Abstract
While all riparian states in the YarlungZangbo/Brahmaputra River basin have conducted or planned dam-building, water diversion or other water-related activities to meet their respective national policy goals, they are also undertaking fragmented cooperation to solve conflicts and disputes as they arise. Mainly using a combination of natural, economic, social, environmental, political and legal factors affecting transboundary water cooperation as its analytical framework, this article explores the features of the current cooperation practice among the riparian states, then analyses manifold challenges the practice faces. The author lastly envisions an available path where all riparian states develop multilateral cooperation to address the challenges in the future. This article suggests that the rationale for future cooperation is the policy of preventive diplomacy with the aim of avoiding water conflicts and significant transboundary harm; the basic prerequisite for future potential cooperation is trust building among the riparian states, especially between China–India and between India–Bangladesh; the suitable form of future cooperation is expected to be an inclusive, comprehensive and coordination-oriented River Basin Organization; and the focus areas for future cooperation are supposed to be data sharing and riparian activities that all or most of the riparian states are suffering from.
HIGHLIGHTS
This article explores the current cooperation practice of the riparian states and envisions their future potential cooperation.
The riparian states need to implement the policy of preventive diplomacy.
An inclusive, comprehensive and coordination-oriented River Basin Organization may be established in the future.
Data sharing and riparian activities should be the main areas for future cooperation.
Graphical Abstract
ABBREVIATIONS
- BAR
Basin-at-Risk
- BBIN
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal
- GBM
Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna
- IBJC
Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission
- ICIMOD
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
- ICPDR
International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River
- ICPR
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine
- IJC
International Joint Commission
- IWRM
integrated water resources management
- LMC
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism
- MoU
Memorandum of Understanding
- MRC
Mekong River Commission
- RBO
River Basin Organization
- TFDD
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
- UNWC
UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
- YBC
YarlungZangbo/Brahmaputra Cooperation mechanism
- YBR
YarlungZangbo/Brahmaputra River
INTRODUCTION
The YarlungZangbo/Brahmaputra River (YBR), one of the world's greatest transboundary rivers, flows 2,900 km from its source in the Chinese Himalayan Mountain Range to its confluence with the Ganges River, after which the mingled waters of the two rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal. With massive hydropower potential, fertile agricultural lands and rich aquatic resources, the river contributes significantly to the economic–social development of the four riparian states (China, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh) and even the entire South Asia. For example, the YBR basin sustains the livelihoods of approximately 400 million people in the mountains and plains, of which more than 25% rely on the river's water resources for fishing, farming and commercial transportation (Barua, 2018a; Biggs, 2018). Notwithstanding the economic–social progress, this region remains one of the poorest in the world (Rasul, 2015). Therefore, the riparian states vie to develop and utilize their transboundary waters to meet their respective national development goals. Meanwhile, these states have also undertaken mutual collaboration to solve some conflicts and disputes, with a limited scope primarily concerned with the exchange of hydrological information and joint hydropower development. Nevertheless, the basin is suffering from the lack of basin-wide collective actions to overcome various problems such as controversial riparian activities and natural disasters. As a result, a number of conflicts and disputes among them remain unsolved, posing manifold challenges to sustainable development, political stability and regional security within the basin and beyond. Therefore, the water of YBR could be a principal driver for enhanced regional cooperation, especially in such areas as resources exploitation, disaster management, poverty eradication and environmental protection.
The objective of this article is to address the following three problems by bringing together multiple concepts and approaches: What are the features of the existing practice on transboundary water cooperation over the YBR basin? What are the challenges facing the practice? How should the riparian states do to address these challenges in the future?
Conceptually, this article uses the policies of ‘responsive diplomacy’ and ‘preventive diplomacy’ (He, 2015) to refer to the rationale for the current and future potential transboundary water cooperation over the basin, respectively. ‘Responsive diplomacy’ is a kind of policy characterized by responding to riparian concerns and water disputes passively mainly through bilateral diplomatic means. Instead, ‘preventive diplomacy’ advocates those states located in a multinational basin which should proactively address riparian concerns through implementing multilateral diplomacy and abiding by customary principles of international water law so as to prevent water disputes as well as significant transboundary harm. Biswas asserted that the water problems are characterized by multi-dimension, multisector and multi-region, and filled with multi-interests, multi-agendas and multi-causes. They can be resolved only through a proper multi-institutional and multi-stakeholder coordination. The issue at present is not whether multilateral cooperation is desirable, but rather how can it be achieved (Biswas, 2004). Meanwhile, the concept of ‘sustainability’ is used as the main goal of undertaking preventive diplomacy and enhancing transboundary water cooperation, which means that the patterns of economic–social development should be generalizable not only to all currently living people but also to future generations, liquidating the natural capital on which future economic–social activity depends (Dieren, 1995). Furthermore, this article uses the concept of ‘River Basin Organization’ (RBO) to define the nature of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism (LMC) established by all riparian states of the Lancang–Mekong in 2016. RBOs are characterized as institutionalized forms of cooperation that are based on legally or politically binding international agreements covering the geographically defined area of international rivers or lakes and consequently account for more formalized and long-term nature of cooperation (Schmeier et al., 2013). Therefore, transboundary water cooperation can be enhanced by the creation and operation of properly designed and well-functioned RBOs.
Methodologically, this article takes an interdisciplinary approach; that is, those natural, economic, social, environmental, political and legal factors affecting transboundary water cooperation as well as their interaction with each other are comprehensively reviewed. These interrelated factors constitute the main components of the analytical framework in the following each section, because the context in which transboundary water cooperation takes place within YBR and beyond is obviously influenced by these factors (Yasuda et al., 2017). Furthermore, it uses the positive Basin-at-Risk (BAR)-value developed by the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) to measure the intensity of current cooperation and justify future potential cooperation (Wolf, et al., 2003). Based on a scale from 1 to 7, cooperative events can be classified according to their cooperation intensity. The BAR-value thus allows for comparing the development of cooperation within and among specific basins, assuming that the BAR-value must increase with enhanced cooperation, especially the creation and operation of RBOs. By combining the interdisciplinary approach with the BAR-value, the author suggested that the LMC framework can be adapted to the YBR basin as an institutionalized form of future potential cooperation. With the above-mentioned concepts and methods in mind, the next section analyses the contextual background of transboundary water cooperation in the YBR basin.
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION IN THE YBR BASIN: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE
This section highlights the interrelated factors constituting the causal chain of water resources governance and cooperation in the basin-wide context. They all have implications for the current and future potential cooperation over YBR.
NATURAL CONDITION OF THE RIVER BASIN
Starting high up in the glaciers of the Himalayas, YBR passes across the Tibetan Plateau located in Tibet in South West China (named Yarlung Zangbo River in the country). It then descends into the northeastern corner of India (named Brahmaputra River in the country) and flows into the deltaic lowlands of Bangladesh (named Jamuna River in the country) (Franco et al., 2014). YBR flows across the plains of Bangladesh for 337 km before joining the Ganges, another large river in South Asia, which originates in Nepal. YBR meets the Meghna River near Chandpur, another main river in Bangladesh, and finally enters into the Bay of Bengal (see Figure 1). Many tributaries of YBR including the ParlungZangbo, Lhasa, DogxungZangbo, Nyang Qu and Nyang Rivers originate in China, while the Amochu, Wangchu and Sunkosh originate in Bhutan. Many tributaries including the Diheng, Dibang, Burhi Dihing and Teesta join the mainstream in Northeast India. The total drainage area of YBR is about 573,400 km2, which is distributed unevenly among the four riparian states (Rahaman & Varis, 2009; also see Table 1).
