Abstract
This review paper is an attempt to analyze the existing literature on hydro-hegemony (HH) theory, which has emerged to explain transboundary water interactions. The literature highlights that the conventional water interaction literature inadequately deals with three important factors: (i) asymmetric power relations, (ii) varying intensities of conflict, and (iii) the importance of the geographical location of riparian states. Since its emergence, it has evolved both in theory development and in application to transboundary basins. Although an attempt has been made earlier for reviewing, organizing and evaluating the overall literature on HH, the review itself is somehow silent on the hegemonic approaches to assess its contribution to the transboundary water governance literature and to identify the existing and future research gaps. This paper, however, not just addresses these omissions to (i) review the scholarly literature on HH; (ii) explore the challenges associated with power, cooperation, and conflict; and (iii) identify and explore potential trends in HH theory, but it also gives special attention to the hegemonic approaches within states’ boundaries and the ingredients to enrich the theory and research agenda of HH.
HIGHLIGHTS
The conventional water interaction literature inadequately deals with three important factors (asymmetric power relations, varying intensities of conflict, and the importance of the geographical location of riparian states).
This paper addresses to review the scholarly literature on HH; explore the challenges associated with power, cooperation, and conflict; identify and explore potential trends in HH theory, and reviews the HH within states' boundaries.
INTRODUCTION
Transboundary rivers are recognized as a global public good, as a common concern/heritage of humankind, and as a resource. However, in a neo-liberal world (as well as in the common heritage wording of the European Water Framework Directive1), it can be treated as a commodity. When conceptualizing water as a resource, guaranteeing healthy flows in rivers to protect biodiversity and contribute to the livelihoods of basin inhabitants becomes the focus. Moreover, the challenges associated with transboundary rivers, mostly when basins extend into the territory of multiple sovereign states which contend to control the flow of water resources, become the subject of inquiry. Various bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements have been drafted over the course of the 20th century (Beach et al., 2000) to mitigate potential conflict but there still remain many challenges.
Interpretations of these challenges range from the neo-Malthusian narrative of ‘water wars’, a prominent discourse in water-scarce regions, providing a stark picture of the future of hydro-relations among and within states (Ward, 2002; Warner, 2008). Alternatively, a liberal interpretation (Wolf, 1998, 2007) has emphasized the unlikelihood that water wars will emerge, arguing that riparian states can and will successfully realize their self-interest by cooperating over shared resources. Additionally, embracing more complexity, hegemonic approaches to water issues have emerged in transboundary water law (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008) and political geography (Warner & Zeitoun, 2008; Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010) literature, with a focus on the national level (Warner, 2008).
This development in the literature has led to the emergence of the concept of hydro-hegemony (HH; section 2). As theoretical approaches to HH have been previously explored (e.g. in Warner, 1992 and Williams, 2002), they have yet to be thoroughly conceptualized or theorized in the water conflict literature (Cascão, 2008: p. 436). Although, an attempt has been made earlier by Warner et al. (2017) to review, organize, and evaluate the overall literature on HH, the review itself is somehow silent on the hegemonic approaches within states’ boundaries and to explore the ingredients to enrich the theory and research agenda of HH. Hence, this paper not only systematically reviews and analyses (i) the conceptualization and theorization of HH in the dominant water-related journals (such as Water Policy, Water Alternatives, Water International, Political Geography and International Environmental Agreements) (section 2); (ii) highlights the various elements and pillars of HH (i.e. power, exploitation potential, and riparian position) (section 3); (iii) enriches the debate on water-related political questions of who gets how much water, how, when, and why; and (iv) assesses the overall contribution of HH theory (section 4) but also gives special attention to (1) the hegemonic approaches within states’ boundaries (see section 4.1) and (2) also explore the ingredients to enrich the theory and research agenda of HH (see section 4.4). The last section concludes with reflections on power relations and suggestions for future research (section 5).
Through this review of how hegemony is constructed around transboundary river basins, two features have emerged. The first is an implicit acknowledgment of water scarcity. While much scholarly work has moved on from this notion since Homer-Dixon (1991), the literature is nonetheless situated in a context of the Anthropocene (Gupta et al., 2015), and the anticipated future demands on the water system with the likelihood that issues of scarcity will become more central. This might exacerbate power struggles over water as opposed to more cooperative approaches. Second, the literature is largely based on relations between states where states claim sovereignty over their territory and resources, as is allowed by international law (Vick, 2008; Rahaman, 2009). While state boundaries can rightfully be questioned (Ashley, 1984; Walker, 1993), this does not change the reality of the difficulties in sharing water, in water-scarce river basins, during the flooding or drought situation (Hussain et al., 2021), and the durability of the structure of the state.
