Water politics in Pakistan: The internal and external dynamics

Pakistan, predominantly characterized as an arid and semi-arid nation, possesses significant surface and groundwater resources (Bisht 2013). According to the data from Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the rivers originating from the glaciers of the greater Himalayan, Hindukush, and Karakoram Ranges collectively yield approximately 191.19 Billion Cubic Metre (BCM) of water annually. Of this, about 129.52 BCM is diverted for irrigation, and approximately 59.23 BCM is drawn from groundwater. The primary river coursing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Punjab, and Sindh is the Indus, which stands as the world's lengthiest continuous irrigation system, spanning 2,880 km before emptying into the Arabian Sea. The Indus River boasts numerous tributaries, some sourced from India to the east and others from Khyber–Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan to the west. In the eastern region, the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi Rivers contribute a flow of 5.44 BCM, while in the west, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab Rivers collectively carry a flow of 176.61 BCM, with 4.92 BCM generated within Pakistan.

Pakistan, despite its initial abundance of water resources, has witnessed a significant decline in water availability over the years. In the early 1950s, the country had approximately 5,000 m³ of water per person, but by 2009 this had dwindled to less than 1,500 m³ per person. Projections indicate that by 2035, Pakistan is likely to face a severe water deficit, a predicament that many experts fear could materialize even sooner (Kugelman 2009). The anticipated water consumption for Pakistan in 2025 is around 338 BCM, exposing a substantial shortfall of 100 BCM.

In the face of these looming water challenges, the intersection of water and politics threatens to exacerbate an already stressful situation. Regrettably, Pakistan is a nation where water politics are openly practised. Research by Bhatti & Farooq (2014) highlights that a significant portion of Pakistan's water issues stems from the provincial dispute over water rights, particularly between Punjab and Sindh. The current water crisis is further compounded by climate factors and suboptimal management practices by the Pakistani government, as criticized by Khalid & Begum (2013). Moreover, a consensus among scholars, including Javed et al. (2021), underscores that Indian influence and hegemony play a central role in aggravating Pakistan's water crisis.

Given this background, the present study aims to investigate the impact of various geographical factors on water availability and its possible repercussions in Pakistan. These factors encompass a growing population, evolving cropping patterns, and constrained storage capacities, among others. Subsequently, the study delves into whether these geographical factors, collectively termed internal dynamics in the paper, play a pivotal role in provincial water conflicts within Pakistan. Additionally, the research explores the linkage between external influences such as climate change and Pakistan's relationships with upper riparian countries like India and Afghanistan, and how these factors contribute to its water security. The paper will proceed by presenting the research findings derived from an analysis of secondary data and responses gathered from experts and academicians through questionnaires. This will be followed by an in-depth discussion and conclusion based on the insights obtained.

Additionally, a thorough analysis of secondary sources was conducted, including academic research papers, newspaper articles, doctoral theses, publications by think tanks, government reports, and contributions from notable global institutions such as the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization. The secondary data were qualitatively analysed, yielding insightful observations that contribute to a holistic understanding of the subject matter. Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques were employed to extract meaningful insights from the collected data

Pakistan has the fifth-highest population in the world with a 1.75% yearly growth rate. Pakistan's population, currently estimated to be at 225 million, is expected to expand to 250 million by 2025 (Yaqoob et al. 2021), with the urban population alone expected to rise by 52% by that time (Janjua et al. 2021). The demand for water for domestic, industrial, and other uses outside of agriculture will all rise by 8% in 2025 as a result of the population's exponential growth (Parry 2016). It has been revealed through a literature review that in 1951 Pakistan had a per capita water availability of 5,000 m³, which fell to 1,100 m³ in 2005, and by 2025 it is expected to fall to 800 m³ (Qureshi & Ashraf 2019). According to the UN's estimates, Pakistan's water demand is rising at an average annual rate of 10% (Connor 2015). This means that by 2025, the water demand in terms of the area will increase to 338 km³, but the total amount of water available will remain within the same range of 240–258 km³ (Shaheen 2010).

The consistent growth in population has significantly contributed to the declining of per capita water availability in Pakistan (Figure 1). The per capita water availability of 5,260 m³ recorded in 1951 dwindled down till 877 m³ by 2020, an alarming fall of 83% (Figure 2). Furthermore, the situation will be more threatening in the future per the projections.

Pakistan is a low-income country and the majority of the population is dependent on agriculture and natural resources. According to the Ministry of Finance, nearly 62% of the country's population is directly or indirectly linked with agriculture, and 39% of the country's labour force is engaged in this sector (Abbasi 2022).

Traditional crops such as jowar, bajra, and barley have been replaced in recent years by the cultivation of water-intensive crops. There is a general trend of decreasing area under all four major traditional crops over the years, with some variability in specific years. The projected figures for 2022–2023 suggest a continued decline in the area for most crops (Figure 4(b)).

Similarly, India is also undergoing a notable transition in its cropping patterns, marked by a shift from traditional to water-intensive crops. According to the Economic Survey of India for the year 2022–2023, the cultivation area dedicated to water-intensive crops such as sugarcane, cotton, maize, wheat, and rice has witnessed a rise from 98.5 to 105 million hectares from 2012–2013 to 2020–2021. Concurrently, there has been a decline in the cultivation area devoted to major traditional crops such as jowar and bajra, which decreased from 13.5 to 12.1 million hectares during the same period (Government of India 2023).

The sustainability of Pakistan's water supplies has come under scrutiny due to this change in cropping pattern. The rising trend of water-intensive crops strains the already scarce water supply, thereby causing water scarcity.