Basin area distribution and hydropower potential by country.
Country . | Drainage area (km2) . | Percentage of basin area . | Hydropower potential (103 MW) . | % of basin's total hydropower potential . |
---|---|---|---|---|
China | 293,000 | 51.1 | 110 | 53.4 |
India | 195,000 | 34.0 | 66 | 32.0 |
Bangladesh | 47,000 | 8.2 | 0 | 0.0 |
Bhutan | 38,400 | 6.7 | 30 | 14.6 |
Country . | Drainage area (km2) . | Percentage of basin area . | Hydropower potential (103 MW) . | % of basin's total hydropower potential . |
---|---|---|---|---|
China | 293,000 | 51.1 | 110 | 53.4 |
India | 195,000 | 34.0 | 66 | 32.0 |
Bangladesh | 47,000 | 8.2 | 0 | 0.0 |
Bhutan | 38,400 | 6.7 | 30 | 14.6 |
Source: Rahaman & Varis (2009, p. 61).
Map of the YarlungZangbo/Brahmaputra–Ganges. Source: GeologyPage, www.geologypage.com/2014/11/brahmaputra-river.html.
Map of the YarlungZangbo/Brahmaputra–Ganges. Source: GeologyPage, www.geologypage.com/2014/11/brahmaputra-river.html.
YBR is endowed with massive water flow, fertile agricultural lands and diverse ecosystems, providing a natural foundation for cooperation among its riparian states (Yasuda et al., 2017). Moreover, the transboundary water of YBR is an integrated system across political borders of co-riparian states due to its geological, hydrological and ecological characteristics, forcing the states to interact with each other. For example, a variety of natural disasters like floods, droughts, erosion, channel migration and earthquakes pose threats to the economic–social development of the riparian states, and climate change is expected to worsen the situation (Biggs, 2018). In particular, rainfall is unevenly distributed tra-annually, with apparent dry or flood seasons occurring in the basin, underlining the significance of cooperation on flood and drought management.
ECONOMIC–SOCIAL–ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE RIPARIAN STATES
Economic–social–environmental sustainability is the core indicator of UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It can be classified into three components of economic growth, social progress and environmental sustainability, which present levels of or changes in the economy, society and environment of a country, respectively.
The economic growth dimension of cooperation is based on the fact that water governance is always linked to the use and exploitation of water and related resources for economic development (Schmeier, 2013). On the one hand, all YBR states are developing countries, nevertheless have been undergoing high economic growth for many years (IMF, 2019). On the other hand, the positions and influences of these states on the global economy and regional affairs vary highly, which can be demonstrated by such primary economic indicators as their respective GDPs and share of world GDP (with China 15.12%, India 3.28% and Bangladesh 0.31%, while Bhutan being negligible) (Worldometers, 2021).
Social progress refers to the improvement of riparian populations' river-related well-being through activities such as disaster management, fisheries management and the improvement of livelihoods and income. The levels of social progress among the YBR states are similar to a certain extent, mainly due to their similar levels of economic growth. For example, a number of people (varying from 17.4 to 42.4%) in all riparian states are struggling with severe poverty or vulnerable to poverty (UNDP, 2019; Worldometers, 2021). Accordingly, they all take on a formidable task of developing economy and achieving social progress in the future, especially the three states China, India and Bangladesh, which are the world's first, second, and eighth most populous country, respectively (Worldometers, 2021).
Environmental sustainability is the key requirement of long-term economic growth and social progress. Concerning YBR, it refers to the extent to a healthier state of the environment in the river basin through reducing or mitigating adverse environmental effects caused by riparian's activities. Environmental sustainability thereby concerns such issues as water quality, hydromorphological alterations, sediment flow, fisheries, wetland health and biodiversity (Schmeier, 2013). Overall, all YBR states need to tackle their environmental problems resulted from preferring water resources exploration for growth-oriented development policies and projects, especially those riparian activities that may alter the river.
RIPARIAN ACTIVITIES THAT MAY ALTER THE RIVER
This subsection focuses on the different interests and uses by all riparian states and their related dependence on the river's resources, especially hydropower and water. YBR possesses a huge hydropower potential but is distributed unevenly among China, India and Bhutan (see Table 1). What is more notable is the hydropower potential possessed by China and India. During its journey from the Tibetan Plateau to India, the upper branch of the river, mainly located in China, flows through the world's ‘Energy Eldorado’ (Franco et al., 2014). The hydropower potential of the mainstream and tributaries of YBR in China is the second highest in the country following the Yangtze River. Nearly half (44.4%) of India's total hydropower potential lies in YBR, among which the debated area of ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ (South Tibet in China) alone has 67.5% (44,593 MW) (Rahaman & Varis, 2009).
Meanwhile, the riparian states are suffering from such problems as growing energy needs and water demands, which justify their interests and uses of hydropower and water in the basin (see Table 2), and consequently pose a range of challenges to social–environmental sustainability and regional security as well.
Distribution of interests and uses across riparian states.
Sector of interest . | China . | India . | Bangladesh . | Bhutan . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Water supply | * | * | * | |
Hydropower | * | * | * | |
Agricultural use | * | * | ||
Flood control | * | * | * | |
Water quality | * | * |
Sector of interest . | China . | India . | Bangladesh . | Bhutan . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Water supply | * | * | * | |
Hydropower | * | * | * | |
Agricultural use | * | * | ||
Flood control | * | * | * | |
Water quality | * | * |
*Asterisks summarize the differences in the interests of YBR states by visualizing the sectors each riparian state is particularly interested in.
China is facing the utmost problem of rising demand for energy resources, including hydropower potential over YBR. The combination of enormous population (nearly 1,412 million), rapid economic growth (the second top country by GDP) and intensified global competition for energy resources is driving China, the world's largest energy producer and consumer, to put increasing emphasis on energy production. China's power sector is largely dependent on fossil fuels, coal in particular, resulting in massive carbon emissions (four-fold that of India). However, with China's energy consumption bound to grow immensely in coming decades, the need to embrace the duties of controlling climate change and lowering coal dependence means a shift to renewable energy resources, as its hydropower development activities over YBR have shown. China currently has ongoing and planned dam-building activities on the river's mainstream in order to meet its domestic electricity and water demands. It has already constructed 10 small-scale dams on the tributaries of YBR and one dam (Zangmu) on the mainstream, with three more (the 640 MW Dagu-Dam, the 320 MW Jiacha-Dam and the Jiexu-Dam whose capacity is not confirmed) on the mainstream under construction (Togni, 2014). The Zangmu Hydropower Station, the first large hydropower station constructed on the mainstream of YBR as well as being Tibet's largest one, has attracted much attention in China and overseas. Designed to generate 2.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually, it was completed and became operational in October 2015. The project has a total installed capacity of 510 MW, which will ease the power shortage problem in central Tibet (Xinhua, 2014). As of this writing, China is the only YBR state to have completed dam-building on the river's mainstream, which has been a highly contentious undertaking because of its potential adverse ecological, economic and political impacts on its neighbors (Biba, 2018).
