Hydropolitics and hydropolitical dynamics between India and Nepal: an event-based study

A country's well-being and economic success are intricately linked to its natural resources, especially rivers, which are rich sources of freshwater. But when rivers flow across political borders (transboundary rivers), these water reserves are transformed into a competitive resource, leading to political tension between countries (Stahl, 2005). The politics of fresh water in international contexts is becoming increasingly contentious. The issues of cross-border water sharing, use, and management need greater attention, as giant hydropower and irrigation projects are gradually performing key roles in defining international relations. Socioeconomic development has resulted in the rapid drawdown of freshwater reserves all over the world, making it a scarce resource. Increasing modern agriculture and irrigation systems can lead to more hydropolitical dynamics (Valipour, 2015; Yannopoulos et al., 2015; Valipour & Singh, 2016). With the pressure building on freshwater resources, transboundary water management is going to play an increasingly important role, both at the regional and international level (Nicol et al., 2001; Jägerskog et al., 2007).

According to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), there are 276 international transboundary river basins (TFDD, 2012), which cover more than 45% of the land surface on the Earth (Loucks & van Beek, 2005). A total of 145 countries, which constitute over 75% of all countries, have shared river basins within their boundaries, while 33 countries have more than 95% of their territorial dominion within international river basins. Internationally shared river basins are home to over 40% of the world's population and contribute to approximately 60% of global river flows (Wolf et al., 1999; Draper, 2002; Giordano & Wolf, 2003; Sadoff & Grey, 2005).

Convergence on cooperation by riparian states can encourage, cement, and reinforce power imbalances and injustice. This may lead less hegemonic riparian states to a dilemma between an imbalanced cooperative agreement with some accompanying benefits and no agreement and no accompanying benefits, but the flexibility to pursue more just power dynamics (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008). Zeitoun & Mirumachi (2008) stated that cross-border (transboundary) cooperation overlooks the needs and values of various groups and stakeholders (e.g., states, ethnic minorities, etc.) that are not represented in decision-making. In India, water is primarily a state subject. Hence, it is very important for the central government to consider the views of the states as without their support any international water agreement would be practically impossible.

An important aspect in transboundary water resources management and hydropolitics is the integration of cooperation and conflict resolution with the management of transboundary rivers. This requires a good understanding of the history and patterns of conflict and cooperation among riparian countries sharing transboundary basins. In addition to the above, the different factors that influence hydropolitical relations also need to be understood (Stahl, 2005). Only in the last decade have researchers begun to collect data in order to analyse these issues on regional and global scales (Wolf et al., 2003; Saleth & Dinar, 2004; Stahl, 2005).

International relations scholarship is often categorized by its analytic purpose, as relating to metaphor, history, theory, engineering, and pattern recognition (Chan, 2002). Edward Azar's Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB) International Cooperation and Conflict scale categorized events in terms of the nature and intensity of conflict or cooperation. The COPDAB scale provides a measure of the international conflict/cooperation intensity for individual nations and between pairs of nations over time periods ranging from single days to multiple years (Azar, 1980). The COPDAB scale was adapted for water events at Oregon State University to formulate the Basins at Risk (BAR) scale (Yoffe & Giordano, 2001).

The TFDD, also developed at Oregon State University, uses the BAR scale to evaluate interactions over shared water resources. The database provides a framework for quantitative, global-scale explorations of the relationship between freshwater resources and international cooperation and conflict. Event data serve as a bridge from traditional diplomatic history to quantitative analyses of international politics (McClelland, 1960). The TFDD was the first attempt to code event data sets specifically related to water resource issues (Yoffe et al., 2004). Events are defined as

The water event database is a unique resource that allows the evaluation of historical events of water conflict and cooperation and the exploration of relationships between events. The event data set provides a variety of opportunities to analyse water-related conflict-cooperation behaviour globally (Stahl, 2005). For example, it is not only possible to extract and analyse events with particular intensities, such as the extremes. But, after choosing a transformation, aggregated measures of conflict/cooperation for a range of spatial and temporal scales (e.g., basin, region, country, year, etc.) can be calculated (Yoffe et al., 2004). It can be used to assess the risk for conflict or potential for cooperation, as employed by Wolf et al. (2003), and has the potential to guide international policy with informed decisions.