Generally, there is an increasing trend in the overall sugarcane cultivation area in Pakistan, especially in recent years. The areas have increased from around 201.9 thousand hectares in the early years (1947–1950) to over 1.1 million hectares in the last reported year (2020–2021) (Table 1). Above all, the provincial disparity is clearly visible over the area under sugarcane cultivation. The data highlight that Punjab and Sindh contribute significantly more to the sugarcane cultivation area compared to KPK. The major chunk of the area for sugarcane exists in Punjab and is still on an increasing trend. Consequently, Sindh contributes roughly one-fourth of the area dedicated to sugarcane. The farmers’ inclination towards these kinds of water-intensive crops may further sharpen the already existing water scarcity issues between these provinces.

In India also, there has been a notable surge in the cultivation of cotton. The cotton cultivation area experienced a substantial increase, soaring from 85.30 lakh hectares in the fiscal year 2000–2001 to an expanded 132.85 lakh hectares by the year 2020–2021. This has reflected in the larger export of virtual water through the cotton export. India, in 2013, exported 7.5 million cotton bales, which is equivalent to the export of 38 BCM of water. To put this into perspective, such an amount could fulfil the daily water requirements of 85% of India's expansive population for an entire year (Leahy, 2015).

The uneven distribution of rainfall in Pakistan, especially between Punjab and Sindh, may create unequal water accessibility in these two major agricultural provinces in Pakistan. Since 74% of the available surface water resources in Pakistan are extracted for agriculture purposes, it may have an impact on the overall agricultural productivity and economic growth of both Punjab and Sindh. Additionally, this disparity in water accessibility could also lead to potential conflicts and disputes between the provinces, further exacerbating the challenges faced by the agricultural sector in Pakistan.

In all of Pakistan's water-use sectors, groundwater has become a dependable source of water. Groundwater pumping is almost exclusively used for domestic and industrial purposes (occasionally through a man-made recharge zone next to a surface river). Groundwater makes up for a lack of surface resources in agriculture. During the dry season, fresh aquifers are heavily utilized in riverine areas. According to a recent analysis by the National Groundwater Association of the United States of America (2015) (Habib & Wahaj 2021), Pakistan is the fourth-largest user of groundwater globally.

According to Qureshi et al. (2010), 52 BCM of groundwater are currently extracted from Pakistan's approximately 1.355 million small-capacity private tube wells, 1.02 million of which are found in Punjab. These tube wells irrigated 19 and 42% of cultivated land when used exclusively or in conjunction with canal water, respectively.

The increasing number of water pumps and over-extraction of groundwater has led to the salinization of almost 4.5 million hectares of land, half of which lies in the irrigated lands of the Indus Basin. Due to inappropriate practices of irrigation and waterlogging from canal seepage, nearly 1 million hectares of irrigated land is also affected. In Sindh, the problem of salinity is more serious (Janjua et al. 2021). In view of the above-mentioned groundwater problems, surface water conflicts between the two large provinces, that is, Sindh and Punjab, also arise. Land degradation and salinity in Sindh is more than that in the other provinces, and, therefore, it is obvious that Sindh has a greater requirement for surface water supplies. In the canal command areas of both Sindh and Punjab, there is a severe decline in the water table due to the overexploitation of groundwater (Bhutta & Smedema 2007). Therefore, the competition for surface water resources between Sindh and Punjab becomes even more intense. This leads to frequent disputes and conflicts over the allocation and distribution of water from shared rivers and canals. The declining water table exacerbates the already existing groundwater problems, further highlighting the urgent need for sustainable water management practices in both provinces.

In comparison to most other irrigation-dependent nations, Pakistan currently has a storage capacity of only 15 million-acre feet (MAF), or roughly 13% of the annual flow of its rivers. Even this capacity is in grave danger due to the rapid depletion of storage capacity in Pakistan's major dams caused by sediment build-up (Pakistan WAPDA 2013).

The Indus Basin's overall storage capacity was 23.3 BCM, consisting of 11.9 BCM of Tarbela, 10.5 BCM of Mangla, and 0.87 BCM of Chashma, or roughly 14% against the world's average storage capacity of 35–40% (Table 2). However, because of silting and a lack of live storage space, it has been reduced to just around 15 BCM, a loss of 35%, which is less than what is needed for 30 days, well short of the recommended 1,000 days for countries of a comparable climate (Habib & Wahaj 2021).

Pakistan only reserves 10% of its river flows, compared to a 40% global average. Hence, Pakistan has a per capita water storage capacity of only 150 m³, which is considerably less considering that the United States and Australia have a storage capacity of above 5,000 m³ and China has 2,200 m³ (Janjua et al., 2021). Conversely, India, particularly the states within the Indus Basin such as Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan, boasts a considerable storage capacity of approximately 26 BCM. This extensive reservoir capacity translates into a per capita water availability of 184 m³, surpassing that of Pakistan (Ministry of Water Resources, GoI 2012).

A quarter of Pakistan's dam storage has been lost. India, conversely, has a 342.91 BCM storage capacity, a 925.12 BCM water potential, and a 120-day carryover capacity. Pakistan has a 15.64 BCM storage capacity and a water potential of 178.86 BCM. According to Randhawa (2002), Pakistan should have a water storage capacity of at least 20%, which is now only 7%.

In addition, to construct a storage facility on the upper side, a significant volume of water flowing below the Kotri barrage needs attention. An international panel of experts conducted a study in 2004–2005 and suggested an annual release of 10.93 BCM of water downstream of Kotri to stop sea intrusion as well as for protection against environmental hazards (Kalair et al. 2019).