India is struggling with severe problems caused by increased water scarcity and energy demands due to its enormous population (1,393 million), coupled with rapid industrialization and urbanization (the fifth top country by GDP). At present, the freshwater withdrawal of India has accounted for 33.9% of its total renewable water resources, the highest among the four riparian states (UNDP, 2019). Meanwhile, being the world's sixth-largest energy consumer, India ranks seventh globally in the current hydropower generation (Wirsing, 2012). Not surprisingly, India is the most active one of the four riparian states, as evidenced by its various riparian activities. First of all, India has ongoing hydropower development on the tributaries of YBR and planned hydropower development on its mainstream. Intended to meet its growing electricity demand, manage flood control as well as to establish ‘prior use rights’ on the waters of YBR, India has stepped up its plans for hydropower development from 146 projects in 2007 to about 200 in 2014 (Jha, 2014; Rehman, 2014). The concept of ‘prior use rights’ means that projects in the downstream states on international rivers would help them in acquiring, and later claiming, rights to the water abstracted under such projects (Salman, 2010). Prior use rights start upon the completion of a project, so the number of projects that India has constructed and planned to construct in the YBR basin has risen rapidly (Jha, 2014). These projects include nearly 20 dams on the tributaries of YBR located in ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ (Rahaman & Varis, 2009; Biggs, 2018), among which one dam (the 600 MW Tawang-I hydropower project) has been completed, with two more (the 800 MW Tawang-II hydropower project and the 780 MW Nyamjangchhu project) under construction. Furthermore, India is unilaterally moving ahead with a controversial water diversion plan called the National River Linking Project, with the aim to mitigate water shortage and increase agricultural production. This plan intends to transfer water from the water surplus regions of the northeast to the water-scarce regions of western and southern India, including water from YBR to the Ganges (Rahaman & Varis 2009; Biggs, 2018; Higgins et al., 2018). In addition, India is collaborating with Bhutan on hydropower development over the tributaries of YBR to meet some of its energy needs (Shah & Giordan, 2013; Liu, 2015).
Bangladesh uses the water of YBR mainly for irrigation and fishery. Being a traditionally agricultural as well as the most downstream state of YBR, Bangladesh's main interest lies in agricultural utilization and delta maintenance. With the large population (166 million) and the highest population density in the whole of South Asia (1,275 per km2) (Worldometers, 2021), Bangladesh is highly dependent on the river and its resources, and most concerned with flood and pollution from upstream states. YBR is actually the most important river in Bangladesh, as it accounts for 65% of the country's river water, and about 70% of Bangladesh's total population (116 million) lives within the basin. The delta that the Ganges forms with YBR and Meghna rivers (the famous Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) basin) constitutes the base of the state's agricultural sector, accounting for almost half of employment in the area (Biggs, 2018).
Bhutan has moved forward with its hydropower development through collaboration with India. In comparison to a small population (771 thousand, ranked 165 in the world) and a low population density (20 per km2) (Worldometers, 2021), Bhutan has huge hydropower potential, which Bhutan positions as a key driver for its economic development. YBR covers Bhutan's total area, and hydropower provides 99% of its electricity, contributes to over 45% of its revenue and 21% of its GDP. However, the total hydropower developed in Bhutan was only 5% of the country's total hydropower potential (Yasuda et al., 2017). Although Bhutan is the upstream state concerning the tributaries of YBR, due to its poverty and lack of political influence, it must sign agreements with its downstream neighbor, India, to fully utilize its abundant water resources. The future challenge lies in the balance between hydropower development and environmental factors.
In sum, the water-related activities conducted by the riparian states will alter the natural conditions of YBR, including water quantity, water quality, ecosystems and geomorphology. This alteration will potentially cause adverse impacts on downstream nations and consequently triggers tensions and conflicts among the up- and downstream states, which needs to be addressed by mutual cooperation.
ECONOMIC–POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE RIPARIAN STATES
For the sake of common interests in developing economy and undertaking regional economic integration, the international society has seen a high growth of bilateral and regional trade and investment among China, India and Bangladesh. Due to the dynamic relationship between economic cooperation, water cooperation and environmental cooperation (Sadoff & Grey, 2002), the further acceleration of bilateral and regional trade and investment will be a potential incentive for enhanced transboundary water cooperation. The details are as follows.
India is currently China's largest trading partner, investment destination as well as engineering contracting market in South Asia, and the two countries have strengthened their economic cooperation and bilateral trade continuously. For example, with a year-on-year growth of 21.5%, the bilateral trade between China and India reached US$84.4 billion in 2017, while the target set by both countries is US$100 billion (Asia Pacific Daily, 2018).
Bangladesh is economically dependent on India, and India is Bangladesh's largest trading partner (Yasuda et al., 2017). The bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh has grown at an average annual rate of about 6% since 2005, mainly due to lower preferential tariff rates with each other under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) among three YBR states (India, Bangladesh and Bhutan) and four non-YBR states (Pakistan, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka). At present, India's exports to Bangladesh are eight-fold of its imports from Bangladesh. If the trade differential between the two countries can be reduced, a higher growth is expected in the future.
China is gradually expanding its economic ties with Bangladesh (Yasuda et al., 2017; Biggs, 2018). The bilateral trade between China and Bangladesh grew more than 18-fold in 2001–2016, from US$676.7 million to US$12,410.4 million (Shamrat & Ali, 2018). China is currently one of Bangladesh's largest trading partners. With its new economic policy ‘One Belt One Road’ that aims to connect China with Asia, Africa and Europe via land and sea routes implemented, China has started to expand its economic routes and trade relationships with its South Asian neighbors. As the Belt and Road initiative takes shape, Bangladesh and China will see bilateral trade and mutual investment boom in the coming years (Xinhua, 2017).
Contrarily to the common interests and intensified cooperation on economic integration among the YBR states, the political relationships among them are very subtle and complex, due to multiple causes like riparian activities, border disputes and regional geopolitics. While both China and India are embarking upon riparian activities, they are competing and contradicting with each other as well. Furthermore, China has had unsettled border disputes with India in South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh in India) since 1962, resulting in their political distrust, and vice versa. India is located in the middle of South Asia, having borders with the states both within YBR (China, Bhutan and Bangladesh) and beyond YBR (Nepal, Pakistan and Myanmar). With its size and population, India has a strong influence in South Asia. Bhutan is, to some extent, politically dependent on India, as it has limited diplomatic ties with other states. China is a relatively new partner in the geopolitical context and often competes with India for political influence over other nations in South Asia, Bangladesh in particular (Yasuda et al., 2017; Biggs, 2018). The increasing influence of China in South Asia, including areas where India has had predominant influence over other nations, is changing the geopolitical context of the region. In sum, the situations of complex geopolitics and power asymmetry among the riparian states constitute major impediments for further water cooperation in the future.
CUSTOMARY PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
As the means of mainly governing international relationships among nations, international law is indispensable to guide state behavior, facilitate international cooperation, prevent and settle international disputes. Concerning the utilization and protection of transboundary water resources, there are two UN Conventions in force which are open to all states in the world, namely the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC) and the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. Although none of the four riparian states has signed or ratified either convention (UN, 2021), the principles of international water law listed in the conventions, especially Part II (headed ‘General Principles’) of UNWC apply to them as customary international water law (McCaffrey, 2019). These principles include equitable and reasonable utilization, no significant harm, international cooperation and regular exchange of data and information. While accelerating their riparian activities, YBR states are also paying attention to these principles through evolving practice of transboundary water cooperation (He, 2015). The next section will explore the existing practice in detail.