The water-event database methodology has the potential to provide a detailed picture of patterns of historical conflict and cooperation between India and Nepal. This can open up new avenues of understanding about their hydropolitical relationship concerning the transboundary Ganges River of South Asia. The Ganges flows through four countries: China, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh. This study focuses on the region shared between India and Nepal, where Nepal is the upper riparian, while India is the lower riparian. The geography of Nepal and India pushes both countries to engage in many spheres, including cultural, social, economic, and political. Given that all rivers in Nepal drain into India, water resources is an important issue, as well as a very sensitive one (Dhungel & Pun, 2009). Water is a scarce resource across many regions in the world including South Asia, which houses a large share of the world's population.

Nepal, however, is gifted with abundant freshwater reserves, which form a strategically important natural resource. Though the bulk of this resource has not yet been exploited, it has the potential to transform the status of Nepal. All of Nepal's rivers contribute to the flow of the Ganges downstream in India. Nepal must cooperate with India and Bangladesh, to obtain optimum benefit from her more than 6,000 rivers with a combined run-off of about 200 × 10⁹ m³ (billion cubic metres) (Sharma, 1997; Bhusal, 1999). Similarly, her neighbours would immensely benefit if this resource were harnessed in such a way that each of the cooperating countries could be in a win-win situation. Thus, these rivers, if properly harnessed, have the potential to substantially contribute to the socioeconomic development of not only the people of Nepal, but also millions of people living in the Gangetic belts of South Asia (Dhungel & Pun, 2009). Gaining meaningful insights into Indo-Nepal hydro-diplomacy is highly important for overcoming barriers to agreement on numerous water resources projects.

The objective here was to study the more-than-a-century-old hydro-diplomacy between India and Nepal, passing through tumultuous political scenarios, and also to understand how the water relations have been shaped and reshaped with time. The history of the water resources relationship between these two nations, based on available records, is more than 140 years old. Even during British India, both countries were engaged in cooperation in water resources at an official level. The two countries have been engaged in numerous agreements, starting with the Sarada Barrage agreement in 1920. There is hardly a river left over which Nepal and India have not reached an understanding. However, the relationship between the two countries has yet to satisfy the people of either country (Dhungel & Pun, 2009). Although hydropolitical relations between Nepal and India have been largely considered to be normal, and there have been developments, the progress of events has been far from satisfactory. This study has been undertaken to examine the events and developments more closely and explore the hydropolitics involving Nepal and India in order to create an in-depth understanding of the different facets of their hydropolitical relationship.

The Ganges has a complex hydrology, with pronounced seasonal and climate variability. The three-month monsoon, from June to September, delivers about 80% of the annual rainfall. There is a huge asymmetry in the contribution of flow by the riparian nations as well. Nepal occupies only 14% of the Ganges Basin but contributes around 70% of the lean season (October to May) flow and around 40% of the average annual flow.

Home to over 655 million people, the Ganges is the world's most populous river basin, with an average population density of 551 people per km². Poverty is widespread; the average gross domestic product per capita is under US$2 per day and the poverty rate is around 30% (World Bank, 2014). The large population, coupled with rapid economic growth, has driven ever-increasing demands for water and energy, putting these demands at the very heart of the region's development.

The goal was to collect and compile historical records of water-related events involving both conflict and cooperation. The resulting database could then be analysed in order to contribute to an in-depth understanding of the hydropolitics between India and Nepal. The authors began by creating a database of water-related events that have impacted the decision making of water resources professionals in both nations. A preliminary investigation was conducted that involved an intensive search of treaties, agreements, policy documents, government documents, joint communiqués, joint press statements, joint working group meeting agendas, letters of communication, reports, books, research and review papers, manuscripts, print and electronic newspaper articles, and maps in order to create the database of events. Some of the events that involved both India and Nepal were directly incorporated from the TFDD. Multiple searches were carried out to prevent missing events. In addition, the authors incorporated information from historical analyses and independent case studies.