Hence, Pakistan should focus on utilizing the excessive water below Kotri. According to the WAPDA, Pakistan, 43.17 BCM on average water is out flowing to the sea each year. Over the 35-year period leading up to September 2010, a staggering 1,350.52 BCM of water flowed into the sea without being harnessed, equivalent to the water usage of 10 years through canals. This unutilized water, excluding the amount necessary to preserve the ecosystem below Kotri, translates into a significant direct economic loss. In monetary terms, factoring in the 370.05 BCM earmarked for environmental preservation, the value of this untapped water amounts to a substantial US$ 149 billion (Sufi et al. 2011). Therefore, it is a very precarious situation that in spite of this, on average, an excess supply is not being put to use to regulate flows downstream of Kotri simply because of inadequate storage capacity in the country. Hence, there is a pressing need for building additional reservoirs for 30.84 BCM of surplus water going to the sea per year that could be partly used to regulate the release of 12.33 BCM/year of water downstream of Kotri.

However, there are some limitations in storing enough water. The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) Chairman Rao Irshad argues that the construction of the Kalabagh, Akhori, and Basha Dams can save Pakistan from massive damage during floods and can raise its storage capacity during lean rainfall years – from 8% of the total flow to 23%. However, others such as water expert Idris Ahmed Rajput argue that if the Kalabagh Dam is built, the water flow to Sindh and KPK will greatly diminish, causing severe damage to irrigation and water quality levels in these two provinces (Bakshi & Trivedi 2011). Furthermore, the formidable financial challenges associated with establishing a colossal dam structure must be taken into consideration. Although there are no straightforward solutions, Pakistan could strategically allocate funds, prioritizing water initiatives for a sustainable solution.

Pakistan faces a critical water management challenge, with significant inefficiencies in both agricultural and urban water use, leading to substantial wastage and unsustainable utilization of its water resources. Key areas contributing to this wastage include the mismanagement of water within the agricultural sector, reduced agricultural productivity, and inefficiencies in urban water use.

Irrigated agriculture in Pakistan accounts for 93% of the country's total water resources, yet over 60% of the irrigation water is wasted during the processes of conveyance and application in the fields (Imran 2018). It means that out of the 142 BCM of water accessible at the canal headworks, only approximately 55 BCM is utilized, resulting in a loss of 87 BCM, which constitutes 61% of the total. This loss occurs during the conveyance process through canals, distributors, minors, and watercourses, as well as during the application of water in agricultural fields. The deficiency in understanding irrigation scheduling leads farmers to continue watering their crops even when such irrigation is unnecessary (Soomro et al. 2018).

Along with this, the inefficient agriculture productivity in Pakistan also consumes more water for food production. For example, Pakistan's rice water productivity is 55% lower than the average water productivity of 1 kg/m³ for rice in Asian countries (Abubakar 2019).

Cities in Pakistan are increasingly faced with problems of erratic supply of piped water and unsafe and declining levels of groundwater. Additionally, over one-third (35–40%) of piped water is wasted through leakages and theft in the water distribution networks (GOP 2012).

The political economy aspects of water distribution to farmers in Pakistan play a significant role in determining the level of inequality in access to this vital resource. The distribution of water resources is intricately linked with political and economic factors, shaping the landscape of agricultural practices and livelihoods of farmers across the country.

In Pakistan, a big chunk of available water gets wasted due to the out-dated and inefficient irrigation system. Pakistan's irrigation system, originally constructed during the colonial era by the British, has suffered from neglect and a lack of modernization since its inception. The out-dated canal and pipe systems currently in place result in a significant loss of water supply, estimated to be between 40 and 50%. A comprehensive study conducted by the World Bank in 1994 found that the delivery efficiency of the system – from the canal head to the crop root zone – ranges from 35 to 40% (Zaidi 2015). This indicates that a substantial majority of water is lost due to issues such as canal seepage, spillage, breaches, and watercourse losses.

The ramifications of this inefficiency extend beyond the inadequate water supply for farmers, particularly those located towards the tail-end of the watercourse. The loss of water also contributes to the issues of waterlogging and salinity, posing a significant threat to the fertile land in the province of Sindh. According to the report published by the United States Institute of Peace, in 2010, 70–80% of the soils in Sindh are classified as moderately to severely salinized (Mustafa 2010). This problem has become increasingly critical, as the continued loss of fertile land jeopardizes the livelihoods of farmers and the overall agricultural productivity in the region (Zaidi 2015).

Along with this, the regional imbalance in the distribution of tube wells highlights significant inequality among Pakistan's provinces. Notably, Punjab relies on over 90% of the total groundwater abstraction, with 1.2 million private tube wells currently operational nationwide. A staggering 85% of these tube wells are concentrated in Punjab, while Sindh, KPK, and Baluchistan account for 6.4, 3.8, and 4.8%, respectively (Qureshi 2020). This disparity underscores the advantageous position of Punjab, both politically and economically, giving the province a pronounced advantage in water utilization compared to other regions.

Additionally, significant disparities exist between small- and large-scale farmers, with the latter, in conjunction with irrigation officials, constituting the dominant force in irrigated agriculture (Alam 2018). Large-scale farmers, particularly those with over 25 acres of land, directly extract water from rivers, leveraging their political influence to secure a consistent water supply. In Rajanpur, the scarcity of water seldom affects big farmers, as they draw water directly from the canal. In Sindh, politically influential farmers in Mirpur Khas control vast expanses of land serviced by two or three branch canals, primarily irrigating their own properties. Water misappropriation is prevalent in irrigated regions, predominantly orchestrated by influential farmers situated at the headwaters of canals and distributaries. It is estimated that approximately 59% of irrigation water is diverted before reaching the intended fields (Alam 2018).