THEORY OF HH
Evolution of the HH theory
Drawing on the conceptualization of hegemony in relation to water (Warner, 1992; Williams, 2002), the term HH was coined and developed into a theory by the London Water Research Group in May 2005 at King's College London. The workshop was the first in a series organized by the London Water Research Group (LWRG) which discussed and refined the theory (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Cascão, 2008; Mirumachi, 2015). Against this background, a range of theoretical approaches to HH have since emerged, alongside broader literature on transboundary issues. Furthermore, Special Issues on HH in Water Policy, Water International, and International Environmental Agreements have demonstrated that riparian hegemons flourish in the near-anarchic international system and find ways to benefit from the absence of applicable and legally binding rules of international water treaties (e.g. the UN Watercourses Convention of 1997 and the UNECE Water Convention of 1992), which have been slow to develop and remain unratified by many states.
Since coining the term, scholars based in King's College London, the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) London, and the London School of Economics and Political Science have further developed HH theory by focusing on power asymmetries, the varying intensities of conflict, and the importance of the geographical position of the riparian states. Among the most important developments of the last decade include multi-layered HH; the role of international water law in negotiations; the multidimensional concept of power (including coercive, economic, political, cultural, and discursive); the concept of counter HH; the role of non-state actors in shaping water governance outcomes; and the concept of virtual HH. In the 20th century, international law dealt with groundwater aquifers only in relation to surface water (Stephan, 2007) and stresses the growing need for its integration in bilateral and multilateral water treaties in relation to sovereign rights to address multiple issues specific to it. Salamé et al. (2021) discuss in the chapter that water discourses reflect on the unfolding of new water realities in the wake of new challenges like climate change, in addition to the limitations of international law in addressing potential transboundary water management issues. Similarly, Varady et al. (2021) conceptualize the discourse associated with the term Water Security in understating transboundary water management.
Understanding cooperation and contestation among riparian states also shows a range of approaches. These include theorizing under what conditions hydro-hegemonic relations and with what results (e.g. Warner, 2008; Wegerich, 2008); identifying different types of hydro-hegemonic relations (Zeitoun & Allan, 2008); using HH concepts to analyze water laws and treaties (Daoudy, 2008; Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008); conceptualizing counter hydro-hegemonic measures (Cascão, 2008; Saleh, 2008); distinguishing different types of power in riparian interactions (Zeitoun et al., 2011); examining the power of civil society in water-based interactions (Zawahri & Hensengerth, 2012); and analyzing the links between domestic and international dynamics in shaping the nature and forms of HH in each river basin (Warner, 2012). In short, these approaches show a range of ways in which the concept of HH engages with the politicization and depoliticization of transboundary water relations. The evolution of the HH concept is summarized in Table 1.
Evolution of theoretical approaches to HH.
Year . | Context . | Objectives . | Contribution to the theory . |
---|---|---|---|
2004–2006 | Conceptualization and theorization of HH | Employing the IR approach in transboundary water governance | Analyzing power, location, and exploitation potential in transboundary river basins |
2007 | HH and sustainably developing water resources | Ensuring equitable and efficient use of water resources | Promoting political stability and socio-economic growth; counter-hegemony strategies |
2008 | HH and International Water Law (IWL) | Linking to international law | Adopting international legal principles in negotiation theory and process |
2009 | Transboundary water governance institutions | The role of the relative distribution of power in resolving water disputes | Assessing how institutions contribute to conflict management |
2010 | HH and critical hydropolitics | Effective implementation of transboundary water management | Water science and stakeholder participation and negotiations |
2011 | The use of soft power in transboundary rivers | Evaluating the impacts of soft power | Soft power influences choices and treaties to manage, delay, or perpetuate conflict |
2012 | Bilateral management to common basin governance | Initiating discussions concerning peace and development | Ensuring equity, human rights, and social justice |
2013 | Transboundary water interactions and the UN Watercourses Convention | Transboundary level rules and conventions for improved water resource management | Management and governance through political processes |
2014 | HH theory to inform virtual water trade | Exposing relationships between access to water, global trade, and power | Virtual water shaped by material, bargaining, and ideational powers |
2015 | Power shift and HH | Political and economic changes challenge the regional balance of power | Donor's investment leads to power changes and new kinds of relationships |
2016- & beyond? | Counter HH and transboundary water governance | Institutional analysis of transboundary rivers | Inclusive development and ecosystem approaches to deal with power issues in shared waters |
Year . | Context . | Objectives . | Contribution to the theory . |
---|---|---|---|
2004–2006 | Conceptualization and theorization of HH | Employing the IR approach in transboundary water governance | Analyzing power, location, and exploitation potential in transboundary river basins |
2007 | HH and sustainably developing water resources | Ensuring equitable and efficient use of water resources | Promoting political stability and socio-economic growth; counter-hegemony strategies |
2008 | HH and International Water Law (IWL) | Linking to international law | Adopting international legal principles in negotiation theory and process |
2009 | Transboundary water governance institutions | The role of the relative distribution of power in resolving water disputes | Assessing how institutions contribute to conflict management |
2010 | HH and critical hydropolitics | Effective implementation of transboundary water management | Water science and stakeholder participation and negotiations |