CURRENT PRACTICE OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION IN THE YBR BASIN
The duty to cooperate is the bedrock of customary international law. YBR states do undertake mutual collaboration, but it is very limited. This section will elaborate on the features of and rationale for the current cooperation.
LEVEL OF THE CURRENT COOPERATION: LOW-MEDIUM COOPERATION
The positive BAR-value, developed by TFDD and adapted by Schmeier (Wolf et al., 2003; Schmeier, 2013), captures the intensity of cooperative events over international rivers based on a scale from 1 to 7 (see Table 3). A serious of scale 2–4 cooperative events demonstrate that the current cooperation practice within the YBR basin is at a low-medium level. The details are as follows.
Positive BAR-scale.
Scale . | Description . |
---|---|
1 | Minor official exchanges or policy expressions; mild verbal support |
2 | Official verbal support of goals or values of regional order; minor cooperative actions |
3 | Non-strategic support; joint projects; meeting of ministers/officials |
4 | Economic, technological or industrial agreement and support; nonbinding agreement/MoU; high-level meeting |
5 | Strategic support; international treaty/agreement with minor impact on basin governance; establishment of RBO without legal personality |
6 | International treaty/agreement on the river issue significantly impacting on its basin governance; establishment of RBO with legal personality |
7 | Voluntary unification of two or more states over water; establishment of RBO under a regional integration framework |
Scale . | Description . |
---|---|
1 | Minor official exchanges or policy expressions; mild verbal support |
2 | Official verbal support of goals or values of regional order; minor cooperative actions |
3 | Non-strategic support; joint projects; meeting of ministers/officials |
4 | Economic, technological or industrial agreement and support; nonbinding agreement/MoU; high-level meeting |
5 | Strategic support; international treaty/agreement with minor impact on basin governance; establishment of RBO without legal personality |
6 | International treaty/agreement on the river issue significantly impacting on its basin governance; establishment of RBO with legal personality |
7 | Voluntary unification of two or more states over water; establishment of RBO under a regional integration framework |
Sources: TFDD/Wolf et al. (2003) and Schmeier (2013) (adapted by author).
First, while the approach of integrated water resources management (IWRM) stresses the need for cooperation across all riparian states to improve the effectiveness of basin governance (Schmeier, 2013), and China and India have the capacity to initiate or engage in basin-wide exchanges, both influential nations primarily take a non-inclusive approach (consisting of a subset of riparian states only), as witnessed by many bilateral water agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) governing the various sub-basins of YBR that they have signed with their co-riparian states (see Table 4). Moreover, except for the several Indo-Bhutan hydropower agreements as well as the Statue of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (IBJC Statue) featuring formal and long-term cooperation, all of these MoUs are ad hoc and short-term cooperation efforts below the level of institutionalized cooperation, which are not in conformity with the requirements of effective basin governance and social–environmental sustainability.
List of bilateral water agreements and MoUs over the YBR basin.
Countries . | Water agreements . |
---|---|
China, India |
|
India, Bangladesh |
|
China, Bangladesh |
|
India, Bhutan |
|
Bhutan, Bangladesh |
|
Countries . | Water agreements . |
---|---|
China, India |
|
India, Bangladesh |
|
China, Bangladesh |
|
India, Bhutan |
|
Bhutan, Bangladesh |
|
Source: Author, based on information from Liu (2015) and Yasuda et al. (2017).
Second, such bilateral agreements and MoUs are extremely fragmented and in most cases very limited in scope and extent. The focus areas of water cooperation under the framework of these documents in force are restricted to specific technical issues, which may be classified into the two following categories.
Joint hydropower development activities conducted or planned between India–Bhutan and between Bangladesh–Bhutan
These activities may be defined as cooperative events of ‘joint projects’ (scale 3) or ‘industrial agreements’ (scale 4). To avoid serious disputes with Bangladesh while meeting its energy needs to some extent, India promotes YBR hydropower development mainly through bilateral cooperation with Bhutan. India is the main investor in Bhutanese hydropower dams and purchaser of the electricity generated from them. The several agreements on hydroelectric projects signed by the two countries allow India to invest in hydropower projects in Bhutan in the tributaries of YBR (Liu, 2015). After meeting its domestic energy demand, Bhutan exports most of the hydropower to India and has achieved economic–social development gains (Biswas, 2011; Liu, 2015). With regard to joint hydropower development between Bangladesh and Bhutan, the two nations do not share a border in the basin-wide context. Bangladesh is interested in investing in Bhutanese hydropower which requires the consent from India, because the required transmission line lying between Bangladesh and Bhutan has to cross India. Bhutan and Bangladesh have signed an MoU for the construction of Dorjilung hydropower dam, and India agreed to it in 2017, implying that India has started to take into account the interests of its neighbors in its foreign policies, and the political tension between India and Bangladesh can be improved. This may potentially open doors for future cooperation among all YBR states (Yasuda et al., 2017).
Provision of hydrological information between China–India, India–Bangladesh and China–Bangladesh
The cooperation in this regard is fragmented and focused on tackling such urgent problems as the provision of hydrological information in flood season, which may be defined as cooperative events based on ‘nonbinding MoUs’ (scale 4). For example, China signed the MoU upon the provision of hydrological information on YBR with India and with Bangladesh separately, although China provides to Bangladesh the same flood season data (water level, discharge and rainfall in respect to three stations Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia located on the river) that it provides to India according to the MoU. In addition, India has to pay for the data, while Bangladesh has free access to it (Liu, 2015). India provides hydrological data of YBR in flood seasons to Bangladesh according to a similar MoU. Nevertheless, a range of substantial collective action problems like riparian activities, water allocation for multiple uses, inter-basin water storage, pollution control and environmental sustainability remain unsolved. Although India and Bangladesh reached an agreement on ad hoc sharing of the Teesta waters (a tributary of YBR) in 1983, which may be defined as scale 5 cooperative events (‘international agreement with minor impact on basin governance’), it has not been signed, let alone implemented.
Third, while some joint mechanisms responsible for the implementation of such agreements and MoUs have been set up among the YBR states, they are of bilateral nature with many limitations. For example, although China and India set up an Expert Level mechanism in November 2006 in accordance with a Joint Declaration to improve cooperation on flood warnings and environmental protection, it is the bottom level of institutionalization (even not truly institutionalized cooperation) in terms of its institutional design, whose main task is to take such ‘minor cooperative actions’ as to discuss interaction on the provision of flood season hydrological data, emergency management and other technical issues regarding all trans-border rivers shared by China and India, indicating a low commitment of the two states. In addition, open information on how the Expert Level mechanism operates or what progress has been made is not available (Liu, 2015; Barua et al., 2018). The IBJC, a medium institutionalized level of RBO without legal personality established in 1972 which can be classified into scale 5 cooperative events at the bilateral level, does not contribute to effective water resources governance between the two nations, evidenced by the following facts: (1) IBJC governs all 54 rivers shared by its two members, of which YBR is only one; (2) its functional scope is such ‘minor cooperation actions’ as ‘to formulate proposals for carrying out coordinated research’ and ‘to recommend implementation of joint projects’ (Article 4 of IBJC Statue); and (3) few of the recommendations made by IBJC have been implemented (Schmeier, 2013).