Historical individual events/actions of water cooperation/conflict from 1874 to 2014 were compiled into the database. The basin or the sub-basin involved in the event was noted, along with the issues dealt with in the event. Then, the events/actions were ranked by intensity, using precise definitions of conflict and cooperation as suggested by the TFDD under the BAR project. Each incident in the database included the following information:

• DATE – the date of the incident (or closest approximation thereof). The dates are in day/month/year format. The last date of the event was used for events covering a period of days. If only the year was available, the date convention of 01/01/year was used; if only month and year were available, the 1st of the month was used.

• BCODE – the basin in which the incident or event occurred, indicated by a four-letter code (see Table 2). The Kosi, Mahakali, Karnali, Gandak and Mahananda are the sub-basins of the Ganges flowing from Nepal to India. When the event included both the nations as a whole then it was considered to fall in the Ganges Basin.

• EVENT_SUMMARY – a summary describing the incident or event.

• ISSUE_TYPE 1, 2, or 3 – Issue_Type1 is for the main issue area of an incident; Issue_Type2 and Issue_Type3 are for additional issue areas. See Table 3 for a list and description of issue areas.

• BAR_SCALE – the intensity (or category) of the incident, based on the BAR scale of cooperation and conflict (Table 4). A numerical score ranging from −7 to +7 was used, with −7 denoting the most negative events, 0 denoting neutral events, and +7 denoting the most positive events.

• MACRO_EVENT – coder defined designations used to track the progression of ongoing interactions through time. Individual events that pertained to the same event were given the same macro-event designation.

After the database was created, the data could then be sorted and grouped, for example, by events, basin, macro-event, and/or intensity of events based on the BAR scale and even on temporal scales. The BAR scale categories and event descriptions are shown in Table 4. The conflict-cooperation levels (CCLs) were incorporated from the work of Stahl (2005). The 15 BAR-scale categories were aggregated to five CCLs ranging from ‘most conflictive’ to ‘most cooperative’ events (Table 4). The aggregated classes of each of the three grouped BAR scales denote violent conflict, political conflict, neutral verbal interactions, moderate cooperation, and active cooperation or treaty signature. This was included in the study to counter the anomalies of the average of all historic events on the conflict-cooperation scale, which could conceal a possible relation to events of specific intensity; whereas analysing only specific events, such as the extremes, ignores moderating information from the entire history. A sample of the structure of the event database is shown in Table 5.

Indo-Nepal hydro-diplomacy has evolved in stages. During the period under consideration (1874–2014), there were many significant ups and downs, a number of agreements and treaties signed, and even some ‘rough patches’ of economic blockades. Over this 140-year period, however, the events of cooperation heavily outnumbered events of conflict. To explore this evolution further, the results were examined for overall patterns, as well as temporally (both by the 140-year timeline and by three time phases) and spatially. The timeline for study was divided into three phases: (1) 01/01/1874–14/08/1947, during the era of British India; (2) 15/08/1947–31/03/1990, from Indian Independence until the imposition of the economic blockade on Nepal by India; and (3) 01/04/1990–31/12/2014, from the end of the economic blockade until the present era. The analysis was also split into various dimensions, such as the sub-basin level, issue type, and event type, in order to gain additional insights beyond the nationalistic viewpoints of India and Nepal.

This helps refute the claims reported in various sections of the media and by some scholars that India is trying to capture Nepal's water resources or that it is largely interested in hydropower development for her own benefits. Of the 43 hydropower events, 13 are related to power trade between the two countries. Nepal's theoretical hydropower potential is 83,000 MW, of which 40,000 MW is technically and economically viable. The installed capacity of Nepal barely exceeds 800 MW. Karnali Chisapani Multipurpose Project (10,800 MW) and Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (6720 MW) with eight and seven events respectively have not yet seen the light of day. The major issues hampering the development of these projects are cost sharing of different project components and calculation of benefits from the project.