2011 | The use of soft power in transboundary rivers | Evaluating the impacts of soft power | Soft power influences choices and treaties to manage, delay, or perpetuate conflict |
2012 | Bilateral management to common basin governance | Initiating discussions concerning peace and development | Ensuring equity, human rights, and social justice |
2013 | Transboundary water interactions and the UN Watercourses Convention | Transboundary level rules and conventions for improved water resource management | Management and governance through political processes |
2014 | HH theory to inform virtual water trade | Exposing relationships between access to water, global trade, and power | Virtual water shaped by material, bargaining, and ideational powers |
2015 | Power shift and HH | Political and economic changes challenge the regional balance of power | Donor's investment leads to power changes and new kinds of relationships |
2016- & beyond? | Counter HH and transboundary water governance | Institutional analysis of transboundary rivers | Inclusive development and ecosystem approaches to deal with power issues in shared waters |
Concepts and definitions of the HH theory
Approaches in HH theories draw from realist accounts of power (e.g. Waltz, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001) and hegemony in international relation theories (Lustick, 2002; Gilpin, 2005); institutionalist theories of regimes (e.g. Keohane, 1982), knowledge and discourse (e.g. Hajer, 1997), water conflict (e.g. Wolf, 2004), and water conflict intensity (e.g. Yoffe et al., 2003) and have roots in the principles of sovereignty as found in international law (Yannis, 2002). In these varying contexts, HH scholars (Zeitoun, Warner, Allan, Woodhouse, Mirumachi, etc.) have demonstrated that various forms of power consistently used in water-based interactions include incentives (e.g. treaties), coercion (e.g. pressure), manipulation (e.g. threat of military operations), and perception change control (e.g. through knowledge construction). Grandi (2020) inquiries into the subjectivity and heterogeneity surrounding the concept of hydropolitics employed with varying meanings across time and space and the lack of interest in academia to develop a standard definition. These forms of power, used in various combinations, allow one riparian state to influence another state and thus control the flow of transboundary rivers.
These forms reproduce a variety of perceptions about hegemonic power that runs from a direct threat (hard power) to a condition where power and consent are only implied (soft power), to institutionalized norms not requiring enforcement (Lukes, 2005). Within this range, theoretical approaches of HH suggest that there are various forms of power intrinsically linked to water resources specifically in a shared river basin and explain control strategies to assess how and why a powerful riparian in a transboundary river basin can influence its co-riparians (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). They also focus on two important under-developed theoretical concepts, i.e., power asymmetry between riparian states and the varying intensities of conflicts (Carles, 2006), and pay attention to the specific features of different geographical locations of the riparian states (Warner & Zeitoun, 2008). Daoudy (2009) goes beyond traditional elements of power in relation to hydropolitics and analyses many facets of soft power, such as time and issue linkages, influencing bargaining power between downstream/upstream riparian, characterized by power asymmetries, in reaching bilateral, if not basin-wide agreements. Similarly, Conker & Hussein (2020), while analyzing the Lebanon–Syria and Syria–Turkey hydropolitical relations, discuss the manner in which Syria has maintained its hydro-hegemonic position on the Orontes River Basin over Lebanon and Turkey and how changing regional political environment and Lebanon's use of issue linkages impacted power asymmetry in the region to Divest Syria of its HH in the region.
Power asymmetries lead to exploring security issues. The Constructivist Copenhagen School (e.g. Buzan et al., 1998) informs some HH scholarship in this regard, questioning the object of security in the context of riparian state competition. Traditional realist approaches privilege the state as the primary subject of what is to be secured. However, in the context of a transboundary river basin and of changing threats to people's lives, the referent of security could be the river basin itself and this re-orients the discussion on how security can be guaranteed. Nonetheless, Copenhagen scholars admittedly fall back to the state as its main referent, claiming that its social construction remains durable over time (Baker, 2013). Reflecting this, HH also privileges the state as the guarantor and referent of security, in terms of securing its interest relative to other states of the river basin.
Forms of HH
Theoretical approaches of HH essentially claim that powerful riparian states can gain maximum benefits from transboundary rivers. However, if the powerful riparian intends to control the flow or persuade co-riparians to take decisions in line with its own preferences, there may be different water outcomes (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). The forms that HH may take include (i) benign outcomes (e.g. when states agree to cooperate in situation of water stress); (ii) neutral restrictive outcomes (e.g. when human rights are not fulfilled); (iii) obstructive oppressive outcomes (e.g. when states intervene to allocate water according to their own preferences); and (iv) contested control outcomes (when changing water-related circumstances may ignite a conflict due to no agreement) (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008).
As such, HH may be beneficial (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Warner, 2008), or it may be ‘negative and dominative’ (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Under conditions of positive HH, a powerful riparian state can take a leading position to provide benefits to all riparian states and share the water resources more equitably (Turton & Funke, 2008). Negative relations are cases in which the hegemon desires to maintain power asymmetries and structural inequalities, drawing on its own resources or colonial legacies (Warner, 2004; Sanchez & Gupta, 2011). The favoring of Egypt and Sudan by Great Britain over the upper riparians in treaties of the early 20th century is an example of this (Waterbury, 2002), where treaties were biased in favor of the more powerful states (Takele, 2004; Cascão, 2005).
