricing and management practices that were implemented in 2007 reduced domestic water use by more than 10% or 100 MCM/year. Regarding supply management, recycling is an immediate and relatively cheap way to increase water supply. It is cheap because of the rapid technological progress in recycling and because the alternative environmental cost of not recycling is high. A cubic meter allocated to household or industrial use can generate 0.6–0.65 m3 of recycled water suitable for irrigation and environmental restoration. Technological progress due to R&D and ‘learning by doing’ associated with increased desalination activities have led to a substantial decrease in the cost of desalination. These trends, together with the fact that the bulk of Israel's population is concentrated along the coast, imply that desalination is an economically viable source of water supply for households. ## Managing water scarcity in the Jordan River Basin Is the Israeli experience relevant to Jordan and the PA? Regarding recycling, the answer is clearly in the affirmative, as recycling can be applied in Jordan and the PA in much the same way as in Israel11. This means that most of the fresh (potable) natural water should be allocated to domestic use, collected, treated and reused in agriculture and environmental (rivers and ecosystems) restoration. The household demand over and above the natural water supplies (which increases over time due to population growth) can be met by desalination plants. Regarding desalination, the case of Jordan differs from that of Israel and the PA. We therefore discuss Jordan and the PA separately. ### Jordan The bulk of Jordan's population resides in the Amman area at about 1,000 m above sea level and more than 300 km away from Jordan's only sea access (the Gulf of Aqaba). The operation comprising desalination in Aqaba and conveyance to Amman is an expensive one: the cost in Amman of 1 m3 of desalinated water in Aqaba (before distribution to households and sewage treatment) is estimated above$2/m3 – about four times the cost of supplying desalinated water to Israel's densely populated areas (see Figure 8). Moreover, discharging large quantities of brine (1 m3 of desalinated water generates about 1.22 m3 of brine) in the Gulf of Aqaba could have detrimental effects on the sensitive coral reef ecology and is also objected to by the other Gulf of Aqaba's riparian states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel). For these two reasons, the combination of desalination in Aqaba (with brine discharge in the Red Sea) and conveyance to Amman is unviable as a comprehensive solution to Jordan's water scarcity problems in the long run.

These demographical and topographical features of Jordan imply that reallocating fresh (natural) water from irrigation to urban use requires considerable pumping. However, the cost associated with such reallocation is still lower than the cost of desalinating in Aqaba and conveyance to Amman due to the shorter distances (see World Bank, 2014). At the same time, these features are conducive to using recycled water in irrigation. This is so because conveyance of the recycled water from treatment plants near higher urban centers to lower agricultural areas (e.g. in the Jordan Valley) can be based more on gravitation and less on energy, and hence entails a lower cost12.

#### Red Sea–Dead Sea conveyance projects

A recurrent idea that has recently been studied in detail entails conveyance of water from the Red Sea (or the Mediterranean) to the Dead Sea, desalination near the Dead Sea, discharge of the brine reject in the Dead Sea, using the elevation difference (of about 350–400 m) to generate electricity, and conveyance of the desalinated water mostly to Amman (see Vardi (1990) for a survey of studies prior to 1990). The recent incarnation of this idea is the Red Sea–Dead Sea (RSDS) Conveyance Project, investigated by a suite of feasibility studies conducted under the World Bank's auspices (see Markel et al. (2013) for an overview; the detailed studies can be found at www.worldbank.org/rds). The RSDS project is planned to be constructed in phases over 3–4 decades. Upon completion, a full-scale RSDS project will convey 2,000 MCM/year from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, desalinate 850 MCM/year (near the Dead Sea), to be conveyed mostly to Amman (but also to the PA and Israel), discharge the 1,150 MCM/year brine in the Dead Sea, and generate electricity. A number of environmental issues (e.g. effects on the Dead Sea due to mixing with large quantities of brine and/or seawater, potential hazards associated with earthquake threats) and economic issues (ability to finance a large and expensive project) render the realization of a full-scale project questionable.

The study of alternatives (World Bank, 2014) considered a small-scale RSDS project, under which only 200 MCM/year will be desalinated and conveyed mostly to Amman. This requires conveyance of 440 MCM/year from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea and will generate 240 MCM/year of brine, to be discharged in the Dead Sea. No reliable estimates of the cost of potable water in Amman associated with this small-scale RSDS project exist, but it is expected to be lower than the cost in Amman of water desalinated in Aqaba (see World Bank, 2014).