The prevailing literature on diminishing water resources and inter-provincial water disputes in Pakistan predominantly underscores external factors as the primary culprits for the region's water-related challenges. However, this current study posits that domestic geographical factors play a significant role in exacerbating this phenomenon. The worsening physical water scarcity is now a pressing issue for the provinces in Pakistan.

In 1991, the four provincial governments collectively agreed to allocate water resources, assigning 69 BCM to Punjab, 60.14 BCM to Sindh, and the remaining 11.66 BCM to KPK and Balochistan. This allocation was based on calculations derived from the average flow of 141.05 BCM within the Indus system. The perceived unfairness of the water-sharing formula has been a source of contention since its inception.

Sindh argues that it receives less water than it is entitled to, and Punjab continues to stake its claim on the basis of ‘historical use’ (Ahmad 2012). According to a widely held belief in Sindh, Sindh compensates Punjab for water that Pakistan agreed to give to India in the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) (Mustafa 2010). Furthermore, Sindh often claims that the upper riparian state Punjab siphons excess water from the Indus River system through excessive groundwater pumping and canal diversions when this water rightfully belongs to Sindh.

Due to factors such as unsustainable groundwater extraction, declining rainfall trend over the period of time, and suspicions over the upstream dam construction by Punjab, a sense of fear and insecurity prevails in the Sindh province of Pakistan. This can also be evidenced by the frequent clashes and public statements by the people and policymakers such as politicians showing their dissatisfaction. Above all, the historical reasons such as surrendering rights on eastern rivers to India under the IWT also significantly contribute to this sense of injustice among the people in Sindh. Under the IWT, the waters of the western rivers are directed to eastern river basins to sustain agriculture in Punjab province. Hence, the province of Sindh found itself at the receiving end in the water equation after the IWT (Aijaz & Akhter, 2020).

Pakistan is a country that is largely dependent on the Indus River system for its water requirements. Since the Indus originates from the Himalayas, which is significantly vulnerable to changing climate, its river flow will be decided by these changing climatic conditions. Ultimately, it may affect the water availability in Pakistan.

According to recent studies, climate change will cause the Himalayan glaciers to continue to recede over the next 50 years and beyond. Kalair et al. (2019) go beyond to precisely locate the extent of this possible retreat. According to Kalair et al. (2019), the Himalayan glaciers, contributing over 80% of water to the Indus River (that feeds more than 65% of the country's agriculture), are receding at an alarming rate of 30–50 m/annum.

Mountain glaciers have all been retreating throughout the world over the past century, but the Hindu-Kush Karakoram Himalaya (HKH) region's glaciers are reportedly retreating more quickly than those in any other region. Because of the glacier area's rapid decline, the Indus River system's flows may drop by up to 30–40% over the second half of the 21st century (Winston 2013).

Climate change, a factor that the IWT does not fully comprehend or handle, exacerbates the issue. Between 50 and 70% of the Indus River's water is currently supplied by Himalayan glaciers. The rapid retreat of these glaciers brought on by global warming has changed river flows and made irrigation water availability unclear, leading to a general decrease in water and drying of riverbeds. Some recent estimates indicate that in the coming years, the rate of glacial melt due to the rise in global temperature will increase. This will cause a 40% surge in river flow. However, the average flow in the Indus River in the long run would be lowered by almost 60% (Briscoe 2006). Moreover, with global warming, the evapotranspiration rates across the irrigated Indus Basin are likely to increase, which will result in increased irrigation water demands resulting in increased competition for surface and groundwater among the provinces (National Research Council 2012).

In conclusion, the impact of climate change on water availability reflects the severity of the issue. The most critical concern for Pakistan is its over-dependence on the Indus River system to sustain its agriculture and other sectors. Since the Upper Indus Basin is more vulnerable to these contemporary challenges, it may directly impact the water availability in the Indus River system. By looking at aforementioned concerns, Pakistan should prioritize its efforts to mitigate these impeding challenges. However, emerging challenges such as climate change require collective regional exercise as they do not pay attention to political boundaries. The Indus River, a lifeline for Pakistan, flows through India. Hence, the effective co-ordinated practices will require both countries to strengthen the existing institutional framework under IWT. For that, Pakistan needs to revise its foreign policy and desecuritize the water sector for the sake of a peaceful South Asia.

The waters of nine rivers are shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan, but no agreement on how to co-operatively manage and administer the shared water resources has been reached. This might turn into a significant problem since ongoing irrigation and power projects in Afghanistan's upstream regions, particularly those that use water from the Kabul River Basin (KRB), could affect Pakistan's downstream water flow. Similar to the Chitral River, any diversion on Pakistan's side of the basin may have a detrimental effect on the inhabitants residing on Afghanistan's side of the basin.

The Kabul River, conversely, is fundamental to meeting the demands for irrigation, potable water, and power in KPK, the north western region of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. The river irrigates three districts of this fertile region – providing 85% of irrigation in Charsada, 80% in Peshawar, and 47.5% in Nowshera – and is the sole source of drinking water for millions of Pakistanis living around the basin (Majidyar 2018).

Since Pakistan is using a major portion of Kabul's river water resources, the country may face the risk of losing access to water should Afghanistan plan and develop new dams and irrigation infrastructure (Majidyar 2018). The unilateral development of a shared river basin by an upper riparian (e.g. Afghanistan) has the potential to harm the quantity and quality of river flows to the downstream riparian (e.g. Pakistan). Alteration in the freshwater flow to Pakistan could have adverse impacts on the livelihoods of much of the rural population (Hanasz 2011). Unilateral development, if not undertaken co-operatively, could strain already tense relations between the two countries (Hanasz 2011). Issues related to equitable water sharing between Afghanistan and Pakistan are highly sensitive given the historical border dispute and political instability in the region (Hussain 2014).