Fourth, although progress has been made on multilateral cooperation, they have many limitations as well, as the following facts have shown. (1) All YBR states have participated in the Brahmaputra Dialogue that adopts an actor-inclusive approach. However, it is a multitrack and multilateral dialogue process instead of truly institutionalized cooperation, that is, an informal platform of policy dialogue and communication initiated by several nongovernmental actors, which can be classified into scale 2 events of ‘minor cooperation actions’. (2) Under the initiative on Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) sub-regional cooperation (scale 4 cooperative events of ‘economic support’) launched by India in 2013, which covered issue-areas other than water resources management originally, the four countries BBIN established an inter-governmental Joint Working Group on water management and hydropower, with the aims to explore the possibilities of collaborating on hydropower development, power trading and inter-grid connectivity (Xie et al., 2017a; Haran, 2018). Nevertheless, this form of cooperation is developed among subset of YBR states and a non-YBR state (Nepal), failing to cover the entire basin. In sum, no water-related institutionalized cooperation targeted the mere YBR at the multinational level is in sight, let alone at the basin-wide level. Accordingly, there is a lack of scientific knowledge and information on the whole basin, which is the starting point of formulating any basin-wide sustainable management plan.
RATIONALE FOR THE CURRENT COOPERATION: THE POLICY OF RESPONSIVE DIPLOMACY
Why does the existing practice of transboundary water cooperation in the YBR basin take on the above-analyzed features? To answer this question, one can explore the diplomatic policies implemented by China and India. Determined by comprehensive national strengths and regional geopolitics, China and India dominate the current water cooperation in the basin. However, both countries prefer to address water concerns and disputes with downstream states in a political and diplomatic approach. In fact, whether the cooperation between China and its downstream neighbors or the cooperation between India and its downstream neighbors is often based on the policy of responsive diplomacy (He, 2015). It has the following main characteristics.
First, the policy of responsive diplomacy usually occurs when a state passively responds to the requests and disputes of other states in its foreign activities, resulting in fragmented, ad hoc and short-term cooperation. For example, in response to India's request, China strengthened communication and cooperation with India on flood control, disaster mitigation and other issues concerning YBR on a very limited basis. Likewise, in response to the concern of Bangladesh on YBR, India made some limited efforts which were very low in contrast to its economic transactions with Bangladesh.
Second, the main goal of the policy is to safeguard short-term economic interests and traditional political interests – desecuritize water disputes, prevent water problems from escalating and maintain the friendship of good neighborhood. The policy embodies the principle of international cooperation to an extent, as reflected in technical cooperation among the riparian states. However, from the perspective of aforementioned contextual background, it can be concluded that the policy of responsive diplomacy neglects such factors influencing transboundary water cooperation as social–environmental sustainability, riparian activities, political trust and regional security, which have posed a range of challenges to the current cooperation practice. The next section will delineate these challenges.
PRIMARY CHALLENGES FACING THE CURRENT COOPERATION PRACTICE
The current cooperation practice is suffering manifold challenges and, with increased riparian activities, they are likely to increase. The primary challenges are as follows.
Water conflicts between China and India
Both China and India regard the water resources of YBR as a strategic source vital for their future economic–social development; likewise, both countries have engaged in riparian activities. Nevertheless, the limited level of cooperation has led to water conflicts and diplomatic disputes. Moreover, China and India contradict and compete with each other on their geographic boundaries, development plans and policy agendas, respectively, within YBR and beyond, resulting in political tension and potential conflicts. Unfortunately, the lack of mutual trust has hampered the prevention and settlement of the following conflicts and disputes.
The first conflict involves China's controversial riparian activities. The main water conflicts between China and India stem from China's hydropower generation plans, some already being implemented, to put the river's unexploited waters to greater use. China's dam-building agenda has created apprehension in India about the risk of flash floods and landslides affecting livelihoods of millions as well as ecosystems downstream, even China's ‘dam up’ control of India in the event of conflicts (Sehenstar, 2014). India is particularly worried that Chinese hydropower dams will affect downstream flows. With indications that China has approved three more hydropower projects on the mainstream of YBR, and the information regarding these projects is not publicly available, India is frustrated in its attempts to reason with China. India has claimed its prior user rights as a lower riparian state. India is hoping to establish prior use rights to stake its claim to an uninterrupted flow of the YBR waters through water-use project construction (Jha, 2014). However, the claim of prior use rights cannot get support from customary international water law, which has never regarded prior use as a decisive factor in the allocation of the waters of the shared rivers according to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Prior use is only one of a series of reference factors, including hydrology, economy, society and environment, and has no priority in the allocation of the waters if there is no related treaty, agreement or compact among the upstream and downstream states.
Moreover, India has conveyed its ‘concerns’ to the Chinese central government and has urged China to ensure that the interests of downstream states are not harmed by any activity in upstream areas. As some observers see, China has attempted to defuse India's tensions by emphasizing the limited impact China's use has on India. China seeks to assuage India's fear of its hydropower development, by publicly proclaiming that its dam-building plans are to be used only for hydropower generation and will not reduce river flow (Biggs, 2018). Besides, the Indian government attempted to establish further mechanisms to monitor China's riparian activities and assess the type of them. However, China indicated that the existing cooperation mechanisms were adequate (Amano, 2015), resulting in misgiving and discontent by India.
The second concerns dry season data sharing. Adequate data sharing is an essential foundation of further cooperation as well as a prerequisite for successful water resources governance. The cooperation between China–India, India–Bangladesh and China–Bangladesh on the provision of hydrological information has proved valuable to flood forecasting and mitigation. Nevertheless, the current data sharing among the riparian states only cover flood season (between 1 June and 15 October from 2014 onward between 15 May and 15 October) river flow. India asked China to provide dry season data, but this request has not been met (Amano, 2015), mainly due to a lack of mutual trust and national security considerations. In fact, dry season river flow records by upstream states are instrumental for lower riparian states to forecast low-flow events, and thereby improve preparedness for agricultural and drought prone (Yasuda et al., 2017). Furthermore, the lack of related data makes it difficult to accurately predict the effects of the dams on the ecosystem (Rehman, 2014). Thus, the incomplete water knowledge and limited exchange of information has led to information asymmetry and consequently created mistrust and suspicion between the two countries (Barua et al., 2018).
Water conflicts between India and Bangladesh
Since 67% of Bangladesh's annual water flow comes from upstream, its agricultural utilization and delta maintenance is significantly influenced by the upper riparian states, especially India. Despite the fact that India helped Bangladesh gain its independence, they need to avoid and solve various conflicts over YBR.
The first involves India's controversial riparian activities. Because of various factors like asymmetrical power relationships, tense geopolitical relations and different religious beliefs, Bangladesh distrusts India and is worried about and protesting against India's riparian activities and related plans. These plans, should they all go ahead, have been called a ‘calamity waiting to happen’ (Jha, 2014), especially because of their potential adverse impacts on various geological stresses which are prone to seismic activity, landslides and flash floods. Besides, if the large-scale National River Linking Project is implemented by India, it would have far-reaching consequences for downstream river discharge and delta maintenance. These impacts may have profound implications on food, environment and public health, particularly in the context of climate change (Higgins et al., 2018).