## References

References
Becker
N.
Katz
D. L.
(
2009
).
An economic assessment of Dead Sea preservation and restoration
. In:
The Jordan River and Dead Sea: Cooperation Amid Conflict
.
Lipchin
C.
Sandler
D.
Cushman
E.
(eds).
Springer
,
Dordrecht, The Netherlands
, pp.
275
296
.
Becker
N.
Helgeson
J.
Katz
D.
(
2014
).
Once there was a river: a benefit–cost analysis of rehabilitation of the Jordan River
.
Regional Environmental Change
14
,
1303
1314
.
Beyth
M.
(
2006
).
Water crisis in Israel
. In:
Water Histories, Culture and Ecologies
.
Leybourne
M.
Gynor
A
. (eds).
Uni. Western Australia Press
,
Perth
, pp.
117
181
.
Beyth
M.
(
2007
).
The Red Sea and the Mediterranean–Dead Sea canal project
.
Desalination
214
,
364
370
.
Falkenmark
M.
Lundquist
J.
Widstrand
C.
(
1989
).
Macro-scale water scarcity requires micro-scale approaches: aspects of vulnerability in semi-arid development
.
Natural Resources Forum
13
,
258
267
.
Gafny
S.
Talozi
S.
Al Sheikh
B.
Ya'ari
E.
(
2010
).
Towards a Living Jordan River: an Environmental Flows Report on the Rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan River
.
EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East
,
Amman, Bethlehem, Tel Aviv
.
Gleick
P. H.
(
1996
).
Basic water requirements for human activities: meeting basic needs
.
Water International
21
,
83
92
.
Gleick
P. H.
(
2002
).
The World's Water: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources 2002–2003
.
Island Press
,
Washington, DC
.
Israel Water Authority
(
2011
).
Water consumption by sectors: 1996–2011 (in Hebrew). Available at: http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/ProfessionalInfoAndData/Allocation-Consumption-and-production/20112/1996-2011.pdf [accessed 20 March 2015]
.
Israel Water Authority
(
2012
).
Long-Term Master Plan for the National Water Sector. Available at: http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/Planning-and-Development/Planning/MasterPlan/DocLib4/MasterPlan-en-v.4.pdf [accessed 20 March 2015]
.
Jordan's Ministry of Water and Irrigation
(
2010
).
Jordan's Water Strategy, Water for Life, 2008–2022, Executive Summary
.
Ministry of Water and Irrigation
,
Amman. pp. 1–7
. .
Kislev
Y.
(
2011
).
The Water Economy of Israel. Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. (Policy Paper No. 2011.15). Available at: http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/economics/teachers/kislev_yoav/water_English%20edition.pdf [accessed 20 March 2015]
.
Kislev
Y.
Tzaban
S.
(
2013
).
Statistical Atlas of Israel's Agriculture (in Hebrew). Available at: http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/economics/teachers/kislev_yoav/atlas2013.pdf [accessed 20 March 2015]
.
Klein
C.
(
1982
).
Morphological evidence of lake level changes: Western shore of the Dead Sea
.
Israel Journal of Earth Sciences
31
,
67
94
.
Markel
D.
Alster
J.
Beyth
M.
(
2013
).
The Red Sea – Dead Sea feasibility study, 2008–2012
. In:
Water Policy in Israel
.
Becker
N.
(ed.).
Springer
,
London
.
Mekonen
S.
(
2013
).
Economic Alternatives for Rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan River
.
M.Sc. Thesis
.
The Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rehovot, Israel (in Hebrew)
.
Rawashdeh
S.
Ruzouq
R.
Al-Fugara
A.
B.
S.
Ghayda
A.
(
2013
).
Monitoring of Dead Sea water surface variation using multi-temporal satellite data and GIS
.
Arabian Journal of Geosciences
6
,
3241
3248
.
Rijsberman
F. R.
(
2006
).
Water scarcity: Fact or fiction?
Agricultural Water Management
80
,
5
22
.
Salameh
E.
El-Naser
H.
(
2000
).
Changes in the Dead Sea level and their impacts on the surrounding groundwater bodies
.
Acta Hydrochimica Hydrobiologica
28
,
24
33
.
Tahal and Geological Survey of Israel
(
2011
).
Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program: Dead Sea Study (Final Report)
.
Tsur
Y.
(
2009
).
On the economics of water allocation and pricing
.
Annual Review of Resource Economics
1
(
1
),
513
536
.
United Nations
(
2011
).
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World Population Prospects DEMOBASE extract. Available at: https://docs.google.com/a/mail.huji.ac.il/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbcGhOdG0zTG1EWkVOb3FVbVRpa0Y5REE#gid=10 [accessed 20 March 2015]
.
Vardi
J.
(
1990
).
Mediterranean-Dead Sea Project – a historical review
.
The Geological Survey of Israel, Report GSI/9/90
.
Weinberger
G.
Livshitz
Y.
Givati
A.
Zilberbrand
M.
Tal
A.
Weiss
M.
Zurieli
A
. (
2012
).
The Natural Water Resources between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Israel Hydrological Service, Israel's Authority for Water and Sewage. Available at: http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/about-reshut-hamaim/The-Authority/FilesWatermanagement/water-report-MEDITERRANEAN-SEA-AND-THE-JORDAN.pdf [accessed 20 March 2015]
.
World Bank
(
2014
).
Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program: Study of Alternatives (Final Report)
. .
Yorke
V.
(
2013
).
Politics matter: Jordan's path to water security lies through political reforms and regional cooperation
.
NCCR Trade Working Paper No. 2013/19
.