Thus, in the absence of any regulatory framework, the shared waters may start to seriously irritate the two riparian states (Malik 2019).

Water governance practices between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been a topic of discussion since 2003. Despite six attempts, including the Kabul River Treaty, USAID-World Bank Dialogue, and the establishment of the KRB Management Commission, no co-operative framework exists between the two nations. The Kabul River Treaty was proposed in 2003, but Afghanistan declined due to a lack of technical and financial capacities. The World Bank also offered to arbitrate a dialogue over water issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan but failed due to Afghan officials’ refusal to collaborate or share data. The KRB Management Commission aimed to enhance collaboration, build institutional capacity, and improve the Kabul River Management Plan (Lautze et al. 2023).

However, a comprehensive water treaty between Afghanistan and Pakistan can help tremendously to address disagreements between the two countries about storage capacity and dam building. Moreover, the IWT can be used as a model to inform the Af–Pak water treaty. Even though the IWT does not stand independent of limitations, it is considered one of the most successful water treaties in the world, let alone the region, and it offers a better solution to water-sharing than the absence of any treaty at all (Bakshi & Trivedi 2011).

Afghanistan is in dire need of developing its water infrastructure. The majority of Afghan's residents are dependent on groundwater sources but this is depleting rapidly. Afghanistan is unable to utilize its rivers to their full potential. The current water infrastructure has deteriorated as a result of 30 years of war. This lack of water management capability exacts a great price, worsening food shortages, unemployment, water disputes, and so on. The existing infrastructure is vulnerable to disastrous seasonal floods and droughts without the ability to retain and redirect water. Afghanistan also needs electricity because only 6% of its rural areas and 15% of its urban residents have access to it currently (Houk 2011).

Since Afghanistan was not able to develop its own water infrastructure on its own, India lent financial and technical help to his northwestern neighbour. In February 2021, the government of India signed a 236 Million USD deal to build the Shahtoot Dam in Kabul, which will provide fresh drinking water for roughly 2 million residents and support irrigation efforts across Afghanistan. However, this ambitious development is fuelling fears downstream in Pakistan that the new dam will alter the flow of the Kabul River and reduce the water flows into Pakistan, which could severely limit the country's future access to water. The Pakistani media outlet Dawn has reported that there could be a 16–17% drop in water flow after the completion of the Shahtoot Dam and other planned dams (Hessami 2018).

Pakistan has expressed its concern over India's investment in Afghan dams, as the Kabul River's water flows into Pakistan could be cut or severely limited by the storage dams, greatly increasing tensions in a region that is already on edge. It is not just one dam that is alarming for Pakistan. According to some assessments, which may be exaggerated, India has assisted Afghanistan with studies on the feasibility of a total of 12 dams to be built on the Kabul River, which could generate 1,177 MW of power and further reduce water flow into Pakistan (Hessami 2018).

While the Taliban takeover in August 2021 and the change in the governance architecture in Afghanistan has pushed these projects into the background, the fear of Indian involvement in the development of hydro projects in Afghanistan remains a major albeit latent concern in Pakistan, particularly so given its own unsettled and friction-ridden relationship with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Geographically, Pakistan is a single-river basin country, greatly dependent on the Indus River system for its water requirements. Since the Indus drains through the Indian territory before entering Pakistan, the Indian position regarding Pakistan's water security concerns remains indispensable.

Unlike Afghanistan, both countries have managed to establish a water-sharing mechanism in the form of the IWT. According to the treaty, eastern rivers belong to India for its optimum utilization whereas Pakistan received rights to use waters of the western rivers. The treaty has survived three full-fledged wars and numerous skirmishes between these two neighbours. However, the issue of interpretation of the provisions regarding the Indian rights to utilize the waters of western rivers remains contested. The sentiment of alleged Indian intervention in the flowing rivers prevails in Pakistan's public discourse.

Therefore, the study has attempted to analyse the secondary data available pertaining to the flow received by Pakistan through western rivers.

The aforementioned data regarding the flow of water received by Pakistan clearly depicts the trends and consistency in the volume of water (Table 3). According to the IWT 1960, the three western rivers, mainly the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, have been allocated to Pakistan keeping the limited scope for India to utilize waters from these rivers. India, keeping in mind these restrictions, has developed its projects in conformity with the treaty. This is clearly visible from the continuous and consistent water received by Pakistan from these rivers.

India has constructed three major run-of-the-river hydel dams on the Chenab River, with a combined live capacity of 264,000-acre feet or 0.326 BCM. India's pondage capacity for power storage is 1.5 BCM, but the current dam capacity is half of Pakistan's lowest flow period and well below the IWTs stipulated capacity. In the case of the Indus, the constructed projects by India could block 0.043 BCM of water from flowing into Pakistan in the Indus. India is allowed 0.19 BCM of power storage capacity on the Indus River per the IWT. In addition, with regard to the River Jhelum, although the cumulative figures are not available for storage, the lowest monthly flow in the Jhelum is 1 BCM, which is higher than that of the Chenab River, and its average monthly flows are also less erratic than the Chenab (Bakshi & Trivedi 2011).

Therefore, according to calculations, the current cumulative impact on the three western rivers of the Indus is not in violation of the IWT nor is it detrimental to the flow of water into Pakistan, even during the months when surface water flow is at the lowest. It means that India has been abiding by the terms of the IWT and ensuring a fair distribution of water resources between the two countries. This adherence to the treaty demonstrates a commitment to maintaining peaceful relations and resolving water-related disputes through diplomatic means.