Nepal is heavily reliant on India especially with respect to economics and trade. This can sometimes bring intricacies between the hydropolitical relations between the two countries, as was the case in economic blockade of 1989. Any kind of economic blockade can plummet the economy of Nepal. This can have long lasting impacts on the hydropolitical relations. Unilateral construction of huge infrastructure for development and management of water resources by India or Nepal can change the dynamics of the water availability. This has the potential to escalate into events of a highly conflictive nature. Instead both the countries should come up with more highly cooperative events especially on joint management of water resources. Joint management can result in win-win situations resulting in all round development of one of the poorest regions of the world.

In terms of variations in the range of BAR scales, economic development had the widest variations, from small-scale military acts (−5) to non-military economic, technological, or industrial agreement (4). Infrastructure followed, with a range from political-military hostile actions (−4) to non-military economic, technological, or industrial agreement (4). These were followed by joint management (−2 to 6), technical support (−2 to 4), hydropower (−1 to 4), flood control (−1 to 3), irrigation (−1 to 2), water quantity (1 to 4), navigation (1 to 3), and border issues (1–2).

This indicates that the issues of water quantity, navigation and border issues had only cooperative events; irrigation with one conflictive event (of scale −1) and the count of such events is low. Thus these issues are less-significant in terms of affecting the dynamics of hydropolitical relations. Economic development too has limited events (only 8) but it has the potential to significantly affect the dynamics of hydropolitical relations. Infrastructure and joint management issues (along with economic development) with wider variations in BAR scales can significantly swing the hydropolitical relations from cooperation to conflict and vice-versa.

As noted earlier, the 140-year time period was examined as a whole, then was divided into three time phases and a phase-wise analysis was created.

Before we move into the details of the events, an overall look at the trend provides particular insights about the regional hydropolitics. The overall trend indicates a continuous slide in the BAR scale, with an average of only 2.08 which indicates official verbal support. This regular slide in the BAR scale illustrates how relations have been deteriorating in recent decades. It also underscores the need for significant steps toward providing a conducive environment for hydropolitics to flourish and move in a cooperative direction.

Discussing each event is beyond the scope of this paper, so a few important ones that have had significant impact have been dealt with in brief. The first agreement between British India and His Majesty's Government (HMG) of Nepal was the Sarada Barrage agreement, signed in 1920, for harnessing the waters of the Mahakali River. The Kosi Agreement, to tame the Kosi River floods and control the shifting nature of the river through a barrage, was signed in 1954, a few years after Indian Independence. The first instance of cooperation to harness the hydropower potential of Nepal came in 1958 in the form of the Trishuli hydroelectric project on the Gandak River. The Gandak Agreement followed in 1959, for the purpose of constructing a barrage with a view toward enhancing irrigation. The Gandak and Kosi agreements were amended in 1964 and 1966, respectively, to incorporate a few changes in project management, as well as in working terms and conditions.

This was because of the unilateral construction of Tanakpur Barrage by India. This pushed Nepal to negotiate comprehensibly with India. In order to normalize relations with India, citing her huge economic dependence, Nepal worked out solutions with India. In the post-1990 period, mega projects such as the Pancheswar multi-purpose project on the Mahakali River, the Karnali Chisapani multi-purpose project and the Sapta Kosi multi-purpose project once again emerged. The result was the signing of the first comprehensive river treaty between the two countries on the development of Mahakali River in 1996; the next year saw an agreement on electric power trade. In 2008, Indian public and private companies entered into hydropower development in Nepal, with two Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) signed by the GMR-ITD consortium on the execution of the Upper Karnali Hydropower Project and by SJVNL on the Arun III Hydropower Project on the Kosi River system. The same year witnessed a massive flood that caused extensive damage to life and property, and India provided 200 million (20 crores) Indian Rupee as immediate flood relief to Nepal. In 2014, an agreement was signed to increase cooperation in the field of transmission interconnection, grid connectivity, and power trade.

The initial negotiations between British India and Nepal began around the Mahakali River Basin. Immediately after India's independence, the nations negotiated on the Kosi and Gandak projects, which were followed by discussions around the Karnali River Basin. The Mahakali Basin was again the focus when the Tanakpur Barrage project was initiated by India, which concluded in the Mahakali River Treaty. The recent negotiations involve the Sapta Kosi High Dam project and Sun Kosi Storage-cum-Diversion Scheme on the Kosi River and the Pancheshwar project on the Mahakali River.