PILLARS OF HH THEORY
This section explains and discusses the various features of power, which are important to water conflict analysis in shared river basins. In scarce water situations, the type of intervention and the nature of competition over shared water resources show each riparian's strengths and weaknesses. Apart from geographical and climatological circumstances and ‘luck’, the powerful riparian can more easily gain maximum advantages and maintain control over the shared water resources.
Power
State power can be linked to its population size and physical territory, its abundance of natural resources, and its military and economic capabilities (Nye, 2004; Armitage & Nye, 2007). How such resources of power are wielded is more complex (Armitage & Nye, 2007). In focusing on the hydropolitics of international river basins, Nye (2004) argues that power is about achieving the desired outcome by persuading others. In line with Nye, Dahl defines power as the potential capability of one actor to influence another in such a way that the latter does something which he/she would otherwise not do (Dahl, 1965 in Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).
Types of power
With respect to water resources, Daoudy (2005) and Turton (2005) refer to two important types of power known as ‘puissance and pouvoir’. Puissance is hidden or prospective power (i.e. the ability to explode a bomb); pouvoir is visible or tangible power (e.g. the real power to stop a bomb from exploding). Real or ‘pouvoir’ power has three dimensions identified by Lukes (2005[1974]) and Strange (1994), and each dimension varies in intensity and applicability. First is the mobilization of capabilities (i.e. stronger economy and military) (Strange, 1987: p. 132) achieved through domestic political support and a geographically advantageous position. Second is the constraining power of the stronger riparian to force weaker riparians to comply with the hegemon's preferred order (Lukes, 2005[1974]: p. 11). Strange (1994: p. 176) identified a third dimension of power in which powerful actors impose their ideas over the weak in such a way that it is acceptable to the weaker, in line with Lustick's ‘ideological hegemony’ (Lustick 2002). These three dimensions of power allow hegemons to maintain and change the terms by which they maintain their power (O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1999: p. 82). As an example, Dellapenna (2003: p. 289) argues that a hegemonic state can extract water from a shared river by imposing its own interpretation of international water law and customary law to prove its legal right to do so.
Impacts of power on hydro-relations
Countries use their power to negotiate international and transboundary water treaties. Reflecting its state bias, HH theory explains how hydro-institutions and interactions among states are influenced by power. It suggests that power, rather than general and specific principles of international law, geographical position, or even the accessibility of water resources, explains the outputs and outcomes of these interactions (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Zeitoun & Allan, 2008; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008; Tawfik, 2015). This may be because powerful states have access to multiple sources and dimensions of power as well as strategies to exercise power and ensure desired outcomes (Cascão, 2008; Daoudy, 2008). Water resource control strategies under hydro-hegemonic conditions can thus lead to a cooperative regime if a HH intends to establish a beneficial hegemonic relationship by sharing water equally among riparian states in a transboundary river basin.
Similarly, a HH can act negatively if it uses its control over the water to dominate the region, leading to a protracted conflict (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 452–453). Various regional hegemons (e.g. Egypt and Turkey, as well as Israel [although not a hegemon in the definitional sense]) in the Middle East have imposed negative hydro-hegemonic relations in transboundary river basins (such as the Jordan, Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile) despite being geographically disadvantaged by their downstream position (Daoudy, 2004 in Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 452). States like Israel and Egypt arguably compensate for this disadvantaged position by drawing on its other power resources to maintain dominance (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). For example, Israel uses 90% of the shared water resources, even though the Palestinian Liberation Organziation's (now Palestine) water rights are clearly recognized by Israel in the 1995 agreement which shaped the Oslo II accords (B'tselem, 1998; Frederiksen, 2003). Resource capture and containment strategies, coercion- pressure, and display of military and economic strength have helped Israel to establish a dominant form of HH (Selby, 2003b, 2005).
Uses of power and control strategies of HHs
Under hydro-hegemonic conditions, a hegemon may use resource capture strategies to affect the quality or quantity of water by developing hydro-projects or dumping waste in shared water resources; this is similar to ‘active unilateralism’ (Waterbury, 1997: p. 279). Examples of active unilateralism include Egypt's High Aswan Dam, which biases the allocation of waters between Egypt and Sudan despite the mechanisms to prevent it in the 1959 Agreement (Takele, 2004). Second, Turkey's south-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) allowed Turkey, as an upstream country, to build on the Tigris and the Euphrates (Warner, 2004: p. 16). Third, Israel's largest water project, the National Water Carrier, was set up to transfer water from the Sea of Galilee in the north of the country to the highly populated center and arid south to enable the efficient use of water and to regulate the water supply (Feitelson, 2000; Allan, 2001). Alternatively, a hegemon can employ a containment strategy to force the weaker riparian state to accommodate its preferences, such as signing an agreement in the hegemon's favor. Examples of this include Israel and Jordan's treaty in 1994 (Dombrowski, 1998: p. 99) and the treaty between Israel and Palestine in 1995 (Selby, 2003a).
Drawing from the literature on hegemonic strategies employed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, various compliance-producing mechanisms are shown in Table 2. Based on the earlier work of Amitai Etzioni (1986) and Held (1991), Lustick (2002) recognizes four types of mechanisms, i.e., coercive (direct threat of force), utilitarian (bribes and mutual trades), normative (reinforcing the legitimacy of the hegemon), and ideological hegemony inspired by Gramsci (Lustick, 2002).