The second conflict concerns the dry season flow of YBR. Even though Bangladesh is one of the world's most water-endowed countries, water scarcity has emerged as its prime concern in the dry season influenced by the southwest monsoon (Shah & Giordan, 2013). Bangladesh claims that the dry season flow of YBR is not abundant and demands that the dry season flow of the Ganges be augmented by conserving a part of its monsoon flow through the construction of storage dams in Nepal. However, India has refused to support Bangladesh's position (Rahaman & Varis, 2009).
The third relates to flood control. Bangladesh is eager to avoid floods from both YBR and the Ganges during the monsoon period. It claims that satisfactory flood control can only be realized through storing water upstream, mainly in Nepal, which requires trilateral cooperation among Bangladesh, India and Nepal. Likewise, India has refused this request (Rahaman & Varis, 2009).
Regional insecurity in South Asia
Both China and India are currently suffering from the situation of ‘upstream dilemma’ (Wouters & Devlaeminck, 2018). That is, their controversial riparian activities have caused various water conflicts and consequently exacerbated political tension between China–India and between India–Bangladesh. Due to the complex geopolitics and asymmetrical power relationships among the YBR states, coupled with two practical reasons, the situation of ‘upstream dilemma’ China and India are suffering has adverse impacts not only on their own national interests but also on political stability and regional security in the whole of South Asia. One practical reason is that the water conflicts between China and India do not concern just the water resources itself, but also the tenure of a debated area of 83,000 km2 in ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ (South Tibet in China), which accounts for 14.5% of the total drainage area of YBR. China would see Indian development further downstream as a threat to its claims over South Tibet (Wang, 2014). The other reason is that India's National River Linking Project includes diverting water from YBR to the Ganges, while the riparian states of the Ganges contain not only the YBR states (China, India and Bangladesh) but also a non-YBR state (Nepal). If this project is developed, it will cause serious conflicts among these states and consequently raise political distrust. Overall, the continuous tension and sensitive balance between China and India (Togni, 2014; Biggs, 2018) could destabilize all states in South Asia, which accounts for one-fifth of the world's population and contributes more than 15% to global growth (IMF, 2019).
To address the challenges, the YBR states are now in a position to make positive changes to their current cooperation practice. The next section will look forward to these changes for future cooperation in detail.
PROSPECT FOR FUTURE COOPERATION
The challenges that the riparian states face shall be addressed by enhancing transboundary water cooperation in the future. It may be very helpful to envision a suitable framework for future potential cooperation.
RATIONALE FOR FUTURE COOPERATION: THE POLICY OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
To better govern basin water resources and improve social–environmental sustainability, each riparian state needs to figure out a rationale for future cooperation that regards the concerns and interests of other riparian states as well as maximizes its long-term national interests, including economic, social, environmental, political and regional interests (He, 2015). The policy of ‘preventive diplomacy’ can be viewed as both a proper rationale and an ideal foreign policy in this regard. Preventive diplomacy occurs when a state proactively anticipates and attempts to address riparian concerns so as to avoid water disputes as well as significant transboundary harm. Contrarily to responsive diplomacy resulting in fragmented cooperation, this policy implements a comprehensive and integrated water strategy that considers and balances all the factors affecting transboundary water cooperation. It adopts both multilateral and bilateral approaches and contains cooperation on issues significantly influencing basin water governance beyond technical activities, such as water allocation and pollution control. Given the legalization of international relations, the customary principles of international law play the same role as political and diplomatic approaches in implementing the policy.
It should be noted that although the policy of preventive diplomacy has a number of advantages, the formulation and implementation of it face some difficulties, such as controversial riparian activities, historical rivalries, asymmetrical power, political mistrust, mismatched national interests and conflicted policy preference among the riparian states (Biswas, 2011; Ho, 2017; Xie et al., 2017b; Barua et al., 2018). Nevertheless, only if these difficulties can be handled through appropriate collective actions of all riparian states, the above-mentioned challenges are likely to be addressed adequately, which will make each state become a winner ultimately. From the perspective of such activities and events as the Brahmaputra Dialogue, BBIN cooperation mechanism, China's contribution to LMC and India's agreement to the MoU for the construction of Dorjilung hydropower dam, China and India have begun to work in a ‘multilateral way’ that embodies the policy of preventive diplomacy to a certain extent, indicating that potential multilateral cooperation in the YBR basin is expected in the future.
PREREQUISITE FOR FUTURE COOPERATION: TRUST BUILDING
Among all difficulties to formulate and implement the policy of preventive diplomacy, political mistrust is the biggest. Given the present situation, trust building among the riparian states is the basic prerequisite for potential multilateral cooperation in the YBR basin. The practice of Indo-Bhutan hydropower cooperation shows that given goodwill and trust between the riparian states concerned, water can be successfully used as an engine for sustainable growth (Biswas, 2011). Moreover, the ‘multilateral way’ in which China and India are going has laid a good foundation for future multilateral cooperation. For example, the Brahmaputra Dialogue that all YBR states have participated in is proven to be quite helpful for building mutual trust and confidence. Moreover, the Dialogue aims to develop ideas on basin-wide institutions that can facilitate cooperation (Yasuda et al., 2018). It has paved a way toward institutionalized multilateral water cooperation, bringing about sustainable changes in the basin management (Barua, 2018b; Barua & Vij, 2018).
Looking forward to the future, the overall improvement of political relationships between China–India and between India–Bangladesh will be a major step toward institutionalized multilateral cooperation in the YBR basin. It can be expected for manifold reasons and incentives.
First, political trust, economic cooperation and environmental cooperation, including transboundary water cooperation, are in a dynamic relationship with each other (Sadoff & Grey, 2002). That is to say, they are very closely interlinked, as evidenced in the following two aspects. (1) Transboundary water cooperation can boost political trust and underpin economic cooperation. For example, even though institutional water cooperation between China and India is of the bottom level, the Expert Level mechanism provides useful channels of communication, helps routinize their interactions and prevents open conflicts from resulting (Ho, 2017). (2) Economic cooperation can ease political tensions and motivate transboundary water cooperation, as illustrated by the example of LMC. Since the YBR states are accelerating their interdependence in such areas as economy, trade, investment and energy, and transboundary water is the gossamer that links all social–economic activities with the governments (Biba, 2018), there is tremendous potential for enhanced economic and water cooperation among the riparian states, which can lead to enhanced political trust. In addition, the current process of regional economic integration as well as a number of economic cooperation mechanisms within the basin and beyond, like the SATFA, the Commerce Portal between China and SATFA, the Belt and Road Initiatives and the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) Economic Corridor, also provide various opportunities in facilitating political trust and water cooperation.