The Kosi River has one of the highest sediment loads in the world and is known for frequent changes in flow paths. It often causes devastation due to floods in the Terai region of Nepal and the state of Bihar in India (because of this, the river is known as the ‘Sorrow of Bihar’). Many structural measures have been suggested for this river, with the latest one being the Sapta Kosi High Dam project, which has been under negotiation for the past three decades or so. In this basin, there were 18 events that were highly cooperative in nature (4 to 6 BAR scale), the distribution of which was 14 events for infrastructure, 2 for technical cooperation, and 1 each for hydropower and joint management. The average BAR scale for the Kosi Basin was 2.78, which is higher than the total average of 2.08 and is also the highest BAR scale among the four sub-basins.

The data assembled are a sampling of the types of information that can be culled from the BAR event database. Gathered from a wide range of sources, this database represents a unique resource. The analyses have been carried out at spatial and temporal scales, as well as by issue area and intensity of conflict or cooperation. This study employs the methodology with a specific regional research, by expanding the database into bi-national water events and exploring events where water was involved. The conflict/cooperation scale has been successfully employed to understand the bi-national hydropolitics between India and Nepal, which share the complex Ganges river system. This study provides insights about how the hydropolitics has been shaped and reshaped with time.

India and Nepal have seamlessly bonded, geographically, culturally and economically over the decades. India has always wanted to be the caring, doting elder brother to Nepal. The two countries cemented their close ties in 1950 with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship that allowed near equal rights to residents of both the countries in the neighbour's territory. It was meant to ensure everlasting peace and friendship, keeping the two Hindu-majority countries permanently locked in a warm embrace. But many political parties in Nepal, and their followers, were not so gung-ho about the bhai-bhai bon-homie. The favours guaranteed to Indians through the bilateral treaty were seen as a threat to Nepal's sovereignty, it led to fears of gradual Indianization of the Himalayan Kingdom. Since then, the original treaty has always been a subject of debate with the Maoists even demanding that it be scrapped.

The results of this study should help in gaining deeper insights about the Indo-Nepal hydropolitical relationship. The hydropolitical relationship between the two countries is cooperative in nature which is indicated by the average BAR scale of 2.08 highlighting official verbal support between the two countries. This is supported by the CCL analysis, which indicated moderately positive cooperation, yet without much concrete action. The same was true for the sub-basins as well, with more than 90% of events being cooperative and the rest being neutral and conflictive.

The concern that India is largely interested in Nepal's hydropower resources appears to be unfounded, given that the issue of hydropower constituted only 12% of the total events. The issue of joint management topped the chart with 29% of the events, followed by infrastructure and technical cooperation, with 27% and 16%; hydropower was fourth. Even in the sub-basin analyses, none of the basins indicated bias towards hydropower. The issues of technical cooperation and infrastructure were highly emphasized in the sub-basins, as well. This indicates that both countries accord joint management of natural resources utmost priority, while in keeping with their own interests. To date, the issue of water quality has not been discussed, and the issue of water quantity is seldom discussed, but with water resources getting scarcer, these two issues may gain prominence.

The major reason for very low hydropower potential being tapped so far is because there appears to be a wide gulf in the priorities of the two countries. Differences appear in the projects to be taken up with priority and sharing of project benefits. Nepal was quite keen on initiating the Karnali project (10,800 MW) while India wanted to take up the Pancheshwar project (6,720 MW). Both these projects need to be fast tracked as they have the potential to transform Nepal into a power surplus state leading to huge economic progress of the region.

For better transboundary cooperation both the countries should shy away from unilateral infrastructure development, rather preferring joint water resources development and management. A framework agreement regarding the development and management of natural resources, especially transboundary waters, should help. Both the countries should take into consideration each other's national interests. This should be at every stage of negotiations of project inception, explorations, design finalization, execution and management of infrastructure, project sites and other related infrastructure.