In conclusion, the study observes that external factors, excluding the impact of climate change on the availability of river water, have a relatively lesser influence on the physical water availability in Pakistan. However, it occupies a larger narrative space in all discussions of water scarcity in the region. The real threat to water availability and its allied issues remain present within the territorial limit of the country. It includes contemporary challenges such as shifting rainfall patterns, changing and often unsustainable cropping patterns, and reckless groundwater extraction. These challenges deserve maximum attention and policy interventions to resolve them. If enough attention is given by setting aside prevailing animosities, it will certainly lessen the existing water scarcity condition among the provinces in Pakistan.

The present study attempted to understand the opinion of the targeted audience in India regarding the various facets of IWT, especially the Indian approach towards the treaty. Of the 132 respondents (91 male and 38 female), approximately 50% of the key informants had an academic background at the Ph.D. Degree level regardless of gender. More than 50% of respondents were above 35 years of age. Data analysis indicates that the greatest number of people who responded were working in the field of academics or former diplomats.

The thorough analysis of the data implies that the majority of the respondents are aware about the IWT and simultaneously hold the notion that the treaty is unfair to India. The key justification for the alleged unjust treatment towards India under the treaty has been attributed to the treaty's restrictions on hydropower and irrigation projects on western rivers. According to the respondents, this could hinder India's ability to harness the potential of these rivers for energy generation and agricultural development. However, while responding to India's options for harnessing the western rivers, many participants believe that improving the current water infrastructure is an important step rather than restricting the flow of the river water to Pakistan and utilizing it for our own purposes. This indicates that almost half of the respondents (49.5%) are vocal for strengthening the existing infrastructural capacity for the optimum utilization of water permitted under the treaty. Along with the emphasis on strengthening existing infrastructure, a significant proportion of respondents (31.5%) gave the opinion of revisiting the existing water distribution mechanism between India and Pakistan.

Regarding the modification of the IWT, the responses show a clear inclination towards the belief that India should seek to renegotiate or modify the terms of the IWT, with a substantial majority in favour (78.1%). This indicates a significant proportion of respondents believe that there is a need to re-evaluate the existing terms of the treaty. In addition, from the provided responses, it appears that a significant number of respondents believe that water-related conflicts between India and Pakistan will intensify in the future due to various reasons. More than half (55.5%) of the respondents believe that decreasing water availability and quality due to emerging challenges appear to be a common concern. They believe that emerging challenges are leading to a decline in water availability and quality, which contributes to their overall belief. Some respondents (33.6%) believe that a weak conflict resolution mechanism exacerbates the issues related to water availability and quality. This suggests that they perceive a lack of effective ways to address disputes and conflicts arising from water-related challenges. However, a significant number of respondents (44.5%) mention Pakistan's objections to projects on western rivers as a significant factor. This suggests that the respondents view these objections as contributing to the challenges and disputes regarding water resources. The lack of co-operative dialogue is also mentioned by several respondents (47.3%). This indicates that they believe that better communication and collaboration between relevant parties could help address the issues related to water availability and quality.

The aforementioned responses by the key respondents throw light on important aspects of Pakistan's water security. Since India is an upper riparian, Pakistan seems suspicious about the water it receives from western rivers under the IWT, a sole water-sharing mechanism. However, the respondents overwhelmingly rejected the notion of scrapping of the treaty (79.4%). It means around four-fifths of the respondents suggested modification instead of abandoning the treaty.

Unlike China, which believes in applying the Harmon Doctrine (asserting absolute control over water flowing from a country's territory) in managing transboundary rivers, India appears to distance itself from such approaches. The responses to the questionnaire also reflect this Indian approach of not intervening with free-flowing rivers. Out of the 71 respondents, only six (8.4%) argued for a maximum/entire share of water for India. This indicates a potential for co-operation rather than conflict in addressing water security issues between the two nations. Upon analysing the responses, it can be concluded that India's position as an upper riparian state seems cordial and does not pose a substantial threat to Pakistan's water security. This is also reflected in the uninterrupted flow of water received by Pakistan through the western rivers (Figure 12).

Water scarcity is generally considered a non-traditional security threat, but in Pakistan it seems to have turned into a traditional security challenge. This shift in perception is due to its considerable dependency on India and Afghanistan for freshwater equally because of Pakistan's long experience of military rule that has strengthened a mindset of securitizing all problematic issues. The River Indus and its tributaries flow across India and Afghanistan before entering Pakistan's territory. Additionally, the competition for limited water resources among different provinces and communities has resulted in social tensions and conflicts, further exacerbating the traditional security challenges faced by Pakistan.

As a result, it is a difficult and multifaceted task to desecuritize water in Pakistan since it includes taking into account several social, political, economic, and environmental aspects. In this context, ‘securitization’ refers to the framing of water as a security concern, which frequently results in a securitized discourse that might obscure other crucial elements of water management. Desecuritization includes taking a more comprehensive approach to water administration, management, and co-operation rather than just perceiving water as a security problem.

The threat perception due to dam construction and water diversion by upstream India continues to be reflected in the statements of politicians, academics, and media literature of Pakistan. Most Pakistani politicians, military personnel, and academics construct water security in relation to ‘Kashmir’ because this is how Pakistan's water security is most commonly framed (Bisht 2011). For instance, Waris Khalo, a member of the Punjab Assembly, claimed that India would remain an adversary as long as the Kashmir dispute and water issues were not resolved (Gupta 2010). Members of the Punjab Assembly also opposed the India trade transit facility and promised to continue to do so until the Kashmir problem and water issues were handled. The focus of Pakistani military doctrine would remain on India as long as Pakistan has unsolved concerns with India, according to General Ashfaq Kayani, who also viewed the water and Kashmir issues as unresolved with India (Gupta 2010).