Water control strategies of HH.
Compliance producing strategies/mechanisms | Coercive | Use of military force | e.g. Israel attacked hydropower projects of Syria in the upper Jordan River (Trottier, 1999; Wolf, 2000; Medzini, 2001). |
Covert action | e.g. Egypt supported Somalian irredentism and the Eritrean Liberation Front to influence the construction of the GAP project (Takele, 2004). | ||
Coercion-pressure | e.g. Egypt used pressure tactics against Ethiopia to maintain its status quo from 1960 to 2000? (Waterbury, 2002). | ||
Utilitarian | Incentives | e.g. Egypt and Uganda's joint electricity grid project (Waterbury, 2002) and common irrigation between South Africa and along the Orange River Basin (Heyns, 2005). | |
Normative | Treaties | Weaker countries sign hoping for benefits, e.g. the 1906 treaty between Egypt and Ethiopia (Waterbury, 2002); and the 1959 Aswan High Dam treaty between Egypt and Sudan (GCI, 2000). | |
Ideological hegemony | Securitization | e.g. in 2002, Israel threatened the Wazzani Springs Project of Lebanon to divert the attention of Israeli citizens from other water-related concerns (Newman, 2002; Zisser, 2002; Zeitoun, 2005). | |
Knowledge construction | Egypt has successfully reduced external pressure and created more space for national and international negotiations on water politics by providing diverse viewpoints (Cascão, 2005). | ||
Sanctioned discourse | e.g. The official Israeli discourse to promote JWC and the Egyptian discourse about the benefits of NBI are regularly communicated in comparison to the Ethiopian and Palestinian viewpoints that are heard less frequently (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). | ||
Coercive resources | a. International political support e.g. In 1929, Britain supported Egypt over Sudan in the Nile Basin agreement, which still influences current perceived political and legal rights (Sanchez & Gupta, 2011). | ||
b. Financial mobilization e.g. Egypt, with the UK support, has been developing infrastructure on the Nile since 1995 (Collins, 2003), and China (along with Italy and Norway) is investing in Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). |
Compliance producing strategies/mechanisms | Coercive | Use of military force | e.g. Israel attacked hydropower projects of Syria in the upper Jordan River (Trottier, 1999; Wolf, 2000; Medzini, 2001). |
Covert action | e.g. Egypt supported Somalian irredentism and the Eritrean Liberation Front to influence the construction of the GAP project (Takele, 2004). | ||
Coercion-pressure | e.g. Egypt used pressure tactics against Ethiopia to maintain its status quo from 1960 to 2000? (Waterbury, 2002). | ||
Utilitarian | Incentives | e.g. Egypt and Uganda's joint electricity grid project (Waterbury, 2002) and common irrigation between South Africa and along the Orange River Basin (Heyns, 2005). | |
Normative | Treaties | Weaker countries sign hoping for benefits, e.g. the 1906 treaty between Egypt and Ethiopia (Waterbury, 2002); and the 1959 Aswan High Dam treaty between Egypt and Sudan (GCI, 2000). | |
Ideological hegemony | Securitization | e.g. in 2002, Israel threatened the Wazzani Springs Project of Lebanon to divert the attention of Israeli citizens from other water-related concerns (Newman, 2002; Zisser, 2002; Zeitoun, 2005). | |
Knowledge construction | Egypt has successfully reduced external pressure and created more space for national and international negotiations on water politics by providing diverse viewpoints (Cascão, 2005). | ||
Sanctioned discourse | e.g. The official Israeli discourse to promote JWC and the Egyptian discourse about the benefits of NBI are regularly communicated in comparison to the Ethiopian and Palestinian viewpoints that are heard less frequently (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). | ||
Coercive resources | a. International political support e.g. In 1929, Britain supported Egypt over Sudan in the Nile Basin agreement, which still influences current perceived political and legal rights (Sanchez & Gupta, 2011). | ||
b. Financial mobilization e.g. Egypt, with the UK support, has been developing infrastructure on the Nile since 1995 (Collins, 2003), and China (along with Italy and Norway) is investing in Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). |
Source: Adopted and modified from Lustick (2002).
Varying intensities of hydro-interactions
The water conflict literature suggests that interactions over transboundary waters range from cooperation to conflict with various intensities in between (Furlong, 2006; Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008: p. 77). Intensities range from the weak riparian protecting the river to the powerful riparian controlling the resources (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008: p. 114). NATO (1999) classifies these interactions as follows: (i) durable peace (i.e. unification into one nation voluntarily), (ii) stable peace (i.e. verbal support for shared values, goals, and regime), (iii) unstable peace (i.e. situations of tension that avoid violence by mutual deterrence), (iv) crisis (i.e. hostile diplomatic, economic, political, and military actions), and (v) war (i.e. formal declaration of war).