Second, both China and India have made assiduous efforts to desecuritize their water disputes and prevent water problems from escalating, while the conventional view is that desecuritization can result in genuine water cooperation (Ho et al., 2019). China's current attitude toward water cooperation with its downstream neighbors may be looked upon as an obstacle to future cooperation, mainly due to the following facts: China's water cooperation in the YBR basin is largely dependent on India's response (He, 2015; Xie et al., 2017b); because China is satisfied with the current state of Sino-Indian relation, its strategy is focused on maintaining the status quo (Ho, 2017). It is, however, only one side of the same coin. The other side is composed of the following two points. (1) Although China is the most upstream state of YBR, its impact and role in the basin should not be overestimated, taking into account the outflow amount of upstream China. The annual flow of upstream China is 98.9 billion cubic meters, while its outflow amount is 166.1 billion cubic meters (China, 2011). (2) Not only can downstream states be harmed by upstream states through interfering with the flow of the shared river or polluting its waters, but also ‘upstream states can be affected, or even harmed, through the foreclosure of their future uses of water, caused by the prior use and the claiming of rights to such water by the downstream states’ (Salman, 2010, p. 351). The concept of ‘foreclosure of future uses’ means that the available use of waters in the future by the upstream states under the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization would have already been foreclosed by the downstream states usually invoking prior use rights and the principle of no significant harm. There had been scholarly work, international legal instruments, judicial decisions and the World Bank policies and practices expounding the concept of ‘foreclosure of future uses’, indicating that harm is indeed a two-way matter (Salman, 2010). Due to current riparian activities and related conflicts as well as complex economic–political relationships between China and India, India could hinder future water use by China based on the claiming of prior use rights in the YBR basin. The conflicts of concerns and interests between up- and downstream states can only be adequately addressed through trust building and strengthened cooperation.
Third, China and India have expressed their political will to show mutual respect, boost political trust, enhance practical collaboration and settle border disputes many times. For instance, in May 2015, China and India issued a Joint Statement which states that ‘the process of the two countries pursuing their respective national development goals and security interests must unfold in a mutually supportive manner with both sides showing mutual respect and sensitivity to each other's concerns, interests and aspirations’. In addition, it provides that ‘the two sides are determined to actively seek a political settlement of the boundary question’ (Articles 3 and 12). The bitterness over Doklam – the border standoff in 2017, which resulted in significant bilateral strain, has not hurt the willingness of the two nations to come closer, as witnessed by the two summits held between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, respectively, in Wuhan, China in April 2018, and in Chennai, India in October 2019 (Sharma, 2019).
FORM OF FUTURE COOPERATION: AN INCLUSIVE RBO
The current fragmented cooperation should only be seen as the first few steps toward integrated and long-term cooperative frameworks to govern transboundary water and related resources effectively and improve sustainability. Whether transboundary water governance is effective depends on a series of factors, including the nature of the collective action problem, the constellation of actors in the basin and water-related institutions (Schmeier, 2013).
Much has been written on the establishment, functioning and effectiveness of water-related institutions, especially RBOs in practice. On the one hand, there are multiple institutionalized alternatives to improve transboundary water governance, such as RBOs, government agencies of water governance, local-scale formal and informal institutions (Middleton & Devlaeminck, 2021). According to UNWC, establishing RBOs does not constitute an obligation of riparian states. Such states ‘may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them’ (Article 8). On the other hand, RBOs can significantly contribute to the neutralization of contentious issues (Biba, 2018), the balance of national interests, the enhancement of political trust, the sharing of data and the alleviation of conflicts on riparian activities. Institutionalist theory, hydropolitics research and international water law highlight the important role of RBOs in ensuring effective transboundary water governance. For example, Middleton and Devlaeminck demonstrated through some examples that an RBO may build trust and predictability in transboundary water governance, improve riparian human well-being and protect ecological systems (Middleton & Devlaeminck, 2021). The International Law Association's 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources, in some regards a codification of customary law, recognizes that the establishment and operation of an RBO is the key to undertake IWRM. Nevertheless, not the existence of an RBO alone but the proper design and effective operation of it is one of the explanatory factors for the effectiveness of river basin governance. The successful experience of RBOs such as the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICDPR) in Europe may be an example to demonstrate this argument.
RBOs can be divided into the following three categories that Table 3 connotes: First, RBO without legal personality (scale 5), diversely in the name of ‘Committee’, ‘Council’, ‘Commission’ or ‘Cooperation mechanism’, such as IBJC and LMC. Second, RBO with legal personality (scale 6), generally in the name of ‘Commission’, such as the International Joint Commission (IJC) established by USA and Canada, and the International Boundary and Water Commission established by USA and Mexico. Third, RBO under a comprehensive regional integration framework (scale 7), such as ICPR and ICPDR under the framework of the European Union and its Water Framework Directive. Each type of RBO has its comparative advantages and disadvantages as well. From the perspective of state practice, the higher the scale of a mature RBO, the lower the flexibility and adaptability to each riparian state, the stronger the political will of its member states to improve transboundary water governance, the higher the level of its legalization and institutionalization, the more stable the basin governance framework, the more sound the basin governance mechanism, the more predictable the behaviors of its member states, the closer to IWRM, and the better the basin governance effectiveness.
In the YBR basin, due to the complicated geopolitical relations, territory sovereignty issues and asymmetrical power structures among the YBR states, negotiation for a normative cooperative framework like a legally binding treaty and a basin-wide RBO under which is not a desirable starting point (Barua et al., 2018). That is, the high-top level (scales 6 and 7) of RBO such as IJC, ICPR and ICPDR is not acceptable for all the YBR states. Therefore, it is more likely that all the YBR states will set up the YarlungZangbo/Brahmaputra Cooperation mechanism (YBC) (or the Ganges-Brahmaputra Cooperation mechanism that includes Nepal) based on the experience and lessons of LMC, a kind of medium-high level (scale 5) of BRO.
Initiated by the most upstream China in the Lancang–Mekong river, LMC performs a broad range of ‘bridging’ functions, that is, like most RBOs in Europe and North America, it is a coordinated-oriented RBO in the charge of coordinating member states' activities rather than implementing projects (Lmcchina, 2021). The establishment of LMC signals China's incremental shift toward multilateralism in transboundary water governance (Middleton & Devlaeminck, 2021). The LMC framework has several comparative advantages, especially the following.
Inclusiveness
RBOs may be classified into two categories of inclusive RBO and non-inclusive RBO according to the membership structure of them. An inclusive RBO brings together all riparian states in a river basin, while a non-inclusive RBO consists of a subset of riparian states only. Coming from a self-initiative of all six co-riparian states (China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), the member of LMC contains all of them, making it an inclusive BRO contributing to the enhancement of cooperation on basin governance, as reflected in the relatively high intensity of cooperation within LMC after its creation in 2016 (Lmcchina, 2021).
Adaptability
LMC was established according to Sanya Declaration (as it was issued in Sanya, China) that mainly reflects political commitments of riparian states in Lancang–Mekong to enhance cooperation on basin governance. According to the Five-Year Plan of Action on LMC (2018–2022) formulating on the basis of Sanya Declaration, the International Secretariat ensuring the continuous function of LMC is expected to be set up in the near future. This shows its flexible nature adapted to the reality in the basin, allowing LMC to be tailored to each riparian's specific needs.
Meanwhile, the functioning of LMC is far from optimal in terms of transboundary water governance. The deficiencies in LMC, especially in the following two aspects, have resulted in its limited effectiveness on water governance, which the suggested YBC need to avoid.
Overly broad mandate
LMC deals with such multi-issues as political and security issues, economic and sustainable development as well as social, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, which contain many non-water-related concerns. At present, the work of LMC focuses on issues in five prioritized fields, among which water resources governance is the only one (Lmcchina, 2021). Nevertheless, hydropolitics literature shows that RBOs targeting a clearly defined but integrated set of water-related issues are more effective in river basin governance (Schmeier, 2013).