In addition, Pakistan considers the worries over the alleged diversion of water by India to be an existential threat. Officials from Pakistan have frequently called India to voice their concerns. For instance, Asif Ali Zardari brought up the water issue with the then Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, in 2008 while the two were both attending the UN General Assembly. He informed Singh that Pakistani agriculture suffered as a result of India diverting water from the Chenab River. In reference to India's diversion of the Indus, an engineer named Fatehullah Khan Gandapur, a former chairman of the Indus River System Authority, implicitly defined water as a ‘weapon of mass destruction’ that India uses to turn Pakistan into a ‘desert’ (Baqai 2017).

Additionally, Pakistan has expressed its strong opposition to India building dams on these rivers. The Kishanganga Dam (330 MW), Baglihar Dam (850 MW), and Tulbul project, also known as the Wullar Dam in Pakistan, are just a few of the numerous Indian projects on the Indus River system that Pakistan has expressed concern over, and has accused of violating the IWT (Riffat & Iftikhar 2015). Pakistan has linked Indian water projects and dams to India's aggressive ambitions and charged India with ‘stealing’ its water (Sharma 2012). Pakistan believes that by constructing dams and undertaking water projects in key locations, India attempts to enhance its influence and harm Pakistan's ambitions in South Asia.

The aforementioned discussion makes it apparent that Pakistan has a generalized anxiety and mistrust about its water security. It seems that water flowing from the Indian territory to Pakistan has become an emotive issue linked with nationalism. However, Pakistan's alleged fear and suspicions regarding the intentional interventions in the waters of the western rivers flowing to Pakistan seem misplaced. In fact, Pakistan should divert its efforts on impeding challenges posed by contemporary issues such as climate change and changing rainfall patterns instead of solely blaming its upper riparian countries, because the real challenge for Pakistan's water security seems posed by contemporary challenges. Addressing contemporary challenges requires a collective approach, as the impact of these issues transcends national borders. By focusing on collaboration and co-operation with upper riparian countries, Pakistan can effectively tackle the real challenge to its water security. Hence, fostering regional collaborations with neighbouring countries, including India and Afghanistan, is an urgent requirement for Pakistan to effectively tackle these issues.

By working together with its upper riparian countries, including India, Pakistan can find sustainable solutions to address the emerging challenges. This co-operation would not only benefit Pakistan's water security but also promote regional stability and co-operation in managing shared water resources. It is crucial for Pakistan to shift its focus towards proactive measures and transboundary partnerships rather than solely blaming its neighbouring countries for its water woes.

In Pakistan, geographical elements significantly impact water availability. The persistent growth in population has notably diminished the per capita water supply, intensifying pressure on existing water sources and escalating water scarcity nationwide. Additionally, the prevalent preference of Pakistani farmers for water-intensive crops has dramatically altered the cropping landscape, with crops such as sugarcane, cotton, and maize gaining prominence at the expense of traditional crops such as jowar, bajra, and barley. This shift exacerbates the water scarcity issue, given the high irrigation demands of water-intensive crops, further burdening the already limited water resources and making it increasingly challenging to meet the escalating water demand in the country.

Moreover, internal mismanagement concerns, including inadequate water storage capacity and excessive groundwater extraction, have the potential to ignite provincial conflicts within Pakistan. To effectively address the impending water security threats brought about by climate change, Pakistan urgently needs to augment its current water storage capacity. However, this effort is entangled with internal conflicts, as exemplified by the controversy surrounding the Kalabagh Dam. A holistic approach is imperative to navigate and resolve these multifaceted challenges.

Along with this, it needs to be understood that Pakistan is lower riparian to both its South Asian neighbours, India and Afghanistan. Consequently, the riparian dynamics with these nations hold significant implications for the water availability situation in Pakistan. In the context of India, the IWT serves as the primary framework for managing the transboundary water resources shared by the two countries. Nevertheless, the treaty has recently emerged as a source of dispute (Lad & Jaybhaye 2023). India's repeated calls for a revision of the treaty have introduced uncertainty into this long-standing water-sharing agreement. In this context, both nations bear the responsibility to adapt the treaty to remain pertinent by incorporating provisions that address contemporary challenges, such as climate change.

In addition to the rivers travelling from India, the Kabul River from Afghanistan significantly contributes to the flow of the River Indus. However, a considerable portion of the water supplied by the Kabul River to Pakistan may be diminished as Afghanistan initiates water storage projects on the Kabul River. Feasibility studies for the construction of new dams are currently underway in Afghanistan. Consequently, it is crucial for Pakistan to negotiate an agreement with Afghanistan regarding water sharing before any disagreements escalate into significant conflicts.

The highlighted discussion underscores the imperative of mitigating these concerns, which regrettably have not garnered adequate attention. The predominant focus often veers towards external factors, particularly the alleged Indian involvement in diverting water intended for Pakistan. However, it is paramount to acknowledge that internal dynamics, along with external factors, equally exacerbate water-related apprehensions in Pakistan. Issues such as inefficient water resource management and a lack of awareness regarding sustainable water practices within Pakistan must be squarely addressed alongside external considerations. A comprehensive approach that confronts both internal and external factors is essential to effectively alleviating the worries associated with water availability and ensuring a sustainable future for Pakistan.