The Water Event Intensity Scale (WEIS) proposed by Yoffe et al. (2003) shows that the intensity of water-based interactions has different effects on inter-state relations and that the same conflict can occur again with different intensities (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Moreover, the Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS (TWINS) proposed by Mirumachi (2007) recognizes five levels of interactions over transboundary rivers, which are (i) argumentative situations over an issue (i.e. when the problem is identified but there are no joint actions or shared goals); (ii) unplanned or informal interaction (i.e. joint action but no shared goals); (iii) technical cooperation (i.e. shared goals but no joint action); (iv) risk-aversion (i.e. joint action and shared goals); and (v) risk-taking cooperation (i.e. a type of cooperation where it is not obvious that states will assume costs without a clear response).
Riparian position
An upstream state's riparian position on a shared river can lead to hegemonic tactics such as diversion, damming, overuse, contamination, flooding, and flow delay (Frey & Naff, 1985: p. 78). In transboundary water interactions, coercion is enhanced by the geographical positioning of the riparian states (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 450) to manipulate the flow of water (Rees, 2010: pp. 9–10). Cascão & Zeitoun (2010) suggest making each of the three dimensions of power (e.g. material power, bargaining power, and ideational power in Table 1) its own pillar, with ‘geography’ as the fourth. The original pillar of ‘riparian position’ is part of ‘geography’; the infrastructure forming ‘exploitation potential’ is part of ‘material power’ (Farnum, 2014: p. 10). The physical geography of a river basin has significant impacts on the flow and quality of water and the nature of interaction among riparian states. In sheer geographical terms, the upper riparian is the most powerful (Amery & Wolf, 2000: p. 6).
The geographical location of a riparian state in a shared river basin plays a crucial role in shaping foreign policy and negotiating processes (Waterbury, 1994: pp. 36–64; Dolatyar & Gray, 2004: p. 7). Drawing on Putnam's two-level game approach (1988: p. 437), a better riparian position of states has the potential to define the size of win-sets (i.e. the set of all possible international agreements that would be acceptable at the domestic level). In transboundary basins, upstream states have very small win-sets as compared to downstream states unless and until the social, political, and economic conditions of upstream states support their geographical position (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Lopes, 2012). In navigable rivers, downstream countries have power over upstream countries (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
ASSESSMENT OF HH THEORY
The multi-layered perspectives of HH theory
The literature shows that theoretical approaches of HH mostly focus on the basin level and state boundaries for understanding international hydropolitics; however, some have shown how hegemonic struggles take place at multiple geographic levels (Selby, 2007; Warner, 2008; Conker, 2014) and show how power relationships and discursive strategies are inherent to ecological interactions (Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Perreault, 2014). In addition to the ‘layered-hegemony’ approach, Conker (2014) also highlights the role of state and non-state actors and the role of power in terms of material and discursive capabilities (e.g. scalar dynamics and the role of values and norms in terms of hydropolitical relations). Furlong's analysis (Furlong 2006) reveals that state actors may interact with each other at one scale, ignoring the interests of sub-national actors (Warner & Zeitoun, 2008) in order to meet domestic needs and maximize outcomes at the international level (Warner & Zawahri, 2012). Table 3 explains the different geographic levels of HH.
The layered-hegemony approach.
Level of hegemony . | Explanation . |
---|---|
At home (national or sub-national level) | State's legitimate rights over water resources to provide water on a regular basis to some farmers while denying it to others (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). |
Basin level | Developing infrastructure intentionally by upstream states on shared rivers may divert and pollute the flow of water or may increase the risk of flooding to downstream countries (see Meijerink, 2008; Wegerich, 2008). |
Regional level | Achieving regional hegemony has a direct impact on neighboring countries (Warner, (2008)) as state power may lead to regional stability. |
Global level | Global hegemons are champions of free trade, while military and economic superiority secures a competitive advantage in politics and rule-making (Warner, 2008). |
Level of hegemony . | Explanation . |
---|---|
At home (national or sub-national level) | State's legitimate rights over water resources to provide water on a regular basis to some farmers while denying it to others (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). |
Basin level | Developing infrastructure intentionally by upstream states on shared rivers may divert and pollute the flow of water or may increase the risk of flooding to downstream countries (see Meijerink, 2008; Wegerich, 2008). |
Regional level | Achieving regional hegemony has a direct impact on neighboring countries (Warner, (2008)) as state power may lead to regional stability. |
Global level | Global hegemons are champions of free trade, while military and economic superiority secures a competitive advantage in politics and rule-making (Warner, 2008). |
Strengths of HH theory
The theoretical approaches of HH explain the hegemonic relationships among states in a reasonably simple and comprehensive way. While emphasizing different features and discussing the various options for riparian states in the interplay of water and power (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 455), HH theory has offered useful ways for understanding hegemonic relationships. Examples of this include the Tigris and Euphrates (Warner, 2008), Orange (Turton & Funke, 2008), Nile (Link et al., 2011), Upper Jordan Waterscape (Zeitoun et al., 2013), Amu Darya Basin (Wegerich, 2008), and Brahmaputra (Sinha, 2012) basins. Three key strengths of HH literature stand out:
- (1)
HH theory helps analyze past and present hydropolitics and explain the role of power in the management and allocation of transboundary water resources (Cascão, 2008: p. 14). It also contributes to international law by highlighting injustices due to asymmetric power relations among states (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008: pp. 110, 118–119) and draws attention to discrepancies between equality on paper and in practice (Zeitoun et al., 2014: p. 178).