Ignorance of pressing issues
LMC seems to focus too much on the creation of economic benefits from and beyond the river, actual cooperation and benefit sharing on sustainable water management remain insufficient (Biba, 2018). In particular, such pressing issues as riparian activities and environmental sustainability are absent in the agenda of LMC. Since the 1990s, there has been progressively extensive hydropower dam construction across the basin, while there is concern that the development of upstream dams is causing significant damage to downstream regions. Researchers find that the building of dams upriver in Laos and China as well as the mining of sand from the riverbed are altering the river's flow, sediment content and even its color (Reed, 2020). Such dam construction negatively affects existing users and could cause ecological harm (Middleton & Devlaeminck, 2021). As each river basin is an ecological entity, legal and policy discourse under LMC and the suggested YBC should focus on managing riparian activities and achieving environmental sustainability.
In sum, LMC is not a success in some water-related issues, especially in managing dam-building activities and achieving environmental sustainability, while LMC has made many achievements since its creation, including year-round hydrological information sharing, enhancement of political trust and economic–social development of the member states (Lmcchina, 2021; Middleton & Devlaeminck, 2021). For example, China has begun to provide hydrological information not only in flood seasons but also in dry seasons of the Lancang–Mekong to other five riparian states and Mekong River Commission (MRC) since November 2020 (Lmcchina, 2021). Before this date, China provided the four MRC members (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam) with water-level data from its territory during each year's flood season through MRC, according to three MoUs upon the provision of hydrological information on the Lancang–Mekong in flood season signed by China and MRC since 1993 (highly similar to current hydrological information sharing among the YBR states). Thus, it may be perceived as a partial success and adapted to the YBR basin.
It can be expected that the YBR states establish YBC adapted from the LMC framework, because most of the factors affecting transboundary water cooperation such as the natural condition of the river basins, economic–social–environmental sustainability of riparian states, riparian activities, economic relationships among the riparian states between the two basins are highly similar. For example, both basins struggle with such water-related problems as riparian activities, natural disasters, climate change and water pollution; both basins face such common tasks as solving disputes over water resources exploitation, developing economy, improving people's livelihoods and protecting environment (preface of Sanya Declaration). Likewise, the long-term national interests of the riparian states would be maximized, if the customary principles of international water law could come into play. However, this does not mean that the YBR states could simply mimic the LMC framework, due to the following reasons: first, there are apparent differences in such regards as power structures, geopolitical relations and security agendas between the two basins; second, the LMC framework has both advantages and disadvantages and may be changed for the economic and political situation of the basin as well as the needs of riparian states.
FOCUS AREAS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION: DATA SHARING AND RIPARIAN ACTIVITIES
Studies show that the effectiveness of river basin governance requires RBOs to deal with all interdependent water-related issues in the respective river basin, which allows for addressing the key collective action problems of the basin in an integrated manner (Schmeier, 2013). Therefore, the functional scope of the suggested YBC should cover various issues clearly related to water resources governance, such as fishery management, water allocation and water quality monitoring. Meanwhile, the focus areas for potential basin-wide cooperation should be defined to solve urgent problems that all or most of the riparian states are suffering from. Taking the needs of each riparian state into account, the imminent fields of cooperation seem to be data sharing and riparian activities.
Data sharing is a basic function of RBOs. Such data concern a broad variety of issues in the basin, including geological and hydrological conditions of the river basin, the river's flow regime, precipitation and evaporation rates. To facilitate data sharing and achieve effective flood and drought management, the current data sharing policy needs to be improved, especially on the following aspects: First, year-round information sharing. The exchange of hydrological data round the year will help in improving the quality of flood and drought forecasting for all four riparian states. Second, develop flood forecasting and early warning systems through the exchange of real-time data on river flow from upstream areas of the basins. The benefits in this regard have been demonstrated in the Danube basin (Rasul, 2015). The riparian states could even generate a comprehensive and scientific knowledge and information database for the river basin, which is essential for all kinds of planning for the basin's resources. Meanwhile, the suggested YBC could collaborate with the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) to strengthen data sharing and cooperation in other fields. ICIMOD, a regional inter-governmental learning and knowledge sharing center, serves the eight regional member countries of the Hindu Kush Himalaya, including all YBR states (its other four members are Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan). It has developed a regional flood information system based on comprehensive data sharing with joint modeling and scenario development among the GBM countries (ICIMOD, 2020), which can be quite helpful for the sharing of data and information as well as other cooperative issues within the YBR basin and beyond. Overall, the suggested YBC and ICIMOD can cooperate in such issues as experience sharing, technical exchange, drought and flood management, joint research, knowledge management and capacity building in the development and management of YBR water and related resources.
The riparian activities mainly implemented by China and India have led to many conflicts and disputes that threaten social–environmental sustainability and regional security, thus should be addressed by the suggested YBC. First of all, the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and no significant harm should be actualized through a series of procedural rules. In accordance with UNWC, the establishment of a procedural mechanism regarding the duties of notification, prior consultation and transboundary environmental impact assessment upon planned activities that are likely to cause significant transboundary harm may be a way forward (He, 2015). Moreover, the riparian activities and related cooperation in the YBR basin involve the Ganges, since the mingled waters of the two rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal, and India's water diversion plan includes diverting water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges. The Ganges is very important for Nepal and China, because 45% of its water flow comes from the two countries. The BBIN cooperation mechanism and its collaboration with the suggested YBC are probably suitable platforms under which measures concerning inter-basin cooperation over the Brahmaputra–Ganges or GBM could be discussed, and consequently the enormous potential on water benefit sharing of the entire South Asia could be developed to optimize multiple uses and mutual benefits of all riparian states. For example, Nepal could export electricity to Bangladesh, China and India; India could give navigation and transit licenses as well as construction funds to Nepal; India could satisfy the concerns of Bangladesh upon minimum flow and storage benefits; and Bangladesh could give navigation and transit licenses to India and Nepal (Salman & Upret, 2002).
CONCLUSION
The sustainable development and regional stability in the YBR basin depend heavily on enhanced transboundary water cooperation. This article first highlighted the interrelated factors affecting transboundary water cooperation in the basin-wide context. Using these factors as its analytical framework, based on the positive BAR-value, this article then explored the features of the current cooperation practice. It has been found that the four riparian states are undertaking a low-medium level of cooperation to avoid serious conflicts; however, it is fragmented and mainly limited to such technical issues as the provision of hydrological information and flood control, the rationale for which is the policy of responsive diplomacy that pursues short-term national interests. The research revealed that this cooperation practice cannot afford to address manifold challenges the riparian states face, including water conflicts between China–India and between India–Bangladesh, as well as geopolitical tension and regional insecurity in South Asia. Due to such factors as the mismatched national interests, asymmetrical power structures and complex geopolitical relations among the riparian states, the high-top level of institutionalized cooperation under the framework of a legally binding multilateral treaty is not suitable in the near future. Instead, this article envisioned an inclusive, comprehensive and coordination-oriented RBO with political bindingness as a desirable medium-high level of cooperation framework in the future, assuming that the rationale for cooperation can be transformed into the policy of preventive diplomacy, and the political trust among the riparian states can be enhanced.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
All relevant data are included in the paper or its Supplementary Information.