The study suggests the following strategies for water security concerns in Pakistan:

• i. The advancement of Track 1 level diplomacy is contingent upon a favourable political climate; therefore, it is essential to promote Track 2 and Track 1.5 initiatives facilitated by neutral organizations such as the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and International Water Management Institute (IWMI) as ongoing communication mechanisms. Initiatives such as the Upper Indus Basin Network and the Indus Basin Initiative seek to enhance collaboration among Afghanistan, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan in areas such as climate research, cryosphere studies, water management, hazard assessment, adaptation strategies, and vulnerability analysis within the Indus Basin, and should be further reinforced.

• ii. Given the scrutiny surrounding the effectiveness of the IWTof 1960 in addressing modern challenges such as climate change, it is imperative for both nations to engage in discussions aimed at revising the treaty to align it with current realities. A collaborative committee comprising experts from both countries should be established to investigate the impacts of climate change on the Indus Basin. Additionally, the initiation of a ‘Regional Water Data Banks’ project, modelled after the collaboration between Israel and Jordan, could represent a significant advancement in this context.

• iii. India and Pakistan should adopt a consensus-driven approach characterized by mutual concessions regarding climate-related issues to mitigate potential conflicts. For instance, the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, such as flash floods, poses a significant threat to Pakistan. In this scenario, India, as the upstream riparian state, should assist Pakistan by providing timely warnings to help prevent damage. Concurrently, Pakistan must acknowledge India's concerns regarding the design of dams on the western rivers. The unique geological conditions of the Himalayas contribute to siltation issues in the Indus Basin, particularly affecting the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers. The escalating silt levels necessitate that India implement dam designs capable of managing this challenge. In light of this, Pakistan should adopt a collaborative stance, allowing India the necessary flexibility to modify dam designs accordingly.

• iv. The formulation of a suitable policy is essential to transition from water-intensive crops, such as sugarcane and rice, to more economically beneficial alternatives such as pulses, vegetables, and sunflowers. This shift not only has the potential to enhance agricultural profitability but also addresses the pressing issue of water resource management. Currently, Pakistan faces a significant expenditure of US$4.4 billion on edible oil imports (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2024). By limiting the cultivation of rice and sugarcane to meet only domestic requirements, it may be possible to alleviate substantial stress on both surface and groundwater resources.

• v. Nearly 97% of the total river water in Pakistan is allocated for agricultural purposes. Various studies have indicated that minimizing water loss from the channels that transport water from distributaries and minor sources to agricultural fields represents a significant opportunity for improving the water supply to these areas. Currently, conveyance losses in distributaries and watercourses are estimated to be around 25 and 30%, respectively. Prioritizing to manage these losses could substantially increase water availability in the region.

• vi. Farmers should be educated and encouraged to use efficient technology for irrigation such as sprinkler and drip irrigation, which would help to save large amounts of water. Of all the modern irrigation technologies that are available at present, drip irrigation remains the most efficient. However, the use of drip irrigation seems to be confined to the province of Punjab, where it is not yet pervasive among the farmers. Hence, the government should come up with an innovative programme, including financial assistance, in order to enhance the acceptability of these efficient irrigation methods.

• vii. Pakistan treats only 1% of its wastewater, whereas countries such as Israel and Singapore, both water-scarce, treat around 70 and 40% of their wastewater, respectively. Policymakers should reconsider water management strategies by promoting the efficient collection, treatment, and recycling of wastewater, similar to the approaches implemented in Israel and Singapore. Such measures would be instrumental in addressing water scarcity, particularly in urban regions that are already experiencing significant threats to water security.

Pakistan is increasingly recognized as a water-stressed nation due to the ongoing decline in water availability. Numerous factors contribute to this predicament, which this study has sought to delineate, categorizing them into internal and external factors. The internal factors encompass elements that are primarily within Pakistan's boundaries, unaffected by external forces. Significant among these are geographical factors, including sustained population growth, shifting cropping patterns, irrigation practices, and insufficient storage infrastructure. The study underscores that these factors significantly impact Pakistan's water sector. For instance, the country's burgeoning population directly diminishes per capita water availability. Similarly, the inclination of farmers to cultivate water-intensive crops such as sugarcane, cotton, and maize exacerbates the strain on water resources within an already water-scarce nation such as Pakistan. Furthermore, the deteriorating water storage capacity of dams and challenges in constructing new storage infrastructure present formidable threats to policymakers.

However, these critical issues often take a backseat within the discourse surrounding Pakistan's water sector. This is primarily due to the securitization of the water sector, where it is treated as a traditional security challenge and linked with hyper-nationalism. Consequently, genuine concerns related to water availability and sustainability remain neglected. The hyper-securitization of the water sector overshadows the urgency of addressing problems such as inadequate water storage in dams and the complexity of establishing new storage infrastructure. This diversion of attention results in policymakers prioritizing other security concerns over pressing water-related challenges, ultimately leaving them unaddressed. This not only obstructs sustainable water management but also places the nation at risk of future water scarcity and associated crises.

In conclusion, adopting an integrated approach that emphasizes co-operation, infrastructure development, efficient water usage, and inclusive stakeholder engagement is fundamental in effectively addressing Pakistan's water challenges and ensuring a sustainable and secure water future for the nation.

The authors would like to thank Dr T. C. A. Raghavan, a former Indian Ambassador, for being a mentor and providing invaluable guidance and support for this research work. We would also like to extend our heartfelt gratitude to Takshashila Institution, Bangalore for their unwavering support throughout this research.

The authors have not received funding for the research.

Data cannot be made publicly available; readers should contact the corresponding author for details.

The authors declare there is no conflict.