- (2)
HH theory explains hydropolitical interactions by reference to power (e.g., see, Frey & Naff, 1985; Lowi, 1993) and illustrates how this power is exercised (Zeitoun et al., 2014: pp. 4–12; Tawfik, 2015: pp. 3–5). HH theory reveals that conditions of HH exist in malign and benign forms (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008: p. 111).
- (3)
HH theory shows how states behave in the absence of institutionalized cooperation, highlighting the role of bilateral and multilateral agreements in conflict management and in promoting cooperation (Rieu-Clarke, 2010: p. 828). It explores the connections between the local and the global in blue water issues and the global ramifications of river basin politics (Sojamo et al., 2012: p. 172).
- d.
HH theory illuminates how prioritizing water in trade policy impacts virtual water trade and power over water resources (Farnum, 2013). The virtual HH concept also explains the implications of increasing competition over the sources of global food supply chains (Sojamo et al., 2012).
Weaknesses of HH theory
HH theory has also shown some weaknesses. With a state-centric conception of hegemony, HH theory can be accused of ignoring the social and transnational characteristics of hegemony (Selby, 2007). However, by presenting multilevel HH (i.e. global hegemony, regional hegemony, river basin hegemony, and state–society relations), Warner (2008) took a step toward more complex conceptualizations by arguing that interactions at various levels influence each other (in line with Putnam, 1988). However, the social dimension remains under-explored.
The literature has also developed an understanding of regional hegemony. This level and the different strands were addressed by HH scholars in a Special Issue of Water Policy (2008: Vol. 20: Supplement 2), though their analyses were mostly limited to the inter-state level. To challenge this, HH scholars can build on the work of Selby (2007) by following the example of critical IR (international relations) scholarship. This strand has also drawn on Gramscian's (1971) accounts of hegemonic control at the national level, defined by social and cultural dynamics of coercion and consent, and are explored at the international and civil society levels (e.g. van der Pijl, 1997; Cox, 2006).
This literature also explores the need for apt-scale development for hydropolitics leading to HH, since the ramifications of this scale are quite widespread affecting the regional hydropolitical dynamics. It is endorsed by analyzing the scales produced by some riparian countries and stakeholders for La Plata River Basin (LPRB) and Guarani Aquifer System (GAS) at different points of times in the 20th century for shaping regional hydropolitics. This concept of scale construction and evaluation was established in the article: Production of scale in regional hydropolitics: An analysis of La Plata River Basin and the Guarani Aquifer System in South America (da Silva & Hussein, 2019). It also provided a comprehensive framework stemming from hydropolitics and human geography in the region. The understanding of the importance of scale in human geography and ecology is developed, the effect of these key components on how river basins are habituated to composing transboundary water governance, structuring distinct river basin trajectories (Molle & Wester, 2009).
Within this frame, some of the critical weaknesses of HH theory include:
- (1)
HH theories are rooted in the realism of international relation theories, allowing them to explain conflict with the view that inter-state interactions are zero-sum power games, and playing down the possibility of structural positive-sum interactions (Lopes, 2012). They have only partially engaged with explaining the difference between interaction and genuine cooperation, and rarely explain how cooperation emerges through, for instance, regime theory (Selby, 2013), or legal institutional approaches which show how sovereignty is limited by rules on cooperation, human rights, and other principles of international law (Zawahri & Mitchell, 2011). It also established how hydropolitical analysis can serve as a baseline for explaining the circumstantially guided cooperation over transboundary groundwater resources (Hussein, 2018).
- (2)
HH theory is rooted in the notion of state power as a resource and has inadequately dealt with multiple levels at which power plays a role (Warner, 2008). It has not problematized the concept of power, nor drawn on critical water scholars (such as Kistin, 2007; Keller, 2012; Mirumachi, 2015) to expand the meaning of power. In global water governance, agriculture plays a vital role in the dependency of nations on each other, and agribusiness is administered through virtual water control which is with a few conglomerates in the world creating power disparities in global agro-food supply. Water being the key element, hydropolitics also challenges the economic power relationships of the world (Sojamo et al., 2012).
- (3)
It has been unable to incorporate liberal accounts of international relations (Moravcsik, 1993), which account for actors beyond the state, such as NGOs (Conca, 2005; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2012), transnational networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), professional associations (Gutiérrez, 2006), or companies (Shiva, 2002), which influence the dynamics not only at the state level but also at levels under and above state relations (Warner, 2012; Zawahri & Hensengerth, 2012). It has yet to encompass the role of hydropolitics in relation to the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) and now the more globally emphasized SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), where SDG 6 stresses the availability of water and sanitation to all, to be ensured through the means of implementation 6.5 under SDG 6, which promotes integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate (Hussein et al., 2018).