Nepal has so far benefitted from the projects, be it the Kosi Agreement or Gandak Agreement or various hydropower and infrastructure projects, etc. The total irrigated command area from the Kosi project/barrage in Nepal is 24,480 ha and from the Gandak project is 57,900 ha. Nepal also received hydropower and flood control benefits from these projects. But a certain section in Nepal believe that the benefits are heavily tilted in favour of India. This is one of the major reasons for the lack of progress in hydropolitical cooperation during the last few decades. Nepal can learn from past experience how to extract the most out of any agreement with India without hampering her national interest. Nepal should enhance the negotiation capabilities to put national interests on the negotiation table with authority.

Of the four sub-basins, the Mahakali had the highest number of events (62, or 18%) followed by the Kosi with 59 events (17%), Karnali with 45 events (13%), and Gandak with 29 events (8%). The Kosi Basin had the most cooperative relations, with the highest average BAR scale and the highest percentage of cooperative events, along with no conflictive events. After the Kosi were the Gandak, Mahakali, and Karnali basins. An increasing trend was visible only in Phase 1 (i.e., during British India) and for the Mahakali sub-basin. The remaining phases and sub-basins exhibited a decreasing trend in the BAR scale, as did the overall trend covering the entire timeline. The increasing trend in British India was because they consulted with Nepal before going ahead with any project and did not take up any action/activity/project unilaterally. For the Mahakali sub-basin, it was due to the only comprehensive agreement signed between India and Nepal – which involved numerous stages of negotiations. The declining trends of the overall and sub-basin BAR scales are a concern for both countries. Immediately after India's independence, there was a surge in hydropolitical cooperation with Nepal. But the provisions in the Kosi and Gandak agreements hurt the hydropolitical relations the most; the impacts of which can still be felt. The agreements gave rise to sovereignty and autonomy concerns in Nepal. The perception of inequitable sharing of project benefits adds to the concerns of Nepal.

But the two countries need to recalibrate their positions. The Ganges Basin riparians need to understand the gravity of the situation and take significant steps to jointly work towards the socioeconomic development of the region. Nepal should maintain cordial relations with India. Nepal's economic dependence, was in fact reinforced during the economic blockade. India too needs a friendly Nepal, whose geopolitical importance due to the open border between the two countries cannot be overstated. It is also in India's interest that there be political stability in Nepal, to prevent the spill-over effect any turmoil can have for the bordering States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

Comprehensive river treaties were lacking; rather only specific project agreements have been signed. This means that the maximum potential between the parties has not been realized. The bilateral approach followed by India is one of the factors affecting hydropolitical relations. India believes in project specific agreements and not an integrated water management approach which significantly reduces the benefits of cooperation. The lack of more cooperative events (events with high BAR scale) is counterproductive. Lack of trust between the two countries is one of the reasons for it. Perceived risks of cooperation could be another factor that hampers the hydropolitical relations between the two countries. But this needs to be explored in future studies. Future studies should also be taken up to ascertain the reasons for lack of trust between India and Nepal.

Natural disasters have the potential to bring the two countries closer as in 2008; after the Kosi floods both the countries initiated negotiations after a gap of four years. It was again seen recently in the aftermath of the massive earthquake in Nepal in 2015 where India was the first country to send relief and aid. The spontaneous outpouring of grief and support among Indians for Nepalese was natural. It was a reflection of how Indians see the Nepalese: less as neighbours and more as an extension of the great Indian Parivar. The public reaction in India shows that Indians still continue to have a little bit of Nepal in their DNA.

Both nations must come forward and take concrete actions that will generate opportunities for more cooperative events that have visible results. The findings of this study underscore the need for significant steps toward providing a conducive environment for hydropolitics to flourish and move in a cooperative direction. Both the countries should move ahead from official verbal support to major strategic alliance, such as the International Freshwater Treaty, through cooperative projects for watershed management, irrigation, and poverty alleviation. India should take up confidence-building measures not limited to capacity development programmes, joint investigations of projects, and data and information sharing to build trust. Apart from this, India should also undertake risk reduction strategies to cut down the perceived risks of cooperation where they exist.