- (4)
It has not yet engaged with the ongoing ‘politics of scale’ debate that gives closer attention to the inter-relationships between power and social networks in studies of water governance, with particular reference to both institutional dynamics and scalar constructions (Norman et al., 2012). Schmeier et al. (2013) suggest that transboundary river basins risk potential flashpoint for riparian states and delve into the role of River Basin Organizations (RBOs) in the institutionalization of International Water Treaties as a result of effective governance to contain emerging hydro-hegemonies in the context of increasing water scarcity around the world.
- (5)
It has not drawn sufficiently from the water discourse literature which argues that water scarcity (Dinar, 2016) and water surplus (Warner & Zawahri, 2012) can create interdependence (Furlong, 2006: pp. 444; Le Billon, 2001: p. 564).
- (6)
HH theory focuses primarily on blue surface water and has rarely paid attention to different kinds of freshwater and the broad range of ecological services that these waters provide (Hayat & Gupta, 2016).
- (7)
HH theory assumes state sovereignty as an uncontested attribute in international relations (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 453) and does not engage enough with literature that allows for a reassessment of power by challenging the notion of state boundaries (Ashley, 1984; Walker, 1993).
- (8)
HH theory fails to give a due share of thought to the increasingly attractive desalination concept, which is now considered by a notable number of developed countries facing water scarcity, including oil-rich Arab Gulf States and water-scarce islands (Feitelson & Rosenthal, 2012).
Enriching the theory and research agenda of HH
The theoretical approaches of HH build upon previous approaches to hegemony in the water-politics literature (see Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) and set the directions for future research for hydro-scholars to investigate transboundary water resources with more complexity. They have problematized the role of the hegemon and of how states use their capabilities to impose their will on other states, shed light on the role of institutions, and on norms in constraining behavior of hegemonic and subordinate states (Bakker, 1999). Furthermore, HH theory indirectly challenges the tendency to de-politicize environmental issues (Lousley, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2011) when they are viewed as scientific problems requiring only technical solutions (Bond et al., 2002 in Furlong, 2006).
While certain approaches of international relation theories can tackle equity issues and the social construction of ideas about security, none are proficient in theorizing the construction and production of ecological conditions (Furlong, 2008: p. 813). In a dialogue between water governance scholars (such as Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) and international relation scholars (such as Selby, 2005, 2007; Furlong, 2006, 2008; Cohen & Davidson, 2011), it also becomes clear how HH calls for inter-disciplinarily by first recognizing how international relation scholars have largely ignored transboundary issues and related water politics and by suggesting that international relations can contribute to water knowledge. Furthermore, gaps in knowledge about how different actors relate to and contest water issues, and the terms of engagement of conflict, can be addressed through ethnographic approaches of anthropology and analyses of inequality through sociology (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). In short, water issues should not be limited to water scholars only. With this in mind, a future research agenda for HH scholars could include:
- (1)
Research on the consequences of asymmetric power relations to mediate situations of low conflict and low to medium cooperation, along with the identification of the drivers of interaction (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008: p. 312; Zeitoun et al., 2011: p. 174).
- (2)
Research on the large volumes of virtual water flows between states (Farnum, 2014: pp. 29–32) and possibly within the states.
- (3)
Research on the techniques to securitize and de-securitize water-related issues (Fischhendler, 2015). The lack of agreements and silence over water-related problems among riparian states and tactics related to the effect of time in resolving water conflicts also need to be explored (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: pp. 455–456).
- (4)
Research on the impact of multilateral institutions on regulating behavior and galvanizing cooperation between riparian states.
- (5)
Research on enlarging the scope of HH theory to take into account all kinds of water as every kind of water is linked to distinct ecological services.
CONCLUSION
This paper reviews HH literature and draws conclusions arising from the reproduction of power asymmetry, exploitation potential, and geographic positioning. It has shown that there is still a long way to go to develop a multilevel, multiactor HH theory in a way that gives attention to the layered nature of hegemonic struggles among states (Davidson-Harden et al., 2007) and the context for transboundary water management in the context of anthropogenic pressures and the resulting climate change affects stressing resources in the Water–Energy–Food (WEF) nexus framework (Keskinen et al., 2016). It has also found that transboundary water issues must be addressed by multi-disciplinary scholars (both social and natural scientists), with emphasis on the contribution of international relation scholarship. In summary, HH theory can explain where power plays a role but (a) does not sufficiently address institutionalist theories which explain why cooperation develops in cases of asymmetrical hydropower relations, nor epistemic theories which show how knowledge leads to converging state policies; (b) does not deal with social practice models that show how common norms shape actor behavior (cf. Young, 2001); (c) ignores the role of law as balancing the power; (d) focuses primarily on blue water and does not yet deal with the various kinds of water and its ecosystem services (Hayat & Gupta, 2016); and (e) does not look at the layered impacts of power on water-related issues such as climate change and nexus approach (WEF). Thus, insights from HH need to be enriched through combinations with theories on hydro-solidarity, hydro-identity, institutionalism, and cognitive theories, and applied at multiple levels of governance.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
All relevant data are included in the paper or its Supplementary Information.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare there is no conflict.
The Water Framework Directive is a European Union directive, which commits European Union member states to achieve good qualitative and quantitative status of all water bodies by 2015.